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INDIA ON THE THRESHOLD OF DESTINY

INDIA stands once again on the threshold of destiny. One political phase is over. Another has begun. The struggle from which she has just emerged has been fierce and protracted. It really began early in the last decade and went on until recently, with three or four intermissions of varying length. The concluding period was the intensest. Thousands of men and women deliberately defied the authorities and when placed upon trial non-co-operated with the acting magistrates. Under the pressure exerted by the officials at every possible point, the campaign has collapsed.

I.—A single instance will show better than any number of words how this spirit has broken down: In the vanguard of the Civil Resistance movement was a Hindu married couple. The wife came from a distinguished family, her father being the Dewan (Prime Minister) in one of the most important Indian States. The husband, after a brilliant career at the London University, was placed by his Highness the Maharaja-Gaekwar of Baroda at the head of his medical service and later became the Dean of an important medical institution maintained by one of the largest Municipal Corporations in the country. They both felt an irresistible urge to take an active part in the Gandhi movement. Relatives and friends interested in their welfare counselled them against taking this course, urging, as a reason, that participation in the struggle would disastrously affect their worldly prospects. Neither husband nor wife would, however, listen to such advice. The wife displayed such zeal in the cause of Civil Disobedience that she was placed by the non-co-operationists at the head of the Volunteers, with the rank of Captain. When

her car issued out of the Congress headquarters in Bombay, Volunteers of all ages jumped on the footboard and crowds of admirers closed in around it. At a single word from her lips the pressing throng would make a gangway and her motor would speed by, carrying her home to her children, or, more likely, upon a tour of inspection. On one occasion a large number of men whom she had led into defiant action were arrested and sentenced to various terms of imprisonment. She, however, was left free. She made a grievance of it. Not for long however: for the very next time she flagrantly defied the authorities they arrested her. Upon conviction she was sent to jail, where she served her full term.

Her husband, too, in due course, was hauled up before the law court. After a brief trial he was sentenced to imprisonment. His friends in the Municipality succeeded in having him granted leave of absence for a period, otherwise he would have lost his post. His political opponents protested against that action and in time succeeded in making him pay the penalty for setting himself up against the Government of the country. Upon release from jail towards the end of the last year he found the forces arrayed against him so strong, or perhaps his resistance at the time was so low, that he went back to his job on terms that surprised even his admirers. In a letter he wrote to the Commissioner of the Corporation he solemnly pledged himself to steer his course clear of any movement that was likely to get him into another predicament of this kind. He would, he declared, 'devote the whole of' his 'time and attention to the service of the Corporation' and would take no 'part in outside activities which might interfere with or lead to an interruption of those duties.' He at the same time undertook to observe the various regulations, some of which had avowedly been framed to prevent persons employed by the Municipality from taking part in activities such as the Non-Co-operation and Civil Disobedience struggles initiated by Mahatma Gandhi.

II.—Even the instrument that that Indian leader used for this purpose lies 'damaged in the dust. Or perhaps it would be fairer to say that the Indian National Congress has been put out of action. Mr. Gandhi's political enemies would fain believe that he has killed the organization that on several occasions enabled him to try conclusions with a Government that, until recently, was regarded as all-powerful. That hope, however, may prove illusory. The truth is that this Indian is a shrewd tactician, with an extensive experience of conducting campaigns of this description. It has suited his purpose to put the Indian National Congress out of gear. He has done so deliberately, no doubt because he felt that this was the only way by which he could save it from being broken to such a point that it could not be mended again.

His principal adherents seem to be of the same mind. Unless they believe that, at the moment, the organization is incapable of standing the strain to which the authorities have been ever increasingly subjecting it, they would not be resolutely shutting their ears to the persistent appeals that many of their followers are making to resuscitate it. They are no doubt waiting for a more favourable opportunity to put the parts together and make them function as a single mechanism. Judging from statements made from time to time, the official thought seems to run in that direction. Direct action of the Gandhian type is probably in a state of suspended animation rather than being dead.

III.—The virtual cessation of attempts at open defiance of the authorities is nevertheless the most important fact in the political situation in India to-day. Earl Willingdon is master in the Indian household to a degree that no Viceroy and Governor-General has been for many years past. Advanced in age, in a manner of speaking, though he is, he has shown an inflexibility of will that would do credit to pro-consuls half as old as he. Once the negotiations were broken with Mr. Gandhi, he has been vigilant and relentless. Not a single battle-front has been neglected. Nor has he

given the civil resisters any quarter. The taking away of the war-chest from the Congress organizations has perhaps proved to be the most powerful weapon the authorities have employed in waging this war. Money, even when credited to personal accounts, has been confiscated if, in the opinion of the officials charged with fighting the movement under the personal direction of Lord Willingdon, it was being employed to carry on illegal activities.

The civil resisters have unwittingly provided the Government with a powerful instrument to be used against themselves. As a part of the non-co-operation programme a large number of legislators resigned their seats in the central and the various provincial legislatures. By so doing they felt that they had weakened the authority of the assembly. The officials were, however, of a different opinion. In their estimation these resignations had taken away an element that constantly gave trouble. They could therefore confidently expect to get through legislation that, but for this action, would have been powerfully resisted if not successfully blocked.

Lord Willingdon has certainly used the central legislature to confound many of his critics. Shortly after he had begun his administration they spoke of him as a man who talked with his tongue in his cheek. Pretty platitudes about the reign of law fell from his lips and he gave voice to his aspirations to be the first constitutional Governor-General of India. He was, at the same time, throwing thousands of Indians agitating for liberty into jail and ruthlessly repressing freedom of speech and Press. The measures he employed for these purposes derived their sanction from his own arbitrary will. They lacked the support of the legislature. These critics defied him to place his fiats before the Assembly and obtain its sanction. They did so in the belief that though men of their own political complexion refused to sit in it, there still were Indians in sufficient strength to reject any measures designed to put down opposition ruthlessly.

Many 'Moderates' likewise considered that the passage of the rigorous executive decrees promulgated by the Governor-General into the law of the land was not within the range of practical politics. Only through a miracle could legislative assent be secured to proposals of a Draconian type, without which British officials expressed their inability to rule India so long as they were confronted with the Gandhian menace. Lord Willingdon has actually succeeded in performing that miracle. The legislature voted him all the power he said he needed to deal with the Civil Resistance movement. Early last year the 'Ordinances' deriving authority solely from the Governor-General, which officials throughout India were using to crush the Gandhi movement, ceased to operate. In their place went into effect an Act passed by the 'Indian Parliament' which empowered officials to deal with politicals whom they regarded as dangerous, in as drastic a manner as they could under the 'Ordinances.' The instrument forged on the legislative anvil was, in fact, somewhat more potent than the executive decrees it superseded. Lord Willingdon's subordinates had evidently bent their brains to remove all the defects they had found in the old weapons—had concentrated their wits upon so designing it that it would meet contingencies with which the discarded 'Ordinances' could not cope.

IV.—The officials, under Lord Willingdon's leadership, have been successful in carrying the legislatures with them in their fight with direct action of a different kind. Terrorism has assumed such proportions in certain parts of Bengal that Sir John Anderson, who assumed the Governorship of that Presidency in 1932, was compelled to ask for drastic powers. Under the authority given by the legislature, the executive carries on administration in the Chittagong District—adjudged to be the nerve-centre of the revolutionary movement—in a manner that strongly reminds one of the military régime on the Continent during the war. Persons between certain ages belonging to the *bhadra log* (genteel) classes have, for instance,

been forbidden to ride about on bicycles during specified hours, in the effort to arrest anarchical crime. A fine has also been imposed collectively upon the citizens of Chittagong. It has been levied because the officials feel that the inhabitants are not co-operating with them in stamping out terrorism—that an effort is being made, and made successfully, to shield perpetrators of political murders and their accessories before and after the fact. The fine was not collected for some time after it was levied, in the hope that the residents of Chittagong would deliver up the culprits—a hope that remained unfulfilled.

Despite official vigilance, however, terrorism continues unabated. Three successive heads of one district—Midnapur—have been shot dead. Sir John Anderson's Government are, therefore, seeking still more drastic powers. A bill they have just framed is reported to provide the death penalty for the possession and manufacture of arms and explosives with intent to use them for committing or abetting murder. It also provides capital punishment for selling arms with the intent to murder, or to abet the offence. It is in addition contemplated to have the Indian Press Act amended in so far as it relates to Bengal, empowering the Government to demand security or to forfeit security or to forfeit the Press for the publication of prohibited information expressing 'undue concern and sympathy for detenus and convicts in the Andaman Islands.' If the Bengal Administration can have its way the Press will be made liable for the publication of the identity of witnesses before special courts when such publication is forbidden.

V.—It must not be taken for granted that the Indian legislators have been arming the executive with extraordinary powers of great potency without any remonstrance. Quite the contrary is the fact. The 'Ordinance Bill,' of which mention has been made, encountered, for instance, opposition even from Indians who have all along been opposed to the Gandhi movement. Sir Abdur Rahim, who at one time was a

Judge of the Madras High Court and later was a member of the Bengal Government, led the opposition to it in the Indian Legislative Assembly. In his view the measure 'aimed at striking at the political rights and privileges of the people.' It was his opinion that this was 'not the sort of legislation which would ensure peace and order, nor ensure the smooth working of the constitution though it may suppress certain manifestations for the time being.'

In the Council of State (the Indian Upper House) a 'Moderate' politician—Mr. G. A. Natesan, a Brahman newspaper-owner and editor of Madras recently appointed a member of the Tariff Board—condemned the Bill in terms just as strong. The provisions that were being enacted were, according to him, 'against the traditions of the English law and constitution.' The clauses meant for application to the Press had been attacked even by sober-minded Indian critics. He was sure that 'this legislation would worsen the (Indian) situation.' He warned the Government that 'Moderates in India were gradually thinking of reversing their policy.' This criticism was all the more significant because it came from a publicist who has the reputation of being cautious and who owed his seat in the Council of State to official favour and not to any electoral constituency.

Despite such strong utterances, the special legislation was passed by both Houses of the Indian Legislature. So many Indians, in fact, supported the Government, that it could not be said—as it could be said on former occasions—that but for the votes cast by the Governor-General's subordinates in those Chambers, the Bill would not have been carried through. Friends of the administration think that Lord Willingdon has at last succeeded in winning the confidence of the prudent-minded Indians. They have come to realize that the officials need support in dealing with the movements aimed against authority and have, in consequence, given such support.

VI.—The legislators have supported the administration in another move of hardly smaller importance. They have

ratified the arrangements into which delegates sent by the Government of India had entered at Ottawa, granting preference to Empire trade. The measure embodying these provisions was attacked in and out of the legislature on the plea that it would prejudicially affect Indian interests. Sir Joseph Bhore, who, as the Commerce Member of the Government of India, was in charge of it, agreed to have that issue considered by a sub-committee specially appointed for the purpose. Even when that body made a favourable report to the Legislative Assembly, the opposition kept up the fight. Some of the speeches delivered from the floor of the House were distinctly hostile. Lord Willingdon's Government triumphed, however, in the end. More recently they have come to terms with a delegation sent out from Japan to align Indo-Japanese trade relations upon a reciprocal basis. The terms are believed to have been so framed as to leave the English cotton industry plenty of room in the Indian market. Representatives of that industry have, in the meantime, come to an arrangement with certain cotton magnates in Bombay whereby Lancashire's position in the Indian cotton trade is to be improved. Though this arrangement is being subjected to severe hostile criticism, there is little doubt that the central legislature will vote for it, as and when Lord Willingdon's Government introduces it in the Assembly in the form of an official bill.

VII.—The life of the various legislatures has been extended so that elections may take place after the constitutional reforms upon which Parliament is working have been placed upon the British Statute Book and come into force in India. Attention is more and more being directed towards the new assemblies that are soon to come into being. A section of the Congress is strongly disposed to abandon the attitude of non-co-operation, at least to the extent of contesting seats in the reconstituted legislatures. The men who take this view talk, in fact, of capturing the constituencies and coming into control of the machinery that is being designed in England.

In this respect the situation is veering once again to the point to which it had reached in 1923. It may be recalled that non-co-operationists had, at that time, broken away from Mr. Gandhi, formed themselves into the Swaraj Party, contested elections, entered the central and provincial legislatures and offered strong resistance to official measures of every description. The Congress Party in the Legislative Assembly, under the leadership of Pandit Moti Lal Nehru—a born parliamentarian—was particularly strong. It managed to have one of its members—Vithalbhai Jhaverbhai Patel—elected as Speaker of the House. Until his rupture with Lord Irwin (now Lord Halifax), Mr. Patel wielded great power. The Congressites who favour the adoption of these tactics declare that the time would be opportune for a similar move as soon as the new constitution is put into operation. In their view the opportunities in the near future are sure to be far more valuable than was the case during the last decade: for whatever the limitations imposed upon the reconstituted legislatures and the members to function under those legislatures, the central and provincial electorates are to be greatly extended and the Congress, by getting the electorates on their side, can bring about *swaraj*.

If these men have gained from the Swarajist experience of the last decade, so has Mr. Gandhi. He listens to their siren song with a bland smile upon his lips. When they appeal to him directly to give them his blessing, he wishes them God-speed. He lets them gather however, that if they take that course they will have to do so on their own responsibility. They will not, in that case, stand under the banner of the Congress, nor have the advantage of drawing support from its party funds for carrying on their electioneering fights. This policy has driven a group of Congressmen to desperation. They profess to have constituted themselves into a party within the Congress and declare their intention of defying the Mahatma by standing for election. Sagacious man that he is, he refuses to answer them back. He, on the contrary,

insists that he shall have nothing to do with politics until the term for which he would have been in jail but for the action taken by the Government on account of his dangerous physical condition has expired. The few months' respite that this self-denying ordinance has given him, he intends devoting to a crusade he is carrying on all over India in behalf of the 'untouchables,' whom he calls *Harijan*—'God's own people.'

No more unpopular cause could he have chosen to which he would devote such strength as he possesses in his present emaciated state than that of washing from the face of Hinduism the blot of 'untouchability.' Orthodoxy has been driven by his determination into a counter-effort of the most intense description that it is capable of making. It realizes that the magnificent socio-religious structure raised by countless generations of their ancestors would collapse the moment the 'untouchables' are permitted to draw water without let or hindrance from the wells and hydrants, sit side by side with high-caste Hindus in schools and assemblies, break bread with men and women whom they have hitherto acknowledged as their betters, and even enter the inner precincts of Hindu temples. In a sense these reactionaries are quite right. When, in matters of eating and drinking and religious observances, the pariah is put upon the same plane as the 'twice-born'—as the three upper castes are proud of calling themselves—the caste system, as the world knows it, will cease to be. To them this social organization is an essential part of their religion. One cannot, in their estimation, exist without the other. Hence the need for them to put forth the mightiest exertion that they are capable of making to prevent the Mahatma from succeeding in the propaganda upon which he is concentrating his energy.

Whatever comes out of this struggle, Mr. Gandhi, by keeping out of politics himself and putting the Congress machinery out of gear, for many months to come, might give a new direction to Indian politics. If he was in a low physical state,

the reserves of the people he had led through the non-co-operation trouble were even at a lower ebb. They had put forth such prodigious effort at defying the authorities and breaking the laws and had undergone such privations, particularly in the jails, where many of them were treated as criminals and not as political offenders, that they needed rest and recuperation even to a greater degree and more urgently than he did. The suspension of Congress activities, at least in an organized form, may therefore prove a wise act—certainly not a mistake. It is, in any case, clear that a new situation is arising in India. If the Constitution Act that is expected to be placed on the Statute Book ere long accomplishes no more than to thaw out Indian politics and give an opportunity for the forces under the thin sheet of the ice of inanition to express themselves, it would have accomplished something worth while.

ST. NIHAL SINGH.

The Unitarian Movement in the Religious Life of England.
By H. McLachlan, D.D. (Allen & Unwin. 10s. 6d.)

Dr. McLachlan is Principal of the Unitarian College at Manchester and Lecturer in Hellenistic Greek in Victoria University. His book, written at the invitation of the Hibbert Trustees, describes the contribution to thought and learning made by a small group of religious thinkers between 1700 and 1900. It is arranged in four sections: Biblical Scholarship; Education; Journals and Periodical Literature; Doctrine, Philosophy, History and Biography, and Belles-Lettres. Prominence is given to Dr. Martineau as an open-minded Biblical scholar and this full account of Nonconformist Academies, schools and the Modern Universities will be read with great interest. The story of Unitarian periodical literature reflects the complex history of Unitarian Churches in the British Isles, and shows the intense interest in politics, literature and education of the liberal religious thinkers of 'a small community outside the main stream of Nonconformity, and subject for most of the time to personal, ecclesiastical, or legal ostracism.' The volume is one of special importance, and is marked by wide knowledge and broadmindedness and is an impressive record of two centuries of literary and social service.

WHERE IS SCIENCE GOING ?

THIS question affords Professor Max Planck the title of a book which has recently appeared in an English translation.¹ There are few, if any, who are more entitled to ask such a question, and, certainly, there are few who are more competent to answer it. His name, like that of Einstein, who has written a preface to this book, is one of the magic names of our time. These two names stand for the two theories which are to-day engrossing the attention of the scientists and of the scientific philosophers—the theory of Relativity and the Quantum theory. And of the two theories it is frequently suggested by our modern scientific investigators that the latter is the more revolutionary. Indeed, Einstein himself seems to agree, according to the translator of this book, that while the Relativity theory has captured the imagination of the world the Quantum theory has been a more fundamental force in bringing about the modern revolution in scientific thought.

Whether or no this is so, there is no doubt but that the Quantum theory has raised questions of the deepest philosophic importance. And it is with these philosophic questions that Max Planck is chiefly concerned in this book. The main issue is this. Does the Quantum theory involve the overthrow of the principle of causation? It is a familiar fact to students of the scientific and philosophic literature of our time that this question is frequently answered in the affirmative. Eddington and Jeans have given their support to the view that in the light of Quantum physics the principle of universal causation must be abandoned. And it has even been suggested that something corresponding to 'free-will' must be attributed to all the constituents of the universe.

¹ *Where is Science Going?* With a Preface by Albert Einstein. Tr. and ed. by James Murphy. (Allen and Unwin, 1933.)

Professor Planck has so much felt the importance of this issue that he is devoting a good deal of his time to writing about it. In a previous volume, *The Universe in the Light of Modern Physics*, published in an English translation in 1931, he had firmly maintained that there is no ground for the renunciation of the principle of strict causality. In the present volume he expounds this thesis in detail; and is supported in his contention by Einstein who, both in his preface and in the kind of Socratic dialogue which forms the epilogue to the book, emphatically declares for the same thesis. In answer to the statement made by Mr. Murphy the translator, that 'it is now the fashion in physical science to attribute something like free-will even to the routine processes of inorganic nature,' Einstein declares: 'That is not merely nonsense: it is objectionable nonsense.'

After sketching in masterly fashion the 'Fifty years of Science' which correspond roughly with his own work in the scientific field, Professor Planck goes on to discuss the question, 'Is the external world real?' Here he firmly repudiates the 'positivist' view which restricts the scope of science to the description of sensory experiences. 'A science that starts off by predicating the denial of objectivity has already passed sentence on itself.' For science is based, not on the dependability of the sense impressions of single human individuals, but on 'common sense,' which calls us to leave 'the logical pathway of the positivist system' and to enter 'the metaphysical realm.' And in doing so 'we have accepted the hypothesis that sensory perceptions do not of themselves create the physical world around us, but rather that they bring us news of another world which lies outside of ours and is entirely independent of us.' On the same issue, Einstein, even more emphatically than Planck, repudiates the notion that the outer world is a derivative of consciousness. 'We cannot,' he says to the translator, 'logically prove the existence of the external world, any more than you can logically prove that I am talking with you now or that I am here. But you

know that I am here and no subjective idealist can persuade you to the contrary.' Planck puts the issue this way: he says that there are two theorems which together form the cardinal hinge on which the whole structure of physical science turns; these are '(1) there is a real outer world which exists independently of our act of knowing, and (2) the real outer world is not directly knowable.' And the seeming mutual contradiction in these theorems discloses, to Planck, 'the presence of an irrational or mystic element which adheres to physical science as to every other branch of human knowledge.' It seems to me that confusion would be avoided if in the second theorem the word 'provable' were substituted for the word 'knowable.' I believe there is a 'knowledge' of a real outer world, but, at the same time, I do not believe that this 'knowledge' is logically verifiable 'knowledge,' or that it is reached by a process of reasoning. It is gained by direct consciousness. All 'knowledge,' whether of the 'real outer world' or of God, is of *faith*; in other words this 'knowledge' is, as we might say, '*non-rational*'—I greatly prefer this word to '*irrational*' in our context. The word '*non-rational*' to my own mind suggests the *absence* of a 'rationality' discoverable by man; while the word '*irrational*,' again to my own mind, goes further and suggests the *negation* of a 'rationality' which might, surely, exist to God.

These contentions were expressed by Tennyson in poetical language in 'The Ancient Sage.'

Thou canst not prove the Nameless, O my son,
 Nor canst thou prove the world thou movest in,
 Thou canst not prove that thou art body alone,
 Nor canst thou prove that thou art spirit alone,
 Nor canst thou prove that thou art both in one:
 Thou canst not prove thou art immortal, no
 Nor yet that thou art mortal—nay my son,
 Thou canst not prove that I, who speak with thee,
 Am not thyself in converse with thyself,
 For nothing worthy proving can be proven,
 Nor yet disproven.

Tennyson elsewhere—in *In Memoriam*—regards 'knowledge' as concerned only with sensory impressions, and this unfortunate use of the word sets it in opposition to 'faith.'

We have but faith: we cannot know;
For knowledge is of things we see.

Surely, it is better to recognize that in all human 'knowledge' there is 'faith,' rather than to confine 'knowledge' either to that which is logically verifiable or to direct sensory impressions. Tennyson, I think, was wiser in his terminology in *The Ancient Sage* passage than in the *In Memoriam* passage. For in the former he goes on, after the lines quoted to exhort us to

cling to Faith beyond the forms of Faith.

And in the succeeding lines he tells us what 'faith' is able to 'see,' 'feel,' 'spy,' 'taste,' 'hear,' and 'find.' If such 'faith' is not 'knowledge,' I do not know what language means. Thus Tennyson declares that 'faith' is necessary to our 'knowledge' of spiritual reality, as Planck declares that 'faith' is necessary to our 'knowledge' of physical reality. In both there is a factor which may be called by such terms as a 'mystic' or 'non-rational' element. Later in his book Planck says that every serious scientific worker realizes that over the entrance to the temple of science are written the words: *Ye must have faith*. In other words, science, to Planck—and to Einstein—is concerned, not merely with the *description* of mere subjective sensory impressions, but with a real objective world existing independently of ourselves; and the assurance or 'knowledge' of such an objective world is given us by 'faith.' This 'faith' in the existence of external reality he elsewhere in the book calls 'a metaphysical belief,' and it is, as he says, 'the cornerstone' of the whole structure of science.

This leads on to the second assumption that science has always made, namely, the principle of causality regarded as a concept independent of our sense-perceptions. Is science

called upon, in the light of modern physics, to surrender this principle?

There are many religious thinkers who would hail this surrender with profound satisfaction. Without this surrender they seem to feel that they can never be secure about Miracle, and can never proclaim *ex animo* the doctrine of personal responsibility. These two issues—Miracle and Free-will—are by all competent thinkers recognized to be the religious and philosophic crux of the modern controversy on the causality principle.

Now, Professor Planck who is, in addition to being in the very front rank of scientific investigators, a man of profound religious feeling and of penetrating philosophic acumen, sees quite clearly the two theological issues involved at this point. And it is, I think, obvious that he has little sympathy with those theological apologists who have been hastening to greet as a saviour of the citadel the modern physical scientists who declare for the 'indeterminacy' of the electrons. Some of our scientific thinkers as well as some of our religious thinkers have been making an illegitimate use of the 'Principle of Indeterminacy,' or, as Planck significantly calls it, the 'Principle of *Uncertainty*.'

On the momentous issues involved, it seems to me that two things need to be clearly and emphatically said. The first is that an apologetic which seeks to find room for God in the discontinuities of the electrons is an apologetic that will never satisfy the mind of man. It is too similar to the theology of the 'gaps'; and history shows that the 'gaps' are usually gaps in our knowledge, not gaps in reality itself. It may well be so in this case, though no competent scientist would dare to say that the time will come when man's finite scientific capacity will ever be able to close all the gaps. The second thing that needs to be said is that the 'freedom' of the human will is a question of a quite different order from that of freakish behaviour within the atom. What we call the 'freedom' of the will is known to us directly in consciousness.

Apart from consciousness we do not know what we mean by 'freedom.' 'Freedom' can only co-exist with consciousness; and, therefore, to attribute 'freedom' to electrons is *either* to attribute to them some form of consciousness, *or* to degrade our human 'freedom' into unmotivated chance.

This statement of personal views, which I have frequently previously expressed, leads me to the penetrating contentions of Professor Planck. He holds that the principle of causality, like the objective reality of the external world, is insusceptible of logical demonstration. 'Nobody,' he says, 'can be forced on purely logical grounds to acknowledge the causal connexion, because the causal connexion is not logically demonstrable.' By this he seems to mean that the thought of an uncaused event does not involve a logical contradiction—such, for example, as would be involved in the idea of a square-circle, or in the statement that white is black, or that the part is greater than the whole. He says, in substantiation of this, that we can *think* of an event having no explanatory, or antecedent, cause whatever. I have to confess, at this point, that *I* cannot *think* of such an event, and it seems to me that there is some confusion on pages 112 ff. I can *think*, to use Planck's illustration, of the Niagara Falls shooting upwards, but it does not seem to me that being able to *think* of any event happening otherwise than we have always known it to happen involves the notion that we are able to *think* of an *uncaused* event. For while I can *think* of the waters of Niagara shooting upwards, I cannot *think* that such a shooting upwards would be without causal antecedents. What, I take it, Planck wishes to say here is that we can think of the regularity of recurrence given to us in Nature as 'broken' by an exceptional or unexpected event; but that, surely, is another thing to say than that we can think of the unexpected event being without an antecedent cause. And the fact that men have in most ages *thought* of 'miracles' does not seem to me to disprove my contention. For while the notion of miracle has always been a popular notion, and

while *by apologists* it was held to mean the absence of antecedent causative factors, the common-sense of humanity has never acquiesced in the idea that the miracle itself was without such factors. Space forbids my illustrating this contention at length: it will be sufficient if I refer the reader to such a type of causal explanation of 'miracles' as has been always popular, and even regarded as 'orthodox'—the 'acceleration of natural processes' explanation. There are many events whose causal antecedents we do not know, or at least do not know in their entirety—as, for example, the weather we have had to-day, the 'shooting-star' I have just seen in the heavens out of my window, the branch of the tree that unexpectedly broke off in quiet weather a few days ago—but our minds immediately reject the idea that any of such events were without causal antecedents sufficient to 'explain' them.

Whether or not we are to think of the law of causation as being 'logically indemonstrable,' at any rate it is a 'fundamental hypothesis,' and it is a hypothesis unlike most other hypotheses in that 'it is,' as Planck says, 'the postulate which is necessary to give sense and meaning to the application of all hypotheses in scientific research.' As much as the real existence of an objective world, the principle of causality is an assumption that we cannot but make. There is something *in the world outside ourselves* which involves the 'connectedness' which our minds demand. We use such words as 'bond' and 'relation' in reference, not just to *our perception* of things, but to *things in themselves*. It is true, I suggest, that this 'bond,' or this 'relation' is not given to us by direct sensory-impression—just as the external universe is not logically demonstrated on the basis of our sense-impressions; Berkeley here is irrefutable *on his own grounds*. Nevertheless, this 'bond' is a hypothesis that we cannot but make when we think at all, just as the acceptance of an external universe is a 'faith' which science cannot but make.

This means that the orderly concatenation which we find in nature is, by 'faith,' believed in by us before we find it. It is not of our *making*, though it is of our *discovering*. Henri Poincaré said that 'Science is made with facts, as a house is made with stones; but science is no more a heap of facts than a house is a heap of stones.' Now, while this is true, it is also true to say that all science involves the 'faith' that the 'house' is *there*, to be *found* by science; the 'house' is not just *made* by science. It is true that the 'laws' of science are *descriptive* generalizations, that is, they *describe* the sequences which we observe in nature. Nevertheless, it is the 'faith' of science that descriptive generalization is not *imposed* by our human minds upon reality, it *springs out of* reality. Inasmuch as scientific 'laws' are our human *descriptions* of phenomena, *from the standpoint of strict logical analysis of our 'experiences,'* they cannot be other than subjective. Yet that there is a real relationship in reality corresponding to our descriptions is the inescapable 'faith' of science.

This 'faith' is fortified by the developing experience of mankind. The significant position is that the *predictions* which, on the basis of his 'faith,' man has made have been a thousand times fulfilled. What does this mean? If man, on the basis of his 'faith,' predicts future events—for example, the return of Halley's comet, the next eclipse of the sun, &c.—and if it is found that these events happen at the time predicted, surely it is impossible to escape the conviction that a reality external to man has been 'speaking,' and not just man himself. What man has said is 'true,' and only true, in so far as it corresponds with objective reality. No statement is ever true just because an expert, or, for that matter, a million experts, have said so. It is only 'true' in so far as what the experts say is a transcript of external fact.

But, it is said by some modern physicists—and the assertion is, as I have indicated, welcomed by some religious thinkers who are not physicists—the 'relatedness' of things

in nature is only 'statistical' and not real. This brings me back to Planck, and what seem to me, who am neither a scientist nor the son of a scientist, his answerable contentions. He holds that while some modification of physical laws is inevitable in the light of Quantum physics, yet 'the quantum hypothesis will eventually find its exact expression in certain equations which will be a more exact formulation of the law of causality.' He maintains that 'in point of fact, statistical laws are dependent upon the assumption of the strict law of causality functioning in each particular case.'

It would be well to ask, if we are to elucidate the issue, what we mean by *statistical* laws. A statistical law may, I think, be called a 'formula of high probability.' Insurance companies have, for example, their actuarial tables based upon statistical probabilities. These companies do not pretend to know just when Mr. X, for example, will die—indeed, the very fact that they exist as an 'insurance' company proves that they do not claim such knowledge. By the very nature of the case there would be no 'insurance' companies if people could know when they were going to die. What the companies' actuarial experts *do* know is that it is in the highest degree probable that the number of people of a certain ancestral history and of a certain physical constitution who will die in a certain year is in a certain definite ratio to the whole number of such people. Nevertheless, the fact that it is possible for men to formulate statistical laws as to human mortality—a fact that is evidenced by the soundness and solvency of insurance companies—shows that there is that *in the whole mortality situation* which makes it amenable to human formulation. The formulation is a human description, yet it is not, in the last resort, the actuarial mind that decides the description: it is existent fact itself. The human description may be sometimes largely inadequate, and it is therefore conceivable that an insurance company may become insolvent through, for example, an unexpectedly high number of claims within a given period.

But in such a case no intelligent person would dream of suggesting that either the total number of individuals or any single individual died without specific causal antecedents. The company's shareholders would blame the actuaries for not estimating all the contingencies; they would not see in an unprecedented death-rate the invalidation of the principle of causality. In other words, the inadequacy of a statistical law lies in the human formulator, and not in nature. It is his observations, or his mental calculations, that are at fault—whether through carelessness or through the necessary limitations of finite capacity does not for the moment matter—it is not that uncaused events have happened.

It therefore seems to me that to explain the correctness of human predictions by saying that they belong to the same order of 'predictions' as those involved in the actuarial tables of an insurance company in no way invalidates the universality of the principle of causation. As a matter of fact, *all* human predictions are relative to our human knowledge. We all confidently expect Halley's comet to appear at a certain definite time, but if it does not appear our surprise will only be momentary and superficial; we shall immediately conclude that some factor unknown to us has upset the time-table. In this sense, *all* scientific predictions, based as they are upon the 'laws' which man has been able to formulate, partake of a measure of uncertainty. Our *certitude* of the correctness of our formulations, and therefore of the predictions based upon them, is not the same as their objective *certainty*. We have, for example, a sense of *certitude* that the sun will rise to-morrow morning. But we have no *certainty* that it will so rise. It is quite *conceivable* that it will not rise to-morrow morning, and this *conceivability* is based upon our conviction that while all our present knowledge of causal connectedness leads us to expect with confidence that the sun will rise yet our knowledge of all the factors and of the whole situation is, and must probably always remain, incomplete. Nevertheless, while we are able to *conceive* that

the sun will not rise to-morrow morning we are not able to conceive that a non-rising of the sun would have no causally determining factors. Just as while we are able to conceive that some entirely unforeseen event may upset the calculations of all the actuarial experts, we are not able to conceive that this entirely unforeseen, and, even, to the human mind unforeseeable, event has not causal antecedents. Our knowledge of the fallibility of our 'laws' does not invalidate the notion of LAW itself. For LAW means our faith that there is order, relation, in reality itself; while 'laws' mean that we have been able *approximately* to describe this order, this relation. When our 'laws' have been shown by our further observations to be inadequate we don't give up our endeavours in despair: we set about seeking, *on the basis of LAW*, to achieve less inadequate 'laws.' In regard to none of our scientific 'laws' can we have absolute *certainty*; we can only have relative *certitude*. Yet we *know* that things are as they are, and not as we think them to be. The existence of external reality and of a real connectedness in this reality are the two 'faiths' indispensable to science.

The same two 'faiths' are as indispensable to religion. For without them we shall, on the one hand, always be visited by 'the nightmare of theology,' the spectre of illusionism; and, on the other hand, shall always be haunted by the notion of a universe of mindless CHANCE. The only answer to these two negations is to be found in FAITH in the REALITY of GOD, with whom 'there is no variableness neither shadow that is cast by turning.'

CHARLES J. WRIGHT, B.D., Ph.D.

*Didsbury College,
Manchester.*

THEODORE, BISHOP OF WINCHESTER¹

THEODORE, BISHOP OF WINCHESTER, portrays a man of distinctive personality and of broad yet enthusiastic sympathies. He was so typical of all that is best in the English Church that we rejoice with the brethren of his own communion in a memory so redolent of strength and charity. This Memoir does not claim to rank as a critical biography, nor does its deep human interest invite a critical estimate. It is a composite production in which the Provost of Leicester has collaborated with the Bishop of Croydon, the Bishop's brother. The book also contains two chapters written mainly by Mrs. Woods and there are numerous intimate appreciations, though one bishop strains to preserve the divine art of impartiality. A surprising unity has been achieved without a too strict observance of the canon which urges a becoming brevity to the exclusion of everything that is redundant and nothing that is significant. Yet if to feel a living presence be the supreme test, then *Theodore, Bishop of Winchester*, must be acclaimed a vivid and notable biography. To catch a glimpse of the Greatheart who moves through these pages is to be enriched and better equipped for service in one's own branch of the Church Militant.

Theodore stood six feet two inches in height and was proportionately built. He was once described as a man with the frame of a Samson and the activity of a disembodied spirit. His life bears witness to the essential truth of this amiable caricature.

He was the son of the Reverend Frank Woods, an evangelical clergyman, a great-grandson of Elizabeth Fry, and of Quaker descent on both sides. Judging from her full-dress portrait, the Bishop resembled his famous ancestress

¹*Theodore, Bishop of Winchester: Pastor, Prophet, Pilgrim.* (S.P.C.K. 7s. 6d. net.)

in attitude and bearing. His gifts of speech and even tone of voice were also reminiscent.

He was educated at Marlborough and Cambridge. From Marlborough he went up to Trinity College, in 1892, along with his friend, Douglas Thornton. The following February, during a mission organized by the Cambridge Inter-Collegiate Christian Union, he passed through a great spiritual crisis, not unlike that of John Wesley when he felt his heart 'strangely warmed,' which marked the turning point in his spiritual career. Thornton came up to Trinity fired with a passionate zeal to win men for Christ. 'Volcanic, impatient, dynamic,' he stood in sharp contrast to Theodore who was 'gentler, better balanced, full of humour.' Theodore, too, became an ardent evangelist and exercised an immense influence in the C.I.C.C.U. Later, he was elected President of this Union and in association with Thornton, signed the declaration of the Student Volunteer Missionary Union: 'It is my purpose, if God permit, to become a foreign missionary.' Various circumstances prohibited the literal fulfilment of this vow, but his friend became one of the greatest missionaries of his time and, exhausted by the sheer intensity of his devotion, died at Cairo in 1907.

On entering Ridley Hall, Theodore immediately responded to the influence of the Principal, Handley Moule, who had 'the critical eye of the scholar and the loving insight of the saint,' and with whom there sprang up an intimate and enduring friendship. Absorbed chiefly by his religious activities, he was singularly indifferent to things most prized by the average undergraduate. He left Cambridge without scholastic distinction and with little more than a hint of his future greatness.

On June 13, 1897, he was ordained deacon in Chichester Cathedral by Bishop Wilberforce. Bishop Woods believed that the failure of a parish is the failure of its pastor. This conviction seemed born of his own experience of the pastoral office. In his curacies at Eastbourne and Huddersfield he

was greatly beloved. He was naturally benign, friendly and courteous, and though somewhat diffident seldom failed to win on the first approach. 'I can never be thankful enough for knowing Mester Woods,' said one of his parishioners, 'I found my way through him.' Similar tributes were evoked throughout his ministry as in the case of another who tells that after an interview he had 'a sense of having met with Christ.'

He was incumbent of four parishes: St. Jude's, Herne Hill; Kersal, Manchester; Bishop Auckland and Bradford. And what is recorded of him at Herne Hill is equally significant of his pastoral work in all his parishes. 'He knew all the poor people, and had a smile for every one he met, stopping to shake hands with the roadworkers and never forgetting to ask about their wives and children.' His zeal for open-air work found expression in his association with the annual mission to holiday-makers at Blackpool, and also in parochial missions.

Probably nothing revealed the real character of Theodore Woods more truly than the spirit in which he accepted his appointment to the Bishopric of Peterborough at the age of forty-two: 'The idea of *me* being a successor to Magee and Creighton is almost unthinkable. Yet dare I refuse? If it is His Call I must not.' The present writer thinks of his warm and radiant friendship during the Bishop Auckland period. He recalls too a request to be remembered in his prayers when the Bishop was about to assume his duties at Peterborough. His humility and surprise were spontaneous. 'God sometimes deigns to do wonders with ordinary people,' he once declared, and if he allowed any claim it was simply that he 'represented the ordinary man.' In speaking at a meeting of the C.E.M.S. at Bradford he referred to his unfitness to stand in succession to his distinguished predecessors: 'Well! at any rate the ordinary man will be able to say when he sees me, "There goes one of us!"' Whatever criticisms were offered either on the

score of his youth or his scholastic attainments there was no misgiving about his spiritual stature. And he was swift to emerge as one of the great leaders of the Church. A London evening newspaper commenting on his Presidential Address at the Church Congress, Leicester, suggested that he had 'shot up into the ecclesiastical firmament like a rocket,' and that it was difficult to believe that but a few years ago he was only the vicar of a somewhat obscure parish in Brixton. It became evident even to critics that the preferment of the vicar of Bradford to the See of Peterborough was abundantly justified on the grounds of sheer personality.

With his Enthronement he soon dispelled the idea that a Bishop is an 'invisible object' and mainly inaccessible. From the beginning he proved himself a capable administrator, and refused to become absorbed in the routine of administration. His pilgrimages gained him the title of the 'Walking Bishop,' and he came in touch with parishioners in remote corners of his diocese. All his pilgrimages were carefully organized:

'He selected two or three deaneries of literally a rural type, with from twelve to fifteen parishes in each of them. He spent a week in each, walking from village to village, holding services in the church and the open air . . . It was a rediscovery of the village green . . . Side by side at some of the outdoor services were the squire, the farmer, the schoolmaster, the tradesman, the labourer, and their wives and families.'

Gipsies, too, attended his ministry. Nor did the humour of a situation escape him. He wrote of a war-time pilgrimage: 'Every house appears to look upon me as an adequate excuse for a good pre-war blow-out! The table groaned so loudly under the weight of good things that I fear the noise will reach the ears of the Food Controller.' Once, after a game of tennis in which he and the Bishop of London defeated two curates, he figured in *Punch*: 'Never say the younger clergy have no tact!' They were also partners in a memorable game at Leicester: 'Buck up Peterborough' frequently

shouted the elder bishop as he and Theodore, 'mighty with his first stroke and strangely mild with his second,' gleefully vanquished an archdeacon and his partner.

He loved pageantry, was not averse to publicity, and did not disdain the newspaper reporter. On a pilgrimage he was always clad in his purple cassock. He also took his pastoral staff for a walking stick. But he fed his people with the Bread of Life. Indeed, there is ample evidence to establish the claim that he was an Evangelist first and foremost, and that his supreme aim was to draw men and women nearer to God. All his pilgrimages had abiding value.

A keen observer, the Bishop was ever alive to current events and his pronouncements often revealed flashes of prophetic insight. Moreover, he never lacked the courage to declare his convictions. His University Sermon at Cambridge was a courageous expression of Christian Statesmanship and stands among the noblest of 'war-time' deliverances: 'The Prussian spirit of "win or destroy civilization" is not confined to the enemies of our country or to the great war of our time. . . . We must either lift our national life on to a level which the so-called practical man declares to be impossible and ideal, or we shall sink into a chaos of factions and antagonistic groups in which the nation's life will be fritted "away in hopeless friction and ultimate despair."' And again, 'The parties in the Church must be prepared to subordinate their several outlooks to this supreme world-outlook and its claim,' and he warned the Church that if she remained indifferent her candle would pass into other hands more worthy to hold it.

His deep interest in social and industrial problems led him to pursue the subject when speaking on 'A New Fellowship in Industry' and, again in Convocation, he pleaded with the Church 'to second the efforts to inaugurate a truer fellowship between all who are engaged in the industries of the nation.' He boldly repudiated the idea that Industrial Systems were outside the interests of Christ.

On the question whether Bishops should concern themselves with the moral aspect of things economic and political he declared, 'I am and will be adamant.'

Though not an avowed Socialist, he held that we were being urged, 'not merely by the spirit of the age, but by the Spirit of Him who is the King of the Ages, to rethink our religion, to repent of our corporate sins, to reshape our common life.'

His intimate knowledge of the miner's lot led him to plead, during the General Strike of 1926, for a more conciliatory spirit. In association with the Bishop of Southwark he wrote to *The Times* reminding the Government that 'there are moments in a nation's life when the sacrifice of strict economic principles to higher considerations of justice, money and humanity is at once worldly wisdom and spiritual duty.'

His equally outspoken attack on the vulgar display of wealth led his critics to dub him 'Class Agitator,' 'Socialist Fire-Eater,' 'Friend of Bolsheviks,' but he never wavered in his attitude. He was a keen advocate of the League of Nations and a passionate apostle of World-Peace. He rejoiced in the Locarno Pact as 'an answer to many prayers.'

Although one of the youngest, Bishop Woods was appointed Episcopal Secretary of the Lambeth Conference of 1920—an appointment which led to intimate contact with various bishops, particularly with the Bishop of Zanzibar, 'all love and fire and laughter,' and which seems to have signalized a clearer understanding of the extreme Anglo-Catholic point of view. The problem of the Reunion of the Churches, in which he was so deeply interested, came under consideration. A true Catholicity had long characterized his relations to Free Churchmen, and it was no small achievement when the Bishops at Lambeth, despite their sharp ecclesiastical differences, sent forth the 'Appeal to All Christian Peoples'—an appeal tantamount to a confession that the Anglican

Communion was not without responsibility for the broken fellowship.

Its essence and strength lay in what is described as 'its frank abandonment of the idea of an extended Anglican Communion gradually absorbing other Churches, and in its substitution of the far more potent vision of a truly Catholic Church, into which each separate Church would bring its own contribution of life and organization.'

The spirit and tone of the 'Appeal' created a favourable impression though it became clear that any insistence on 're-ordination' would not prove acceptable to Free Churchmen. As visualized by the Bishop the problem was 'to combine historic order with spiritual liberty.' He once said that if all Nonconformist leaders were like Dr. Garvie there would be reunion during the next generation. 'Indeed,' he said, 'I should live to take part in his consecration as a Bishop of the reunited Church.' He himself illustrated the true ideal of Christian Unity and to the end never ceased in his endeavours to further its consummation. In 1922 he was appointed joint-leader of the Mission of Help to India, an experience which gave him a new sense of fellowship in the Kingdom.

His translation to the See of Winchester created no surprise. At the outset he was faced with the problem of dividing the Diocese. And here again, as at Peterborough, his patience, statesmanship and knowledge of human nature solved complex and delicate problems. Here, too, he went on memorable pilgrimages and was no stranger to remote and obscure members of his flock.

In Church affairs and corporate councils he continually glimpsed ever-widening horizons: 'Copec,' Lambeth, Stockholm, Lausanne, were all profoundly significant: 'Can we ascertain the Mind of God in relation to the difficulties which beset us in these days?'

The Bishop's attitude to the Revision of the Prayer Book surprised, and probably disappointed, stalwart evangelicals.

It seemed that he himself had left the confines of a narrow evangelicalism. He had undoubtedly moved since his Bishop Auckland days but, as Dr. Selwyn suggests, his mind had moved not to fresh positions so much as to fresh sympathies and appreciations. That he came gradually to appreciate the Anglo-Catholic point is evident from a letter to *The Times*:

'The Church is, in fact, in a mind to be more Catholic; but it must be a Catholicism whose chief interest is truth and its expression in life, and whose confidence is in His leadership, who is the divine *esprit de corps*. We do not want a Catholicism which, like the Evangelical Movement in the last century, is suspicious of intellect and afraid of facts. . . . But we do want a Catholic Movement which shall be scriptural, large-minded, large-hearted: and this, I believe the Anglo-Catholic Movement in the main to be.'

He believed that the aim of Revision was to simplify the services and to render worship more intelligent and intelligible. He also held that it must provide for many angles of vision. In *The Prayer Book Revised* he admits that experience had led him to look at the questions raised from different standpoints:

'I was born and bred in the strictest sect of a simple and spiritual Evangelicalism, for which, as exemplified more particularly in a father and mother of blessed memory, I shall thank God to my dying day. But since then, if I may so put it, I have found that Evangelicalism and Anglo-Catholicism, in their true interpretation, are not incompatible but complementary.'

He fully appreciated the point of view which so sharply divided those to whom the sacramental approach to Christ is central in their spiritual experience from those who are temperamentally suspicious of any 'sacramental system' which may seem to come between the soul and God: 'To those who do *not* use the "system" it is obnoxious. To those who *do* so use it, it is in thousands of cases the very gate of Heaven.' If but liberated by the Spirit they would set their feet in a 'larger room.'

The rejection of the Revised Prayer Book was a great blow. He believed the essential authority of a Bishop to be

spiritual, not legal. He held, too, that the best cure for false doctrine is not the persecution of those who hold it but the persistent propagation of truth.

Bishop Woods was a gifted musician and had a life-long interest in music. On his fifth birthday he was asked what he would like for a birthday present and promptly replied, 'A music lesson.' His musical abilities were recognized wherever he went. He thought of music as 'a sacrament of fellowship' and spoke of 'the living spirit of the living God' as the source of all harmony—international, musical, personal. His crowded programme left him with less and less time for music. 'As to interests of art, literature, or music,' he wrote, 'I have much sympathy with a hard-worked clergyman I met some years ago: "I am leaving my music till I get to Paradise," said he, "for I have no time for it here."'

The Bishop's humour was contagious. He loved a joke, even against himself, and occasionally gave vent to Homeric laughter. He would sometimes remind his audience that he was once a slim schoolboy and on a memorable occasion at the Mansion House he claimed for Marlborough distinction in the 'mass production' of Bishops. Once he was conveyed fifty miles in the side-car of a motor bicycle by a Suffragan bishop, a notorious speed merchant. 'Thank you,' said the Diocesan frigidly at the end of the journey. 'But how did you really feel?' asked the Suffragan anxiously. 'Never again,' came the emphatic reply, 'never again at that pace in that miserable coffin of yours—why, even the cows on the road bellowed a litany and the hens crossed themselves!'

On another occasion after the Bishop of Aberdeen had driven him to a meeting, he commenced his address by saying, 'Here by the mercy of God I stand, after having been out with your Bishop in his car.' His correspondence abounds with records of his genial humour as when he wrote: 'I am going to play golf to-morrow with a Bishop several sizes larger than myself.' This 'big, burly, beaming, brotherly

man' had a strong yet tender nature. He loved children, entertained them royally and looked out upon the world through their eyes.

The Bishop seemed to tap unfailing springs of energy. What one of his friends describes as a vigorous and smiling vitality was a distinctive attribute. He possessed also the secret of poise—the attribute of an inward peace which doubtless explained his cheerful approach to manifold arduous duties. He was forthright and undismayed in facing difficult problems. One country parson said he preferred his Bishop's predecessor: 'He was a gentleman and left us alone.' But that rustic worthy was not conspicuous for his energy and stood rebuked by a Bishop all aflame. Another defied his authority but afterwards admitted that 'it was not just a Bishop commanding his underling, but a man of sympathy who knew his own mind and felt that he must insist on obedience, and I could not but obey.' He abhorred wire-pulling, and was obviously sincere and unsullied by self-interest.

He had great tact. As a chairman he was swift to appreciate every point of view and revealed a fine sense of perspective. He had judicial gifts of an uncommon order, was a master in stating the consensus of opinion and, as the Bishop of Portsmouth records, he had 'a marked capacity for visualizing great issues and for reconciling contrasted outlooks.'

Bishop Woods did not rank with the distinguished scholars and theologians of his Church, but he excelled as a Christian statesman. His gifts of leadership were undisputed and he was one of the foremost preachers of his day. 'Woods,' said Archbishop Davidson, 'is a most versatile man. He can preach about anything at short notice.' Yet he prepared thoroughly and conscientiously. The diversity of his public engagements was amazing: Public Schools, Universities, Literary Societies, Musical Festivals, Congresses and Conferences sought his services, and seldom in vain. His brilliant lecture

on 'The Spacious Days of Queen Elizabeth' at the Harrogate Literary Society was but one of many 'Specials' during a most exacting period. The Royal Hall was packed and his eloquence rendered the occasion memorable.

When preaching his intense conviction arrested. His words glowed with spiritual fervour. He had vision, a moral purpose and a large humanity; and he was a master of pungent speech and apt illustration. He proclaimed the Word of the Lord, inspired fidelity to high principles and never ceased to appeal for the application of Christ's Spirit to international, industrial, civic and personal affairs. Several of his books, including *Lambeth and Reunion*, *Interpreters of God*, *Great Tasks and Great Inspirations*, and particularly *What is God Like?* gained a wide circulation. His powers of appeal were significant of his genius and personality. Few bishops commanded such a wide constituency.

He fulfilled innumerable tasks disclosed in moments of insight. Nor was he unaware of the difficulty of keeping heights the soul is competent to gain. He must have governed himself strictly, even severely, to accomplish what he did. But he never thought of easing up, much less of laying aside his armour. He passed on with faith undimmed at the age of fifty-eight and left a rare example of one who had a deep sense of his High Calling. He held that the Church exists to unveil the character of God. His own words perhaps most truly reflect his spirit and attitude: 'By its character the Church exhibits God's beauty. By its activity the Church extends God's Kingdom.'

Many will be grateful for *Theodore, Bishop of Winchester*. The authors have rendered a conspicuous service. Insight and a great love have dictated this stirring record of a noble life.

B. AQUILA BARBER.

WESLEY'S DOCTRINE OF CHRISTIAN PERFECTION¹

I

THE New Testament, in its teaching on Holiness, makes three things plain and emphatic. First, holiness means cleansing from the filth of sin; to be redeemed is to be washed. Second, holiness is something in which one grows; it needs to be made perfect. Growth indeed and progress are everywhere in the New Testament the marks of the Christian; in holiness, as in all else. Third, holiness and love are constant companions, and explain each other. For if in Old Testament times God at once demanded and bestowed justice and mercy, in the Church He demands, He bestows, and He *is* love. Love is the authentic mark of that consecration to God which is holiness; it is naturally the first of the fruits of that Spirit whose purpose is to be the medium of the communication of all that God has and is to man. To these two marks of the doctrine, growth and love, we shall return later. Meanwhile, let us note four points in which, implicitly or actually, the New Testament leaves the Old behind. Holiness is now both actual and ideal. It is possessed by every Christian; even the schismatic and bewildered Churchmen at Corinth are 'holy'; but it is to be striven for, prayed for, longed for. No one would lightly lay claim to its embodiment; least of all Paul himself. Secondly, it is the union of the religious and the ethical. The ethics of the New Testament are *sui generis*. Not that they neglect or despise the virtues of other systems or societies; though on some of them, the New Testament writers are strangely silent. But all duties are grounded on the Christian communion, that sense of fellowship, membership in a great community, of which God Himself is the head, and of which

¹ Part of a paper read at the Handsworth Commemoration Service, October, 1933.

holiness is the very nerve or life-blood. Thirdly, holiness is the gift and accomplishment of Jesus; the variant reading in Rev. i. 5 exactly expresses this—*lusan*ti or *lousan*ti, to Him who *loosed*, or who *washed* us from our sins. And fourthly, it is the Holy Spirit who imparts the divine characteristics, and who completes the mutual character of holiness, wherein our consecration is met by God's self-impartation.

Now, John Wesley claimed nothing except a Biblical foundation for all that he taught. He was not a theologian. He was a preacher of the Word; and his success as a preacher made him the leader of a religious society. His first duty was to proclaim salvation from the Lord to dying men; his second, to guide those who had passed from death to life. What he found in the Bible he had to enforce. What he observed in his converts he had to recognize and to correlate. But he was firmly convinced that the two things would fit into one another; and if there seemed to be any discrepancy between the Biblical texts and the consciousness of his people, something must be wrong not with either of them, but with him. It is therefore careful Biblical study that will enable us the better to test Wesley's claim and to describe the characteristic doctrine of Methodism.

Let us now look a little more closely at Wesley. The influences which led him to the doctrine are set down at the beginning of his lengthy treatise on *Christian Perfection*. Of these he mentions four; Taylor's *Holy Living and Holy Dying*, which he read in 1755; à Kempis, which he came across in the next year; Law's *Christian Perfection* and *Serious Call*, were, as he expresses it, 'put into his hands'; and lastly, the careful study of the Bible, begun in 1729. In four years' time, five years before what is popularly known as his conversion, he was preaching on it before the University of Oxford. In essentials, his teaching did not vary. It was his regular custom to revise his earlier work; and his treatise on *Perfection* received, later on, some severe annotations: 'this is too strong'; 'this is far too strong'; 'frequently this

is the case, but only for a time'; 'sometimes they (temptations) trouble them not; at other times they do, and that grievously.' But he was clear throughout that holiness means a state of close communion with God, in which a man does not wilfully and deliberately commit sin; and that it is to be expected by all Christians who have been redeemed.

Wesley does not in this document mention Arminius and his followers; but he was avowedly an 'Arminian.' The difference between Calvinist and Arminian he was accustomed to define as the difference between absolute and conditional predestination—or 'the difference between Mr. Whitefield and Mr. Wesley.' The three main tenets of the Arminians were that the Atonement is for all; that Freedom of the Will exists; and that there is a prevenient as well as a saving grace. On all these three points, Wesley is entirely at one with the Arminians. And without these his doctrine of Christian perfection would have been impossible. It could only have survived as the Calvinistic tenet of the Final Perseverance of the Saints.

But there were three points of distinct difference between Wesley and the Arminians. First, he would have none of the Arminian Subordinationism; the tendency to subordinate the Son to the Father which led, along with a general rationalizing tendency, to Socinianism. Secondly, the Arminians did not themselves make much of the doctrine of perfection. It did not well fit in with their cautious and, as we may call it, semi-Pelagian attitude; it had for them too much of the clear-cut Calvinism about it. Wesley on the other hand, as we have seen, embraced it fearlessly, although he would not allow, as he protested in a letter to Fletcher, that every babe in Christ had obtained Christian perfection, just as in the same letter, he confesses the force of the question, Why do so many fall in love with Calvinism? But thirdly, and herein lay the real uniqueness of Wesley, he was in earnest with his convictions. He held them, *non ita disputandi causa*,

sed ita (if we may adapt the old words) *praedicandi*. Not that either Arminians or Calvinists, in his time or before it, were mere theorizers—very far from it. But while they argued for victory over opponents, he preached for the conversion of sinners. If a doctrine was to be of any value to him, it had to prove its worth on the hill-side or in the market-place. True, he would preach nothing that he did not find in the Bible; but if he thought that he found a doctrine in the Bible, but could not find verification for it in actual experience, he would conclude that it was not in the Bible after all. If he did not actually know of persons, he said, who had been perfected in love, he would give up preaching the doctrine.

It is not without good reason therefore that he quotes at large, in the treatise we have previously referred to, from the hymns which he taught his people to sing. The true and satisfying statement of the doctrine was not to be found in the tractates of scholars, but on the lips of humble saints. And the very controversies in which he was chiefly engaged were practical rather than theoretical; he had to face those who denied that perfection was possible, those who asserted its existence where love, as he understood it, was absent, and those who simply attacked himself. And he had all the time before his eyes the examples of his Kingswood colliers, slaves redeemed from death and hell, brands, as he loved to call them, like himself, plucked from the burning; and such instances of sweet and fragrant piety as he described in the instance of Jane Cooper, 'that burning and shining light,' as he calls her; 'both a living and a dying witness of Christian perfection,' who died with the words on her lips, 'My Jesus is all in all to me; glory be to Him through time and eternity.'

We must now turn to a further aspect of the doctrine, which is at once theological and (like everything that Wesley touched) more than theological; the relation of Christian perfection to justification. The question is not of importance

to Methodists alone, or even to Evangelical theologians. Its importance has been recognized by all the theologians of the West, Catholic as well as Protestant. We have to consider it simply as it affected Wesley and his followers. It was naturally felt to be necessary to mark off the two from one another. Justification was the privilege of every Christian from the moment when he became one. But Perfection was not given to every babe in Christ, as we have just seen; nor was it certain that every Christian would attain it before he died. To some, the separation may seem disagreeably schematic, like St. Paul's schematic division of human history into three periods, from Adam to Moses, from Moses to Christ, and after the coming of Christ. But the stages, as Wesley understood them, had to be sharply distinguished, even if later it were to prove well to modify the distinction. But, to quote his words again, 'by perfection I mean the humble, gentle, patient, love of God and our neighbour, ruling our tempers and words and actions.' It 'is always wrought in the soul by a simple act of faith; consequently, in an instant.' Yet he adds that there is a gradual work both preceding and following that instant; but, strangely enough, this instant, Wesley believes, is generally the instant of death, the moment before the soul leaves the body; just as to Dante, repentance, 'with one little tear,' could come *in articulo mortis*. On the other hand, it might come years before death, as it might come years after justification.

Four points are noticeable here, in view of much teaching about sanctification in the sense of the so-called 'second blessing,' which has often been associated with Wesley. First, love to God and man, which Wesley was never tired of emphasizing, it must be remembered, was the ideal of the Old Testament and was in the Gospels recognized as such. Secondly, this love is not the same as sinlessness; ('though,' says Wesley, 'I do not contend against the term'); but the possibility of error and weakness is expressly recognized,

and, as Wesley rather naïvely adds, credulity; for, he remarks, if a man is full of love to his fellow-creatures, it will be all the easier to impose upon him. Thirdly, the gift can be lost; Wesley will have no final perseverance of the Saints; his experience of his own Methodists was too wide; and no symmetry of doctrine had a chance against this. In 1767, indeed, impressed with this possibility of falling, he definitely retracts certain expressions in earlier hymns. Fourthly, in view of the possibility of losing this state of perfection, and of losing it, as he says, more than once, he sets down certain 'advices' 'to guard those who are saved from sin, from every occasion of stumbling.' The tract in which he first published these he called 'cautions and directions given to the greatest Professors in the Methodist Societies'; and it may be suspected that he had in view not only those who might fall, but those who falsely thought that they stood. These 'advices' are—to watch against pride, to beware of enthusiasm, to beware of antinomianism and self-indulgence, to guard against sins of omission, and of desiring anything but God; to beware of making a rent in the Church of Christ; and to be exemplary in all things, particularly in outward things such as dress.

It is when we consider these 'advices' that we can understand the real significance of the doctrine in the mind of Wesley. It has nothing to do with Calvinism. If it is perfection at all, it is but the perfection of the garden of Eden, where the inhabitants were certainly not lifted above the possibility of falling; and when we reflect on the numerous sins against which these 'professors' are bidden to beware, they seem, for all the perfection they may claim, to be near to distressingly numerous kinds of imperfection. There is so much about self-seeking and self-sufficiency in these warnings, that it is hard to think that those to whom they were addressed could know much about love in any shape or form. But he was the pastor before he was the theologian or the exegete. In an earlier sermon he had argued hotly that 'he that is

born of God, and therefore loves God and man, doth not sin'; and he there brushed aside with the utmost impatience the suggestion that the apostle merely meant to deny habitual sin; 'it is not so written in the bond,' he replied. In his maturer thoughts, if he does not 'contend against' sinlessness, he allows that this complete love may lie very near to some sin.

We have before referred to his claim that this perfection was an actual fact; yet he is very chary of stating cases of its occurrence; he is clear that many who seem to be renewed in love are full of faults of various kinds; he never claims such perfection himself, and in his brother's hymns, to most of which he gave a judicious but whole-hearted approval, perfection is a matter of divine command or human longing, rather than of attainment. Here Charles Wesley is at one with the language of the New Testament, and more especially of Paul, who, when he speaks of perfection, almost always will be found to be using the imperative or the subjunctive moods, or the future tense, but never the present or the perfect. 'Not as though I were already perfect.' John Wesley, indeed, does not appear to notice this characteristic. His exegesis was the exegesis of the preacher rather than the scholar. But he was true to the spirit of the apostle whom he so much admired. He could point on occasion to those few instances of perfect love that he would allow; but the real weight of his teaching fell just where did St. Paul's; on its possibility, or rather, on its unmistakable appearance in the New Testament as an ideal. That we are told to be perfect, or to go on to perfection, is undeniable. Therefore, perfection must be taken seriously. It is possible. It must be aimed at. It is like the categorical imperative. *Sollen* implies *können*. But, on the other hand, *können* implies *müssen*. You can be perfect; therefore you must aim at perfection.

To recognize this is also to recognize the solution of one of the great contradictions inherent in religion in general, and Christianity in particular. The Christian life on earth,

especially, is pain and grief and toil. Yet the Christian life here and now is peace and victory and life eternal. Or, more philosophically, religion here is a becoming, and yet religion even here is the partaking of the divine nature; the passage from becoming to being, from death to life. Or, more bluntly, imperfection dogs our footsteps here; yet we are even here the sons of God, and therefore we have already attained. These various forms of the antinomy are really one and the same; they have all of them to do with the relation between the *diesseits* and the *jenseits*. Is the real fruition of God on the other side only? Our doctrine would bid us reflect that if the end is promised, under whatever conditions, we have it and enjoy it now; we 'antedate' (to quote Wesley again) that day. We have our 'antepast of heaven.' This love is perfect, because it is love. Love must be whole-hearted; it must think of the other rather than of itself; or it would not be love at all. There is indeed growth; but it is not from the imperfect to the perfect, but *in the sphere* of the perfect. What I have is the full and complete gift of Christ. How can God bestow what is imperfect? But I shall know and understand and act on it more and more. Thus, by means of these elements in the doctrine as Wesley preached it, the contradiction is transformed. What might well puzzle philosophers was really made clear to hundreds of simple Methodist labouring men and women. 'Revealed unto babes.'

II

In actual practice, the great weakness of the doctrine of sanctification has been its connexion with the so-called second blessing, a condition in which attainment, both in experience and conduct, was regarded as so complete that there was no place left for further growth. Wesley had constantly to protest against this claim. Even in those in whom he found the gift of perfect love, he did not speak of the level of perfection; and he knew that many who claimed it were living

below the level reached by even beginners in Christ. We need hardly point out that there is no Biblical foundation for such a conception as this; it is as far from scriptural holiness as from Wesley's own Christian perfection. And if it has developed out of a distorted view of holiness and perfect love, its extravagances would be at once cut down if due stress were laid on the elements of devotion and cleansing which Wesley so properly made his own.

But it is possible and valuable to look at the question from a wider standpoint. For, when all necessary deductions have been made, it would seem that the doctrine, as Wesley preached it, is the most significant thing in modern Protestantism. To most people, Protestantism means either Lutheranism or Calvinism; at present, the majority of Anglicans, in England and America, would repudiate the title Protestant altogether. Both Lutherans and Calvinists would stand solidly for the doctrine of justification by faith. Whatever differences of interpretation or colour each would exhibit, justification by faith is the sheet anchor of Protestant evangelicalism, and he would be a bold man who would attempt to minimize its historic importance. But this importance must not blind us to the fact that both the communions professing it have lost their original vigour and formidable aggressive strength.

The Lutherans, concentrating doctrinally on the great watchword of *sola fide*, and making it the test for their acceptance or rejection of theological tenets, institutions, and even of books in Holy Scripture, have in practice come to cling to the protection of the State. The principle, *cujus regio, ejus religio*, originally a passionate claim for freedom of worship and thought, gradually became a cry of conservatism, both in doctrine and in politics. The accepted tenets might be dissected minutely; nothing fresh was to be welcomed. Any change in the general system was to be deprecated. What life and vigour there was in Lutheranism in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was found mainly in Pietism.

The characters it produced were rare and beautiful, of a type very similar to the type in England represented by George Herbert and the community at Little Gidding. But it could not be called aggressive; in spite of its tender and melodious hymns, its appeal to the common people was almost negligible.

Calvinism, on the other hand, with its much more militant war-cry of *solī Deo gloria*, was the fighting force of Protestantism from the beginning. Its political leaders as a whole were far more high-spirited and single-minded than the majority of the Lutheran champions. Instead of leaning on the State, it set itself to create a state to embody its principles. Attacked as Lutheranism was never attacked, it broke the power of its enemies on every battle-field it fought. Thus, while Lutheran Germany formed the great and solid bulk of Protestant Europe, it was the Calvinist warriors in Holland, France, Scotland and England, with the Calvinist state in Geneva, to which they all looked as to a mother, which drove back the menace of the Counter-Reformation. But when the campaigning was over and the threats of persecution had died down, Calvinism, too, began to settle on its lees; more anxious to preserve the purity of its doctrine than to glorify God by bringing sinners to the Saviour. In fact, both Lutheranism and Calvinism suffered from the success by which they had built up Protestant communities. Their members, born into a community which was at once a State and a Church, could not logically be appealed to to leave the far country and as returning sinners seek their Father's grace.

We must not forget the criticism of Calvinism put forward by the Arminians. Redemption is for all; man can co-operate with God. God is no austere judge or tyrant, but a heavenly being who can be understood and approached. But Arminianism had no more of a popular appeal than Calvinism itself, until it crossed the North Sea and was taken up by Wesley. It would be unjust to overlook the influence on Wesley of Herrnhut; but what gave his preaching its real

impetus was Arminian Protestantism, with the significant addition of his own teaching of perfection. Perfection, like redemption, is for all. The new life is not a matter of what may be called in grammatical language the comparative degree; it is not a matter of fewer sins, more righteousness; it is a life which sees sin overcome, expelled; and righteousness, the faith that works by love, seated without a rival on the throne of the repentant sinner's heart. In fact, it may be urged that here for the first time came the true positive note into the preaching of Protestantism. Deliverance from sin through the blood of Christ was common to both Protestantism and its ancient rival; the only difference—confessedly, an enormous one—was that this deliverance was not mediated, so said the Protestants, by a hierarchy and an ecclesiastical institution. All the practices enjoined by that institution on the faithful, therefore, came automatically to an end, or were greatly simplified; beyond that, in his daily life, the earnest Protestant had to struggle much as his Catholic brother, though with less certainty as to his final victory. Wesley completely changed the face of that struggle. To listen to him was not simply to learn the importance of the individual's personal acceptance of salvation, which might or might not issue in peace and holiness; it was to be confronted with a new life, a new assurance of salvation, a new consciousness of goodness. And the result was the starting of a new movement, unexampled in Protestantism, or, for that matter, in the Catholicism of the past; a movement which was quite different from the spread of the monastic revival, and to which only the rise of the various pre-Reformation sects was at all comparable. Certainly neither Lutheranism nor Calvinism had known anything like it; and it is not too much to say that with its thirty millions or so it has changed the face of the world.

W. F. LOFTHOUSE, M.A., D.D.

CAN GOD BE KNOWN ?

AGNOSTICISM is perhaps the most common of all attitudes towards religion in modern Christendom. It represents a refuge, at once intellectual and yet modest, to which the earnest-minded who pride themselves upon being devotees of truth are particularly drawn. They do not like the blatancy of atheism which they think is as objectionably dogmatic as is religious belief. They find in agnosticism an atmosphere of suspended judgement which leaves a way open for retreat back to religion should conviction eventually arrive, and a way open to atheism should the incidence of proof fall in that direction. Agnosticism is essentially a refuge of the bewildered yet honest soul, and it was first coined as a term by one of the most honest minds ever devoted to science, Thomas Huxley. He introduced the term to the world in the following passage :

‘When I reached intellectual maturity and began to ask myself whether I was an atheist, a theist, or a Pantheist, a materialist, or an idealist, a Christian or a Freethinker, I found the more I learned and reflected the less ready was I to answer. The one thing in which most of these good people were agreed was the one thing in which I differed from them. They were quite sure they had attained a certain gnosis—had more or less successfully solved the problem of existence—whilst I was quite sure I had not, and that the problem was insoluble. So I took thought and invented what I conceived to be the proper title—“Agnostic.”’

The simple meaning of this term, of course, is ‘one who cannot know.’ It is rather a pity that Huxley allowed this little measure of dogmatism to escape him in the coining of his term. He was perhaps thinking of the inscription upon the Athenian altar to which St. Paul refers in the Acts of the Apostles, ‘To the Unknown God,’ but the Greek word there is ‘agnostos=unknown,’ ‘agnosticos’ would mean more than unknown, it would mean ‘apt not to be known,’ ‘unknowable.’ Whilst this is the literal meaning of the word

'agnostic' it is probably true that many people call themselves agnostic who simply mean to indicate that they have found God unknowable up to the present. We need not trouble to be too precise about our terms since our challenge is direct and clear to both positions, to those who say that God is unknown, and to those who say that He is unknowable.

Huxley based his position as an agnostic on David Hume's famous phenomenal theory of existence. Hume denied the reality of mind or soul, declaring that we are all mere bundles of thoughts and feelings which have no real bond linking them together, the ego is an illusion born of the relativeness to one another in these passing thoughts and feelings. The logical result of this theory is materialism rather than Agnosticism since with the denial of the soul, religion and the question of God's existence, become utterly irrelevant. Huxley seems to have recoiled instinctively from materialism, which has always had a depressing effect upon scientists, even Tyndall declaring it was not in his best moments that he found the theory acceptable.

It was Herbert Spencer who gave to Agnosticism a philosophic background, incidentally, at the same time ringing the deathknell of atheism by his famous argument for the existence of the soul and of God. In his *First Principles* Spencer taught that our sense of finitude can only be explained by the existence of an Infinite and that our sense of the imperfect can only be explained by the existence of the perfect, so that the Infinite and the Perfect do actually exist. It is this indubitable fact for Spencer which prevents his being an atheist, yet with a curious perversity the philosopher goes on to argue that this God who indubitably exists and registers Himself in our finitude and imperfection is utterly unknowable in Himself. Religion must be content with what he calls 'awe of the unknowable.'

Professor Ward, in his *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, has accounted philosophically for Herbert Spencer. The important fact for us is that Spencer's philosophic attitude has become

a fashionable and all too popular cult which, upon a basis of apparent reverence for God, relegates religion to the category of superstition on the plea that God is too great to be known. It is this popular Agnosticism that needs to be dealt with drastically.

The first point to be made is that Herbert Spencer is thinking of God in His absolute and unrelated Being when he refers to Him as unknowable. No one, of course, need quarrel with such a view. An unrelated being would be *ipso facto* unknown and unknowable; we only know those things which come into some degree of relation to us. Christianity, however, has never claimed to know an unrelated God, and has no particular interest in knowing such a being. The God of our faith is a Creator, one who brought the world, and ourselves into existence. At that point His Absoluteness was modified and in so far as we know ourselves and the world we must know something of Him, *in His relation to His creation*. Seeing, moreover, that in this creation the highest thing that we can discover is personality, we know of the Creator that He is at least personal, and if we can feel it to be true that the highest thing we know in personality is Jesus Christ then we can go on to say that we know of this related Creator that He is at least not less than Christ. There is a tremendous irrelevancy therefore in philosophical Agnosticism. It is fighting a shadow, championing an immense abstraction, it refers to God in a form in which religion is only very remotely interested.

We must, however, come to closer grips with the popular form of this philosophical irrelevancy.

POPULAR MISUNDERSTANDINGS.—The philosophy of the Schools is perpetually filtering through at last to the lay mind and becoming an atmosphere of general thought and a vague prejudice in the general mind. There is not the slightest doubt that in this way Science and Agnosticism have become all too closely allied in the popular mind. The shrug of the shoulders of the sceptical Science master in the

High School as some senior scholar asks a question bearing on the issue between religion and science is far more damaging than a long laboured argument versus religion would be. It creates an atmosphere of unbelief. Nor can we ignore the large numbers of people who shelter mental inefficiency and cowardice behind the Agnostic theory. No blight is more prevalent in the world than mental sloth. The common catchwords, 'Nobody knows,' 'See how they all differ,' 'How can anybody really tell?' 'When doctors disagree who shall decide?' and so on, become so many excuses for drifting into a practical Agnosticism. Nor is the situation helped by those who, like certain Roman Catholic apologists, harp on the instability of the findings of Science, showing for example, the way Ptolemy has given place to Copernicus, and Copernicus to Newton, and Newton to Einstein. To add scepticism of scientific knowledge to scepticism of the knowledge of God in the interests of blank theological dogma is only to make confusion worse confounded and recoils at last very heavily upon religious belief. It cannot be too strongly realized that faith cannot be held for long against the strain of daily life without some real support in reason and knowledge. The wear and tear of life are too heavy and if the mind has made an unconvinced and essentially cowardly mental surrender to theological dogma as the basis of its faith, it knows secretly that the foundation is insecure and at some crucial time in moral temptation that sense of the essential insecurity of the foundation will produce collapse. What then can we say in reply to popular Agnosticism?

1. *The assumption of reverence that Agnosticism makes regarding the majesty of the Infinite is a specious one.* It may appear more humble and more reasonable to acknowledge the mystery of the Divine Being to the point of saying, 'We can know nothing about Him' than it does to make a definite statement about the character of God. But a little closer explanation shows this to be an illusion. Agnosticism admits elaborately the Divine reality and wonder and then solemnly

sets up a barrier to both. This Marvellous Being cannot make Himself known to His highest type of creatures. As Chesterton put it once, 'For Agnosticism, God is too great for a little child ever to know Him.' It is not irreverent to go on to say that if that be true so much the worse for God! Such a Creator is missing something vital and exquisitely lovely in His own Universe. Surely a God who cares enough to create must care enough to make Himself known by His highest creatures. Surely, therefore, it is more rational to believe in the greatness of God to the point of His perfect self-revelation and to believe with Browning,

So the All Great were the All Loving too,
So through the thunder comes a human voice
Saying, O heart I made, a heart beats here!

2. *Christianity is essentially a religion of faith, but of faith operating upon the basis of knowledge.* Agnosticism treats faith as illusory unless it is based on the senses. But there is more than one way to knowledge and we must not be blind to the degree in which faith enters into every one of those different forms of knowledge. The fundamental element in all faith is confidence, and as confidence faith enters into human knowledge in three ways:

- (a) *Confidence in the instrument of knowledge.* Unless we can believe in the correct registering of our senses we are indeed lost and astray. Even the Agnostic must trust his senses before he can have any confidence in the knowledge they impart. But again, we must have confidence in the power of our instrument of knowledge to draw correct inferences from the testimony of the senses. It is quite true that we are often at sea in the act of inference because of our failure to observe the laws of thought, but the laws of thought are there, and their superior logic does at least convince the honest mind. The laws of thought can only do this, however, on a basis of real trust.

- (b) *Confidence in the intelligibility of the Universe.* Even the measure of perseverance shown by Agnostics in the pursuit of fact and truth is strictly based upon the assumption that the world with which it is dealing is rational and intelligible. To persevere in what is a hopeless puzzle is not scientific, it is insane.
- (c) *Confidence in the results of the operations of the mind.* It is true that we may have to correct former impressions from time to time as in the development of all the Sciences. Nevertheless, the fact that the Sciences do make definite progress is amply proved by the ever increasing addition they make to the amenities of everyday life.

We may safely demand from the agnostic therefore a greater respect for faith, especially as we proceed further to show that *different kinds of facts demand different ways of knowledge*. For example, how do we know when a triangle is an isosceles one? The answer, of course, is very simple, we know it by measurement, by the application of the foot-rule; we can recognize it by sight; it is a sense-phenomenon. But if we proceed to ask the question, 'How do you know that your mother is a good woman?' the very last thing that we would use to confirm the fact is a foot-rule! The observation of the senses may enter into the fact as far as the observation of her deeds is concerned, or the judgement of her appearance, but other and more subtle elements are much more decisive, such as an estimate of the moral values of her ideas and speech, and action. Incidentally, a large amount of trust as to secret motives enters into such a judgement.

Suppose we go on to ask a third question, 'Is it wrong to tell a lie?' How do we know? Again the foot-rule and test-tube and all the apparatus of the

senses and the laboratory are out of place. Perhaps the simplest answer to such a question is that our total system receives a shock when that system departs from reality; the fundamental instinct of self-preservation is outraged; even when we may be telling a lie to save ourselves from danger we know instinctively that we are only escaping one danger by falling into another. Lying arouses fear; it is like leaning on a post that you know is not there. Even when you are busy justifying the lie you are doing so because you know it is wrong.

In his most valuable volume *Reality*, Canon Streeter has pointed out that there is a definite division of labour undertaken by science and religion in relation to human knowledge. Science deals always with quantities, with that which is measurable; religion deals always with qualities, with that which is immeasurable. Now it is just in this distinction that we get to the crux of our argument for religion, because knowledge of personality calls particularly for the exercise of just such an imponderable and immeasurable quality called 'faith.' We do not approach one another with any probable degree of successful knowledge and understanding unless we approach one another in a spirit of confident trustfulness, leaving each other plenty of room for self-expression. Now what applies to our knowledge of one another because we are persons must therefore apply to God, if He be a person. If there be a God, as Herbert Spencer says there is, and if He is a personal God, which is a rational judgement seeing that personality must have its origin somewhere, and if the majesty and wonder of this personal God be all that the Agnostic claims, must it not follow that one of God's greatest problems in making Himself known to man is to do so without overwhelming him with fear on the one hand, or bribing him with power and glory on the other? Must not this be the explanation of why He dawns upon

man so gently, and hides Himself so wondrously, and has to be sought for, and is to be found only by the really earnest and believing soul? There is in the act of faith, especially as it is turned into a habit of the mind, a moral education in the brave launching of the self away to the Oversoul and in the spiritual discipline of self-abnegation, which is essential to humanity's development in the very powers of God.

Consider the generosity that is developed in the soul that makes real sacrifices for truth! Consider the courage that is developed by the soul that will be loyal at all costs to moral value! Consider the self-conquest that ventures again and again in faith, reaching beyond sight! Consider the way the soul stretches itself and grows in its passion to be worthy of a personal, moral ideal! Now it is just here that Herbert Spencer went so tragically wrong. As we have seen, his agnosticism is in regard to *God as He is in Himself*, namely, the Unrelated Absolute. Such a Being is utterly irrelevant for the purpose of religion. Christianity does not ignore the transcendence of God and to this extent there is a Christian Agnosticism. There is nothing inconsistent with Christian faith in declaring there may be much in God of overwhelming wonder and glory that we do not know. His 'otherness' is a reality that for ever flings its awe over souls that are most convinced of His love and human-ness. There is undoubtedly in God the *mysterium tremendum* of which Rudolf Otto has written so eloquently and on which Karl Barth insists. *But this is not the vital truth for humanity.* This God who went forth to create from that moment entered into relationship with His creation, and it is this Creator God, who insists upon exalting His creatures into children and founding for Himself a family of souls, who is the object of Christian faith and worship.

THE VINDICATION OF FAITH.—Finally, faith in such a God vindicates itself in the furtherance of life both in the individual and in society. It is curious how some of the most sceptical spirits have been compelled by the facts of

life to acknowledge this truth. Readers will recall the famous statement of John Stuart Mill that 'if a man would make his life righteous he could not do better than copy the example of Jesus Christ.' But take this testimony from Mr. Bertrand Russell, of all men, in his book, *The Conquest of Happiness*:

'Whenever you happen to take your children to the Zoo you may observe in the eyes of the apes, when they are not performing gymnastic feats or cracking nuts, a strange strained sadness. One can almost imagine that they feel they ought to become men, but cannot discover the secret of how to do it. On the road of evolution they have lost their way; their cousins marched on and they were left behind. Something of the same strain and anguish seems to have entered the soul of civilized man. He knows there is something better than himself almost within his grasp, yet he does not know where to seek it or how to find it. In despair he rages against his fellow-man, who is equally lost and equally unhappy. We have reached a stage in evolution which is not the final stage. We must pass through it quickly, for if we do not, most of us will perish by the way, and others will be lost in a forest of doubt and fear. . . . To find the right road out of this despair civilized man must enlarge his heart as he has enlarged his mind. He must learn to transcend self, and in so doing to acquire the freedom of the universe.'

Dr. A. E. Burroughs, the Bishop of Ripon, has made a most interesting comment¹ upon this passage which I think is completely justified. He writes:

'Any one familiar with the New Testament will recognize the parallel here with the Christian plan of salvation; the sense of failure, of missing the mark, which is sin; the poignant counterpart, the sense of "something better than himself almost within his grasp," which is the glory and kingdom of God; the need to "forget the things that are behind, and press on," which divine forgiveness makes possible; progress by enlargement of the heart rather than of the mind—the widest sympathy being always the highest wisdom in a world where the last word lies with love; last, and most significant, the claim that "to acquire the freedom of the universe"—that is, to be at home and happy in God's world as a son of the house—man "must learn to transcend self"—to "cancel self out, and take up his own cross daily and follow"—not Cæsar, but Christ.'

The Bishop concludes, fittingly, I think:

'Could you have a more complete capitulation to the Christian wisdom by one who is by way of excluding religion altogether?'

¹ In *Christianity and the Crisis*. (Gollancz.)

But indeed is this not the common experience of us all? A half faith, or no faith at all, cramps the human organism, reduces the heart beat to palpitation, slackens the bloodstream, depresses the mind, disheartens the individual, shuts down life; but a generous faith raises to their noblest height the vital forces within our constitution. Faith expands the lungs, quickens the heart, deepens the breathing, makes the blood course quicker, glorifies the mind, and exhilarates the spirit; the affirmation of God and Goodness enriches the soul that makes it with every form of vitality; Faith and Life belong to one another.

ALBERT D. BELDEN, B.D.

Whitefield's Tabernacle.

India—What Now? By N. Gangulee, C.I.E., Ph.D. (Allen & Unwin. 7s. 6d.)

The writer calls this a study of the realities of Indian problems. Where so many confusing voices are to be heard, it is difficult for the Western mind to realize where these realities lie, but as India is likely to be a matter of serious concern for some time, any effective guidance here is of value. The main contention of this book is that the needs of the great masses of the Indian peoples are economic and social rather than political. In support of this point of view he gives a survey of India's economic problems, and gives a careful account of many points associated with the life of the Indian peasant class. An interesting chapter discusses the question of the 'untouchables.' The writer feels that the attempt to handle the situation in India as if it were merely a constitutional problem is foredoomed to failure, and would challenge the view that a constitution fashioned according to the spirit of democratic ideas in the West, would facilitate efforts at economic re-arrangements. He asks whether there is not rather a serious risk 'of making that machine a thousand times more complicated and difficult in its manipulations'? That ideas of government which have worked well enough in the West should be applied where the entire social structure is essentially different seems to him a serious blunder, 'The basis of Indian society is status not contract.' In a short concluding chapter, the writer makes a few suggestions concerning the policy of the next ten years, in which he makes a plea that the Government of India should enter on a period of planned social and economic reconstruction. The book has value as a careful summary of relevant facts, especially on the economic side.

R. S.

AN ANCIENT SPECTATOR IN THE THEATRE OF DIONYSUS

MANY people nowadays have the privilege of witnessing, from time to time, the performance of a Greek play, either in the original, or in the poetical version of Professor Gilbert Murray, and in most cases they are impressed by the dramatic power of the playwright, his knowledge of character, and his deep sense of unseen forces that influence human life. On such occasions the scholar in the audience may also enjoy the sheer beauty of the language of Aeschylus and Sophocles, or of the lyrical portions of Euripides. Nevertheless he is acutely aware that his emotions and impressions must be very different from those experienced by an ancient spectator of the time in which the play was actually written. He realizes that, in the ancient theatre, all the accessories—the costume, the acting, the voices, the gestures, the pronunciation, the music—differed extraordinarily from what he perceives before him. He knows, too, that at this late period of time the old atmosphere can never be reproduced, or the old emotions recaptured, with any assurance of accuracy, and that, even if this were possible, he might not be entirely pleased with the result. It is better, he feels, to concentrate on those essential qualities which Greek tragedy shares with all other great drama, and which make their appeal on the modern and the ancient stage alike.

There remains, however, a theoretical interest in the situation, and in the feelings and thoughts, of the ancient spectator, and it is worth while occasionally to go back in imagination to the fifth century before Christ and to endeavour to put ourselves in his place, as he watches the performance at the Dionysiac festival. At the very outset our imaginative powers are thwarted by many uncertainties in regard to the actual theatre of the Periclean age. Was it of wood, like the temporary structure that collapsed in 499 B.C., or of stone

like the later fourth-century building that we still possess? Was there an elevated stage, or did the actors perform on the orchestra-level, beside the chorus? Did the actors have buskins as well as masks? Was there any arrangement at this time for change of scenery? Were women permitted to attend the performances? To none of these questions can a dogmatic answer be returned. Various conjectures may be made from remarks scattered about in fifth-century literature, from inscriptions, and from information given by Aristotle and by the scholiasts and grammarians of the Alexandrian age. But conjectures do not enable us to draw a detailed picture of the theatre or of the accessories of an ancient performance. The best course, therefore, is to eschew any attempt to describe the actual scene, and to try instead to enter into the mind of the spectator and to record some of his feelings and impressions.

The spectator was influenced, first of all, by the sacred character of the performances, which formed part of the ritual in celebration of the spring festival of the god of wine. Only twice in the year, at the spring and winter festivals of Dionysus, were dramas produced. Of the two festivals, the former was the more important, as attracting many foreign visitors, besides the native Athenians. The sacredness of the occasion and the relative infrequency of the performances assured the poets of a good 'house.' Moreover, since the festival took the form of a competition for a prize, there was always a genuine and lively interest in the proceedings. Mr. Haigh has compared the occasion to a Welsh Eisteddfod with its rival bards and choruses.¹ We may picture, then, a large crowd of some 17,000 citizens and strangers, seated together in close proximity in a circular auditorium, under the open sky, following the day's events with the utmost concentration—without a lunch interval—from sunrise to sunset, giving vent to approval or disapproval in the liveliest manner, but at the same time jealous for the honour of the festival and

¹ See Haigh's *Attic Theatre*, p. 3.

determined that it should be conducted in an orthodox way. The wearing of garlands by the audience and the ceremonial sacrifice indicated the seriousness of the occasion.

Aristotle, in the *Politics*, assures us that the spectators varied in critical ability—that some were cultured and intellectual, the rest untutored labourers, tradesmen, and artisans.¹ The latter are frequently alluded to in the comedies of Aristophanes. Their trades are specified in the *Peace*,² where the crest-maker, the hoe-maker and the armourer sit cheek by jowl, and in the *Frogs* Xanthias even hints at the presence of burglars and other reprobates.³ That this section of the audience was at least as influential as the high-brows we conclude from Aristotle's other remark that it was the frailty of the audience that caused later dramatists to introduce the happy ending in tragedy, and to vulgarize the music.⁴

Pericles, the first citizen, and Dicaeopolis, the farmer, would assuredly look for different things in a tragedy, but there must have been many elements in the performance that appealed equally to both classes—the music and dance, the acting, the repartee, the manipulation of the plot. It is equally certain that many of the finer touches—the subtleties of character-drawing, the rich beauty of phrasing, the deeper religious problems—were significant chiefly to those who had had the benefit of a Sophistic education. Aristotle had both sections of the audience in mind when he analysed the drama into its six component elements—plot, character, diction, thought, spectacle, music and song,⁵ and we cannot do better than follow his guidance and consider how the ordinary spectator and the intellectualist reacted to each of these different parts of a play.

Let us examine them in the reverse order, and begin with the music and song. In order to understand what these meant to an ancient spectator, we have to think ourselves back to

¹ Aristotle, *Politics*, v. vii, 1.

² Aristophanes, *Peace*, 543-9.

³ Ibidem, *Frogs*, 808.

⁴ Aristotle, *Poetics*, 13; *Politics*, v. vii, 1.

⁵ Ibidem, *Poetics*, 6.

a very elementary form of the instrumental art, but a very elaborate form of the poetic art and of the allied art of the dance. In modern times the art of the dance has vanished, except where it has been revived by specially talented performers, such as Pavlova, as a means of emotional expression. The Greeks, however, seem to have had steps and gestures appropriate to all the emotions—prayer, thanksgiving, repentance, joy, sorrow, anger. Some slight notion of the movements and postures of Greek dancing may be gained by a study of those vase-paintings which depict nymphs and satyrs dancing, or the relief of Pyrrhic dancers in the Acropolis Museum.

Some writers have compared the chorus of a Greek play to that of a modern opera, but there are two differences. First of all, in modern opera dancing is employed only slightly, or as an interlude, whereas in Greek drama it was as prominent as, or more prominent than, the music. Secondly, in modern opera the music rules, but in an ancient chorus it merely accompanied the words. Greek music, being excessively simple, was never regarded as an art that could exist by itself. The tune, whatever it was and whatever its nature, had to conform to the pitch of the words in the song, for Greek, being a musical language, possessed pure vowels of varying pitch. If there was a stress-accent in Greek (many scholars deny its existence altogether), it must have been of subordinate importance. What was important was the length of the vowel, for long vowels took at least twice as long to pronounce as short vowels, and it was the varied arrangement of long and short syllables, without regard to stress, that produced metre in Greek poetry, just as it produces the various time in modern music. It seems to follow, then, that the ancients sang the choral odes in unison, to a simple accompaniment on the flute, uttering each word distinctly, using a tune that followed the pitch of the vowels and allowed precise time-value to each sound, never assigning two or more notes to a syllable as in modern singing. The general result,

when one remembers the aid given by expressive dancing, must have been to bring out the meaning of the poet and the beauty of his rhythm with a cumulative force such as we can scarcely imagine in these days, when man's ideas of music, singing and dancing have become so different. The thought of the poet was the supreme factor: the metre and the melody were chosen to suit it, so that the right ethical effect might be achieved.

We must bear in mind, too, that the chorus of singers, moving as they did in the orchestra, the very heart of the auditorium, came directly under the spectator's vision, and must have contributed largely to the total effect of the play. If we could imagine the chorus of Furies in the *Eumenides* of Aeschylus going through the threatening actions and postures appropriate to their terrible Binding-song, we might form some notion of the effect produced by the music and dancing on a devout spectator. The appeal made by the music to the common folk may be judged by the evidence of Aristophanes, who makes his veteran jurymen wend their way at dawn to the jury-court, humming ancient songs, 'the charming honey of Phrynichus' *Phoenissae*.' Just as an audience to-day will memorize the chorus of a comic opera, so these old men had learnt by heart the choric songs from the tragedies, and not only the songs, but the accompanying dances too—'the strange old dances which Thespis taught.'¹

But it is almost impossible to envisage the dance and song of the chorus without thinking at the same time of the spectacle, under which Aristotle includes costumes and masks, scenery and stage-properties of all kinds—every contrivance, in short, that was employed in the ancient theatre to make the performance vivid, if not realistic. Prior to the middle of the fifth century, indeed, there was little besides the costumes and masks to aid in producing illusion. The stage was of less importance than the orchestra, and the early plays of Aeschylus required no elaborate properties.

¹ See Aristophanes, *Wasps*, 220, 1479.

Sophocles was the first to decrease the interest in the orchestra by painting the back of the actors' changing-room so as to represent a scene. Whether after that the actors performed on a platform in front of it, we cannot tell with any certainty, but from about 458 B.C. onwards the back of the actors' booth represented a palace, a temple, or whatever other scene fitted the play. The painting was probably more symbolic than realistic, although tradition assures us that the wall was usually pierced by three doors, through which the actors issued on to the stage, whether the latter was elevated or on the same level as the orchestra. A change of scene within a play was very rare, and, even where this was the case, no change was made in the background, so far as we know, during the classical period. For interiors the curious device of the 'eccyclema' was used—a small wooden platform which was pushed out through the central door of the stage-building, and on which was arranged a group of figures representing what had just taken place inside. When divinities were shown, another device, the *Mechane*, came into operation; this was a crane by means of which an actor could be lowered from the top of the scene-building and hoisted up again. None of these devices—the nature of which is obscure—would conduce to illusion, but the spectators, being familiar with the convention, would use their imaginations accordingly. Probably the most effective part of the stage-properties was the costume of the chorus and the actors. There is evidence to show that the latter, in tragedy, was of rich material and vivid colourings, consisting of a long, sweeping, sleeved tunic and an over-mantle. The effect of this dress, combined with that of the large grotesque mask indicating the type of character, must have been very vivid from a distance. Aeschylus paid great attention to costume, and frequently roused a thrill of curiosity by the bizarre or unusual dress of his characters, e.g., the uncouth, barbaric garb of the suppliant maidens, or the rich robes of the Persian elders. Very effective, too, were the hippocamp of Father Oceanus, the winged

car of the nymphs, the aegis of Athena, the snakes of the Furies, and the purple carpets in the *Agamemnon*. Aeschylus evidently used the spectacle to enhance the dignity of tragedy; Euripides, conversely, was accused by Aristophanes of degrading it by the introduction of beggars and cripples in rags. This tendency to realism was not approved by the more orthodox spectators, although it captivated the younger generation. In the *Acharnians* the rustic Dicaeopolis borrows from Euripides a suit of tatters, a beggar's staff, a burnt-out lamp, and a broken jar—until Euripides complains that he has plundered him of a whole tragedy.¹

An ancient spectator, therefore, must have found in the properties considerable aid to visualization, but, even in witnessing Euripides' plays, he would be far from experiencing the optical illusion which is the aim of the modern theatre. To the eye of fancy, however, the situation would stand out clearly, and at the same time the emotions which the circumstances demanded would be aroused by the voice and gesture of the actor.

We pass on to the next point in Aristotle's analysis—the thought. 'The thought of the personages,' he says, 'is shown in everything to be effected by their language—in every effort to prove or disprove, to arouse emotion, or to maximize or minimize things.'² He adds that this part of his subject belongs to the art of rhetoric or persuasion, a factor of the greatest importance in Greek life. The litigiousness of the Greeks and their love of argument are reflected in many plays, from the *Eumenides* onwards. In the case of the latter play, the audience evidently derived real intellectual enjoyment from the sophistical contention of Apollo that the father only is the parent of a child, and from Athena's assertion that she, being sprung miraculously from the head of Zeus, will ever uphold the father against the mother.³ Similarly, in the *Trojan Women* of Euripides, the ancient spectator felt

¹ Aristophanes, *Acharnians*, 410–70.

² Aristotle, *Poetics*, 19. ³ Aeschylus, *Eumenides*, 657 seq.

none of our distaste when Hecuba, the captive queen of Troy, presents the case for the prosecution against the guilty Helen, with Menelaus as judge.¹ The pleas of the contending characters evidently caught the fancy of the audience in somewhat the same fashion as the paradox and repartee in a Shavian dialogue 'bring down the house' in a modern theatre. This is implied in the references made by Dionysus in the *Frogs* to the popularity of such sayings as: 'My tongue hath sworn, but my mind remains unbound.'²

Patriotic and religious sentiments, too, never failed to impress the audience, even when introduced irrelevantly. Notable instances of these were the dialogue between Atossa and the elders in Aeschylus' *Persians*, in which they satisfy her curiosity about the Athenian people, the Persian messenger's description of the sea-fight at Salamis, the ode on Colonus in Sophocles' *Oedipus at Colonus*, Antigone's speech on the unwritten laws of Heaven, the chorus in praise of Athens in the *Medea*, or the famous condemnation of the Spartans in the *Andromache*. These must have stirred the ancient spectator much more than they stir us. At all events the speeches of Euripides were so admired, even in 413 B.C., that the Syracusans—so Plutarch tells us—spared the lives of those Athenian captives who were able to recite from memory passages of his plays.³

The diction, which is mentioned fourth by Aristotle, is closely bound up with the thought. To judge of its effect, apart from the thought it expressed, is a very difficult matter, inasmuch as we shall never be able to hear a line of Greek poetry spoken and pronounced as a Greek would have spoken it. The elocution and gesture, we may be sure, helped the ancient audience to follow the bold metaphors and intricate imagery of an Aeschylean chorus, but the inner significance of much of Aeschylus' language was surely lost on the ordinary, uncultured folk. Dionysus in the *Frogs* complains that he

¹ Euripides, *Trojan Women*, 903-1032.

² Aristophanes, *Frogs*, 101-2.

³ Plutarch, *Nicias*, 29.

cannot sleep at nights for wondering what a 'tawny horse-cock' might be, while Euripides insists that the 'wild-bull words, with bristling crests and shaggy brows' were unintelligible to the spectators.¹ The reference later in the *Frogs* to the fact that the audience of that play were possessed of a book of the words shows that it was customary for Athenians, even at that epoch, to refresh their memory of plays by reference to a written text.² If that was so, Aeschylus need not have depended for his effect on an oral performance alone. Sophocles, of course, disciplined his poetic fancy in his quest for the golden mean; nevertheless one feels that many of his lines require a second reading in order to be completely appreciated. But his plays were so harmoniously and artistically constructed that even one performance made a clear impression on the audience, who, as we know, regarded him with great favour during his life-time. The diction of Euripides was particularly adapted to suit the popular taste. In that, as in other departments, he was a realist, and, as Longinus put it, used 'common, every-day language,' such as might be heard in the streets of Athens.³ At first this new experiment did not please the judges, on the ground that it did not harmonize with the heroic, elevated atmosphere of the festival, and it was only in the next generation that the simplified diction of dialogue, and the new choric songs, written to suit the innovations in music, became truly popular. In the third century B.C., according to Lucian, the people of Abdera caught a tragic fever and went about declaiming the monody on Love from the famous *Andromeda* until the Thracian winter cured them of their enthusiasm.⁴

That the audience were keenly sensitive to both the words and sentiments of the plays may be inferred from the frequent parodying of tragic speeches in the comedies of Aristophanes. In the *Thesmophoriazusae*, for instance, no fewer than four passages from Euripides are travestied. The whole point

¹ Aristophanes, *Frogs*, 931, 925.

² Ibidem, 1114.

³ *On the Sublime*, 40.

⁴ Lucian, *The Art of Writing History*, I.

would have been missed had not the spectator been thoroughly familiar with the originals.

There remain the two important factors of character and plot. Aristotle insisted that the characters were less important in a drama than the plot, and this generalization seems to hold good of the earlier work of both Aeschylus and Sophocles. In these plays the characters are typical rather than individual; they are what they are simply because the plot requires them to be such. At that stage in the evolution of drama the audience were probably not profoundly interested in the psychological verisimilitude of the characters. The incongruity, for instance, of a man like Ajax dissembling his intention of suicide would have caused them no difficulty, since this incident served to advance the plot and afforded a vivid example of tragic irony. An interest in character as such begins to be discernible in the *Trachiniae* and *Philoctetes* of Sophocles; in fact, in the latter play character has such an influence on the plot as almost to change the traditional ending of the story. By that date (409 B.C.) the Athenians were ready to be thrilled by the piquant contrast between Odysseus and Neoptolemus, and the resulting clash of temperaments. With Euripides, character often dominates plot. In the *Medea* and the *Hippolytus* he gave realistic studies of the struggle of conflicting passions and motives in the individual soul. With Euripides, in fact, there begins the transition to New Comedy, where character admittedly takes precedence of plot.

In dealing with the characters of tragedy, Aristotle demanded, among other things, that they should be 'good.' Here, obviously, the point of view of the ancient spectator was different from our own. The insistence on the 'goodness' of the characters of tragedy is largely due to its connexion with a religious festival and its association with the heroic saga. Thus, Aeschylus in the *Frogs* found fault with Euripides for introducing into his plays bad characters, slaves of unseemly emotions and passions, instead of the brave, heroic

souls of his own dramas.¹ One is reminded of Plutarch's tale of a performance of the *Seven against Thebes*. When the messenger uttered the famous lines describing the shield of Amphiaraus, the wise seer whose ambition was 'not to seem just, but to be just indeed,' all eyes turned approvingly to Aristides the Just, who happened to be present.² In the generation of Aeschylus the audience looked to tragedy for moral edification, and a needlessly bad character like the Menelaus of the *Orestes* would have aroused disgust. As Aeschylus put it in the *Frogs*: 'We, the poets, are teachers of men. We are bound things honest and pure to speak.'³ None the less bad characters, such as Clytemnestra, do occur even in Aeschylus. The badness, however, is here balanced by high birth and position, and the fact that the sinning was done on a magnificent scale and in such a way as to exhibit most vividly the workings of divine Nemesis.

One may infer, therefore, that the ancient spectator, in the latter half of the fifth century B.C., began to be intrigued by character-studies, such as those presented by the two sisters in the *Antigone* and the *Electra*, and by the 'divided soul' of the *Medea*. There was a certain excitement attendant upon the sharp antithesis of contrasting personalities, or of contrary impulses within the same personality; there was a thrill of surprise, too, when in Euripides some traditional hero or heroine was discovered in a lowly situation. But on the whole this emotion seems to have been subordinate to the interest aroused by the great vicissitudes of fortune to which the characters were subject and by the lessons regarding divine justice that were to be learnt therefrom.

Lastly, what peculiar pleasure did the ancient spectator derive from the plot, accounted by Aristotle the most important factor of all? A different kind of pleasure, certainly, from that of the audience at a modern play, who, being unfamiliar with the incidents beforehand, are curious to

¹ Aristophanes, *Frogs*, 1013-7.

² Plutarch, *Aristeides*, iii, 3.

³ Aristophanes, *Frogs*, 1055-6.

know how it will all end. As regards Greek tragedy—in spite of Aristotle's remark that 'even the known stories are known only to a few'¹—the conclusion seems inevitable that the Greek spectator, after witnessing many tragedies on the same theme, must have known that Medea would kill her children, or that Ajax would take his own life. So much was common knowledge before the play began, but there remained the excitement of discovering how these particular incidents were to be evolved by this particular playwright, and whether the legend would be entirely remodelled or not. Euripides particularly was fond of providing surprises in this regard, as when he revealed the princess Electra wedded to a lowly peasant and caused Clytemnestra to be slain by a trick in the latter's cottage, or when, in the *Orestes*, the matricide tried to avenge himself on Menelaus by slaying Helen. Another kind of intellectual excitement was to be found in Tragic Irony, in which the works of Sophocles above all excelled. To secure this, the incidents or the speeches were so arranged as to arouse in the spectator an expectation of which the agent was entirely unconscious. *Oedipus the King* is full of such situations, as when the king utters a curse upon the unknown murderer which the audience knows is bound to recoil upon himself; or when the usurper Aegisthus, expecting to see the corpse of his enemy, Orestes, lifts the robe and finds that of his wife. At times the irony coincides with the Peripeteia, or Reversal of Fortune, on which Aristotle laid so much stress—as when the Corinthian messenger, hoping to free Oedipus from his gloomy forebodings about his parents, discloses the very information that proves those forebodings to have been fulfilled. The Recognition-scenes, too, must have been followed with great attention, judging by the elaborate rules which Aristotle gives for them, and by the criticism which Euripides passed upon such a scene in the *Choephoroe* of Aeschylus, where Electra recognizes her brother by a lock of hair, a foot-print,

¹ Aristotle, *Art of Poetry*, 9.

and an embroidered robe. The more natural expedient of making Orestes recognize Iphigenia by the sending of a letter pleased the more sophisticated audience of Euripides' time. Aristotle adds that in time the standard in regard to the *dénouement* of the plot weakened—the spectators preferred a happy ending to that of the ideal tragedy, in which the hero passes from happiness to misery, thereby arousing the emotions of pity and fear.

We have tried to conjure up the feelings of an Attic audience in respect of the six elements of Aristotle's analysis, but there is still one important aspect that Aristotle left practically untouched. What was their impression of the moral and religious effect of tragedy, and how did it differ from our own? Here it seems imperative to distinguish between the ordinary man and the pupil of the Sophists. The ordinary man probably regarded the legends, or their main outlines, as history. Certainly he believed that the gods could be influenced by prayer and sacrifice, that bloodshed caused pollution, and that the spirit of the dead man had power to help or harm his kindred above the ground. He obeyed omens and oracles. His religion was chiefly a practical one, consisting more in doing certain things than in holding certain dogmas. In the eyes of the ordinary spectator, therefore, Oedipus and Pentheus would probably be guilty men, and Antigone an innocent woman suffering wrongfully, whereas a modern reader might feel doubtful in all these cases. We are assured that the ordinary, pious citizen, although he gave little thought to theology, was strengthened and encouraged in his religious habits and duties by witnessing the plays of Aeschylus, who strove to moralize the old tales without overtly questioning the beliefs on which they were based. At all events, the orthodox Dicaeopolis is represented as enjoying the plays of Aeschylus thirty years after his death.¹ Sophocles also, for a different reason, encouraged the pious in their piety. He did not obtrude

¹ Aristophanes, *Acharnians*, 10.

the difficulties of orthodoxy, because theology as such did not concern him. By producing highly vivid and moving dramas he satisfied his hearers imaginatively, and left it to his successor, Euripides, to come to grips with the problem of the nature and character of the gods. Hence the popularity of Aeschylus and Sophocles, and the unpopularity of Euripides, with the ordinary man in the street.

But what did Anaxagoras, Pericles, Thucydides, and the pupils of the Sophists think of the plays from the religious point of view? Rationalism, in their case, had gone far enough to free them from most of the superstitions of the common folk, such as belief in omens and oracles, in the pollution of homicide, and in the anthropomorphic deities of tradition. One can hardly conceive of these rationalists accepting the Aeschylean thesis of a supreme and just Zeus, when one of them had explained the belief in a moral god or gods as an invention of lawgivers, who wished to frighten men into right action.¹ Sophocles, being non-controversial in religious matters, would probably have pleased them more than Aeschylus. Euripides was one of themselves, and one can picture the young men of the Illumination glorying in the exposure of the Olympians in such plays as the *Ion* or the *Heracles*. In the matter of religious teaching, therefore, each type of spectator drew the lesson that suited his own case.

We have seen, then, that those who gathered year by year on the southern slope of the Acropolis to celebrate the festival of Dionysus, although differing one from the other in wealth, status, or cultural equipment, could enjoy many things in common—the music, the dance, the gorgeous colours of the costumes, the rhythm of the actor's chant, the mental exhilaration of following the rhetorical speeches and the Sticho-muthia, and the emotional suspense of watching to see how the well-known story would be worked out. Moreover, all felt that they were taking part in a national function which

¹ See Critias' *Sisyphus*, quoted in Diels', *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, ii, 1, 620-2.

redounded to the prestige of their city. The majority also had the kind of satisfaction that a worshipper in modern days would receive from an uplifting sermon—the knowledge that the gods of their religion had been honoured and glorified. After they had spent the earlier part of the day in this state of exaltation, we know, their mood relaxed, and the proceedings usually closed with a satyr-play, followed by a comedy. The atmosphere of an ancient comedy, however, is practically irrecoverable, because of our inability to revive within ourselves, at this late day, the feelings and beliefs of men who still worshipped fertility gods and practised fertility rites. From our reading of Aristophanes we are assured that wit, ribaldry, obscenity, satire, with interludes of charming lyrics, were the staple ingredients of Old Comedy. Some harmless indulgence of the grosser emotions, was, according to Aristotle's doctrine, no less essential than the Catharsis of pity and fear secured by tragedy. At all events, when the festival was over, the spectator carried away with him many memories of a week of varied enjoyment—vivid images of movement, colour and sound, haunting phrases that recurred constantly to his mind, snatches of speech or of song to be committed to memory anon, recollections of the protagonist's rendering of a notable part or of the tragic *dénouement* of the plot, a lesson of submission to Zeus and Fate—and here we must part with him, for it will never be possible for men of one age to sympathize completely with those of another.

MARIE V. WILLIAMS, M.A.

Witwatersrand University, Johannesburg.

ARNOLD OF BRESCIA

A STUDY IN THE PURITANISM OF THE XIITH CENTURY

IN common with many of the early heretics Arnold of Brescia is known to us only through the writings of his enemies. No written word stands to his credit. There is no portrait of him, nor was he a sufficiently good Catholic for one to have been invented. He is little more than a *vox clamantis* across the centuries, yet we recognize him to-day as a man of outstanding personality and a protagonist of pure Christian idealism. Only gradually does he dawn upon the consciousness of the student of Church History. We may encounter his name half-a-dozen times before he attains significance, but when once he begins to live he fascinates us. The reticences, the swift entrances and exits, the shadow-graphs suggestive of titanic spiritual conflict, allure the imagination and our pulses quicken with the stir of

Old, unhappy, far-off things
And battles long ago.

His parentage is unknown and his birth probably took place during the last decade of the eleventh century, whose dawn had been hailed throughout Christendom with such intense relief. The dreaded millennial year, 1000, had come and gone and there had been no such cataclysm as many had expected. The morning of January 1, 1001, broke, and the familiar world was still there, functioning in the old delightful and familiar way. 'Bliss was it in that dawn to be alive.' For Europe it meant the beginning of a new life. Old apathies gradually died and new hopes, centring round a new conception of human freedom, came to birth. The ordinary man, believing that life was good and might be better, sought release from those feudal fetters which made him the pawn of priests and kings, and his hopes and dreams touched an ever-widening circle as the exhilarating century

sped on its way. With growing disfavour men beheld the contentions of Empire and Papacy for European mastery, knowing that the freedom for which they yearned could come through neither, unless both underwent a radical and well-nigh inconceivable change, settling by mutual agreement their respective spheres of influence.

Arnold's youth was passed in the atmosphere of the famous Investiture Controversy, beneath which innocent sounding title lurks a story of human passions and ambitions which turned parts of Europe into a shambles. So immense had become the revenues and estates administered by the Church that her highest officials had come to hold the equivalent of princely rank. Whoever possessed the right of appointment to such offices obviously held resources of far-reaching power. Important and wealthy ecclesiastical benefices were bestowed frequently upon the highest bidder, who, in some cases, had taken holy orders solely to qualify in the ecclesiastical auction mart, and who, at the same time, pledged himself to full support of the overlord who had invested him with the fief and its temporalities. Should that overlord be Pope or Emperor? Both contested the right, even at the point of the sword; and, with either victorious, there were tremendous and obvious dangers to the peace of Europe.

One phase of the struggle must have profoundly impressed Arnold. In 1111 Pope Paschal II proposed that the matter should be settled by the Church retaining her right of Investiture, carrying with it freedom to choose men of eminent spiritual qualifications for her distinguished offices, but that she should surrender to the secular power all real estate received since the days of Charlemagne. To this the Emperor, Henry V, agreed with alacrity, for Investiture, without real estate, meant nothing of value to the secular authority. But the princes of the Church vehemently refused their consent. A Church stripped of her earthly possessions and poor as her Lord! A Church dependent on the free-will

offerings of her worshippers! It was degrading, unthinkable, impossible. So furious was the protest of the followers of Him who 'had not where to lay His head,' and from the successors of that Peter who said 'silver and gold have I none,' that the Pope was compelled to withdraw his offer. The Church continued a wealthy corporation, with bishops and dignitaries who were the equals and often the superiors of princes; but in refusing consent to the noble policy of Pope Paschal she missed her way and turned into a wilderness from which she has never completely emerged.

In the mental background of Arnold's world shines the great name of Peter Abelard, under whom, according to one authority, he studied in his youth.¹ It was clear to Abelard that, if the Church were to survive and function as an instrument of human progress and salvation in the new age, there must be a new intellectual formulation of her essential doctrines. This he sought to give. His emphasis lay upon Love as the master-key to the understanding of our Lord's life and gospel. God's universal love for men was shown supremely in the utter and voluntary sacrifice of the Son of God and the Christian life must itself be one of sacrificial love.

Such teaching lent valuable support to the widespread abhorrence of the warring of covetous, worldly-minded princes, spiritual and secular, and to the search for a common-weal in which the rank and file of men might live a fuller, happier life, with freedom to work out their own salvation. These were looking for a world in which love should supplant hate, war be exchanged for peace and serfdom for freedom, and Abelard's interpretation of Christian doctrine gave them every right to expect it. Ultimately it was Arnold who took these doctrines into the market-place and challenged Christendom to a gigantic social and political experiment. This doctrine of Love must be expressed in terms of life and conduct. Christian men, he maintained, are bound by their

¹ Otto of Freising. *Petrus Abailardum olim praeceptorum habuerat.*

very profession of Christianity to attempt this, and particularly the ministers of the Christian Church. It is not sufficient to hold a faith which is merely intellectually or emotionally satisfying.

After a course of studies at Paris we find Arnold in holy orders and the prior of a house of Augustinian Canons at Brescia. Here he was free to exercise the type of ministry which he regarded as apostolic, embracing, as it did, anything and everything that would truly serve his fellow-creatures. As clerics the canons ministered to men in spiritual matters and, in addition, instructed their minds and cared for their bodies. Gradually it seems to have been borne in upon Arnold that it was his mission in life to persuade the Church as a whole to accept just such an apostolic rôle as this; to cast aside her accumulated wealth, with all attendant worldly pomp and circumstance, thus standing liberated for her divine mission.

Arnold becoming involved in a dispute with a new Bishop who was appointed to Brescia, Pope Innocent II, at the Lateran Council held in 1139, deprived him of his office and banished him from Italy.

Then began the second distinct phase of Arnold's life. He withdrew to France and Abelard and a momentous friendship was thus established. Abelard was at this time about sixty years of age and a disappointed and largely discredited man; Arnold was probably in his forties. In spite of his enemies Abelard still retained his power to attract the young and eager intellects of Europe, amongst whom at this time, fortunately for us, was John of Salisbury,¹ one of our main authorities for what we know of Arnold.

In 1141, during Arnold's residence in Paris, began the final phase of the controversy between Abelard and Bernard of Clairvaux, with the pitiful sequel of the Council of Sens.

¹ For John of Salisbury see R. L. Poole: *Illustrations of the History of Medieval Thought*, pp. 200-225; also *John of Salisbury*, by C. C. J. Webb.

From the ignorant decisions of that Council Abelard appealed to Rome, whither he set out to conduct his case in person. How Bernard forestalled him and Abelard, broken-hearted, took refuge with Abbot Peter at Cluny and ended his days at Châlons in 1142, is another story, but the sequence of events had great determining power over Arnold's life. With the sole intention of acting as his *locum tenens* Arnold carried on the Master's teaching work in the Chapel of St. Hilary, pending his triumphant return from Rome.

But for Abelard there was no return and soon the golden voice was stilled for ever. Elijah passed, but his mantle fell upon Elisha and 'the sons of the prophets' gathered round the feet of Arnold. These, like so many students of all times, were, according to John of Salisbury, poor men. Some even had to beg alms to live. *Sed auditores non habuit nisi pauperes*. Probably that is an exaggeration, but they went out, like the disciples of Jesus, on a new Christian crusade and with the same message as they. In the world that awaited them their doctrine fell as seed into ground which, under the harrow of political and social discontent, had been widely prepared.

Arnold was a fearless tactician. Perceiving the futility of denouncing the luxury and worldliness of lesser ecclesiastics he directed his attack straight against the high places and the seats of authority. He sought to win Popes and prelates to the austere simplicity of Early Christianity, believing success with them to be the most effective means of winning all. His tones, apparently, were not those of the wooer unto righteousness but of the denouncer of wrong. He was a prophet of the order of Amos rather than of Hosea. The avarice and self-seeking of the bishops roused, in particular, his fierce indignation. '*Episcopis non parcebat ob avariciam et turpem questum*,' says John of Salisbury. Again and again it is the imperfect tense that the chroniclers use: *non parcebat, dicebat*. They were not reporting an occasional attitude or isolated speech of Arnold but attitudes and sayings that were characteristic and expressive of the whole fiery purpose

of his life. These things were a part of his gospel to his age and they were for ever upon his lips because they were for ever upon his heart.

Already the tides of his life were bearing him out to wider and more tempestuous seas. The death of Abelard lay, in part, at the door of Bernard of Clairvaux, that singular mixture of saintliness and bigoted ignorance, of hatred and love. Bernard transferred his enmity from the dead Master to his active successor, and Arnold was moved to accuse him, before the public of Paris, of being a vain-glorious man, envious of those who achieved distinction in scholarship or piety if their ideas were at variance with his own.¹ The truth of the charge can hardly be denied.

Thereafter Bernard, the all-powerful, the counsellor of Popes, pursued him with relentless animosity. Hounded from France he repaired to Zurich, preaching his doctrine of primitive Christian purity, and from thence to Moravia and Bohemia, but everywhere the long arm of Bernard reached him in letters that denounced him to those in authority, as a dangerous person and an enemy to the Church.

We must go back a little way. During the eleventh century, as culture revived and commerce extended, men had become increasingly impatient of the old feudal system, and the arrogant claims of the Empire and Papacy were a continual obstacle to the fuller realization of their ideals. The Commune had been established in a large part of Northern Italy, where the flourishing towns of Tuscany and Lombardy had freed themselves from the authority of the Bishop, resisted the Emperor and become republican. In due course the impulse reached Rome.

Events there followed a troubled and tortuous course. The Emperor lived far away, and Rome, the titular head

¹ *Abbatem, cujus nomen ex multis meritis clarissimum habebatur, arguebat tamquam vane glorie sectatorem, et qui omnibus invideret qui alicujus nominis erant in litteris aut religione, si non essent de scola sua.*

of the Empire, was in reality ruled by the Pope. Against him the forces of discontent ranged themselves. The lesser nobility and the common people, incited by mutual interests, drew together to end the autocratic rule of the Papacy and to establish a popular form of government. Eventually a Republic was proclaimed, with a Senate from which the leading nobles, whose interests were with the Papacy, were excluded. The Roman people declared that it was unfitting that a Pope should rule as a temporal sovereign; that his authority should be confined to spiritual affairs; and that he and the ministers of the Church should live on the tithes and offerings of the faithful. In the midst of this upheaval Pope Innocent II died in 1143.

Two short and ineffectual pontificates followed, and in 1145 an old pupil of Bernard of Clairvaux became Pope, taking the title of Eugenius III. Much to Bernard's surprise he showed remarkable vigour in his defence of the traditional papal rights. He declined the demand to renounce all temporalities and recognize the Republic, and three days after his election fled from Rome to plan his course of action amid a quietness and security that were impossible at the storm-centre itself.

Riot and bloodshed reigned in Rome and the residences of high ecclesiastics were sacked and destroyed. The small papal faction that remained in the city fostered the struggle until the people sickened of strife and disorder and begged the Pope to return. He complied, but, finding the situation still too difficult, retired by stages to France. On his way thither a momentous incident occurred. At Viterbo, about forty miles from Rome, he met Arnold, who sought readmission to the fellowship of the Church. He apologized for his former conduct and took fresh vows of obedience, whereupon Eugenius reversed the Lateran decree of 1139 and enjoined upon him certain penances. These involved a visit to Rome, with the carrying out of fasts and vigils and offering of prayers at the sacred places. But Eugenius had

made a false move. In sending Arnold to Rome he had sent 'fire to a volcano' and opened the third and final stage of the reformer's life.

The stage was now set for heroism and tragedy. It would appear that Arnold became the storm centre of the city's unrest. Here was a whole populace demanding many of those reforms to whose advocacy he had dedicated his life. Probably it seemed to Arnold that, in so far as the popular motives were unworthy, he might inspire men with a nobler and more discerning passion. His enemies identified him with the mob in its worst excesses. They saw him only as the renegade priest, betraying his Church to Demos. Bishop Otto, of Freising,¹ describes him as one 'who, under the guise of religion (*sub typo religionis*), acting the part of a wolf in sheep's clothing (*sub ovina pelle lupum gerens*), entered the city.' John of Salisbury writes as if discontent began with the arrival of Arnold in Rome, and some think this indicative of an earlier visit made by him. He says that Arnold kept his vows and performed his penances, but that at the same time he won over the city to himself and he and his disciples found their chief support among 'devout women'—*apud religiosas feminas*. This success he attributes to their 'semblance of good faith' and their austerity. (*Propter honestatis speciem et austeritatem*.) *Species* is a malevolent word in this connexion, and a fair-minded man rejects it as he reads the narrative. Bishop Otto declares, quite deliberately, that Arnold had only taken orders and assumed clerical dress that he might the more easily prosecute his attack upon the Church. *Religiosum habitum, quo amplius decipere posset, induit*. It is a malicious suggestion. Otto's Latin is steeped in venom. Arnold is a man 'rending all things, gnawing at all things, sparing nobody.' . . . *Omnia lacerans, omnia rodens, nemine parcens*. Indeed, his invective becomes so intense that it over-reaches itself and leaves the reader on the side of Arnold. He would like to accuse

¹ In the *Monumenta Germaniae Historica*.

him of heresy but dares not do so openly, for, in all his official dealings with Rome, Arnold's orthodoxy of belief appears never to have been called in question. To Otto he is the arch-enemy of the Church, but we must remember that Otto was himself a bishop and came within the range of Arnold's indictment. We can, therefore, hardly expect an impartial judgement. He accuses Arnold of denying the possibility of salvation for clerics and monks who hold property and bishops who maintain princely state, and of teaching that these are, rightly, the adjuncts of secular princes, who ought to allow the use of property to the humbler laity.¹

John of Salisbury supplements the story. He shows less rancour than Otto but a similar spirit animates both narratives. John describes his uncompromising attack on cardinals and Pope. The former, through their pride, avarice and hypocrisy, have converted the Church of God into a house of merchandise and a den of robbers. The Pope, who should be a shepherd of souls, maintains his authority by fire and slaughter and pampers the flesh, filling his own coffers and emptying those of other people. His manner of life is not apostolic and therefore neither reverence nor obedience is due to him.

In such strong teaching Arnold indicted the Church and hierarchy of his day and his clerical opponents never forgave him. His chroniclers merely record his accusations and make no attempt to refute them. Their attitude is rather—What a monster of iniquity must this man be who can utter such sacrilegious sentiments! But when we find that men like Arnold's arch-antagonist, Bernard of Clairvaux,² make precisely the same charges we feel assured of their truth.

From the mass of rebels in Rome Arnold emerges as the one vigorous personality. If he did not create the rebellion it speedily became focussed in him. He voiced most loudly

¹ *Dicebat enim, nec clericos proprietatem, nec episcopos regalia, nec monachos possessiones habentes, aliqua ratione salvari posse: cuncta haec principis esse, ab ejusque beneficentia in usum tantum laicorum cedere oportere.*

² *De Consideratione.*

the popular demand for an apostolic Church and a democratic state and therefore upon him the entrenched forces of reaction concentrated their attack.

Pope Eugenius III had striven and anathematized in vain, and in 1153 he died. After the brief pontificate of a man too old to be effectual, Nicholas Breakspear, an Englishman, the first and last of his race to occupy this position, became Pope and took the title of Adrian IV. The situation, from the point of view of ecclesiastical interest, was alarming, and Adrian acted with energy and decision. His first stroke was a bold one; he placed Rome under an interdict. The effectiveness of this now obsolete weapon depended upon the credulity of the community against which it was used and the loyal co-operation of the priests. Its intention was to gain the submission of the recalcitrant people by depriving them of all religious ministrations, including the Sacraments. Several factors would, on this occasion, conduce to its entire success. Rome was actually under the eye of the pontiff; the priests would support him almost to a man, this being their own battle; the Roman populace was deeply imbued with the superstitious belief that the Church had determining power over their condition and destiny in the hereafter. The withdrawal of the rites of the Church would seem to most of them like the withdrawal of God Himself, leaving the field free to that terrifying Devil who was such a dire reality to the mediaeval imagination.

Thus it befell that, where his predecessors had failed, the Englishman won. He enlisted the sympathy of the Emperor Frederick I, Barbarossa, and in a moment the Republic collapsed and Rome lay at the feet of the Pope. Only by entire submission could the Romans secure their pardon and re-admittance to the rites of the Church. They regarded what they believed to be their welfare in Eternity as of greater moment than their status and liberties in time.

All seemed lost and Arnold fled, but the Pope had determined on complete victory. There must be no one left to

agitate another day. Frederick succeeded in capturing Arnold and he handed him to Adrian who in turn delivered him to the prefect of the city. The deed that followed was willed by the Pope but executed by the secular arm. Arnold was hanged and burnt in June, 1155, and his ashes were scattered in the Tiber lest anything of his mortal body should remain which the people could treasure as relics.

The hatred which Arnold aroused in clerical circles during his lifetime continued to an astonishing degree after his death. One of the most interesting of minor references is an anonymous and contemporary poem, preserved in the *Gesta di Federico*.¹ It is the most intimate bit of writing we possess about the reformer and, in thirty lines, describes his execution. How far it is imaginary we cannot say. It differs from all other contemporary references in that the author displays a genuine admiration of and pity for his subject, though regarding him as a sadly misguided man. He says that Arnold, when asked if he would renounce his evil teaching and confess his sin, remained 'fearless and faithful to himself,' asserting that his teaching contained nothing foolish or injurious. Having silently commended his soul to God, on bended knees and with hands raised to heaven, he faced the end with tranquillity. The onlookers shed tears and even the executioners were moved to pity. The writer also makes the interesting statement that the Emperor Frederick regretted his own part in Arnold's death. *Set doluisse datur super hoc rex sero misertus*.

The poem closes with an apostrophe to the dead man. Why did he, who had despised slothful ease and fleshly delights, thus act? Why did he urge men to turn a biting tooth into the Church? *Heu quid in ecclesiam mordacem vertere dentem suavit?* That is the unforgivable sin. The

¹ 'The *Gesta Friderici Imperatoris in Italia*' is an account of Frederick's campaigns in Lombardy to the year 1160. It was published in 1887 as Vol. I of the *Fonti per la Storia d'Italia*. The poem about Arnold is transcribed in full, in the original Latin, in G. W. Greenaway's *Arnold of Brescia*.

writer predicts that Arnold's teaching will perish with him.

Rome got him at last but his teaching did not perish. Men like Arnold pay the penalty appropriate to their age for appearing out of due season, but they help to create that 'season' which they themselves never know. Men were neither morally nor spiritually prepared for Arnold. On the rock of their crude, mechanical religious ideas his Christian idealism was bound to come to grief. So engrossed was he in his dreams and schemes for a Christianized democratic state that he failed to realize that his human agents were inadequate to his purposes. Men wanted the improved conditions and the larger freedom, but not at the price of those superstitions which were so deeply ingrained; which usurped the place of effective Christian belief and experience, and from which only true culture and the Grace of God can set men free. Dr. H. B. Workman has well said: 'He mistook the transitory intoxication of the populace for religious and moral conviction.'¹ It is an easy mistake for a high-souled, utterly un-self-regarding man to make.

Modern historians have read between the lines and also set in clear, cold light the Christendom of those days. In consequence they have reversed the verdict of Arnold's contemporaries and immediate successors and refer to him in terms of warmest admiration and respect. In their hands he emerges from the mists of calumny and of an ignorance that was not sufficiently courageous to seek and face the truth, and he stands at last, a clear, heroic, prophetic figure, against the murky background of his turbulent and vicious age.

W. L. DOUGHTY, B.A., B.D.

¹ *The Church of the West in the Middle Ages*, Vol. I. p. 242.

THE LATER DEVELOPMENT OF MYSTICISM

MYSTICISM as it developed within the rigid tradition laid down by Plotinus and Eckhart¹ was in danger of becoming a spiritual gymnastic designed ultimately to reduce the self to a state of negation. 'First the body is to be reduced as not belonging to the nature of the soul; then the Soul which forms body; then sense perception. . . . When the Soul becomes Spirit by contemplating Spirit as its own principle, the source of all being still remains unexplored.'² Thus, at length, the self completely depersonalized becomes boneless and bodiless, a sort of wandering beam that may at last find its home in becoming absorbed in the whiteness of the great light. This achievement may be possible within cloister and cell, and with the assistance of flagellation and hair shirts. Even so, such an approach to Reality will hardly commend itself to those who have no desire to escape from the flesh. 'Dimness and lostness of mind is a paradoxical proof of attainment.' This may be, but is there not, asks the plain man, a path less solitary and bleak than this *Via Negativa*, a union with the Divine in which the sound of human voices and even laughter are not entirely silenced and personal contacts not altogether denied? If mysticism represents a necessary aspect of life it must somehow have alliance with a 'love of the broad and generous life of the world.'

It is not possible here to attempt to give even an outline of the development of the mystical spirit within the third, fourteenth and seventeenth centuries, the great ages of mysticism. Our references will be restricted mainly to those aspects most closely allied to a liberal acceptance of the whole of life. Even within these limitations we cannot do more than suggest vistas. Among the little colony of English

¹ See my article in *L. Q. & H. R.* for April, 1933.

² Inge, *Plotinus*, vol. II, p. 145.

mystics in the fourteenth century, there was one at least who was not content with the highly intellectualized love of Plotinus and the chilly ascent to the One through 'the cloud of unknowing.' This was the Lady Julian of Norwich. The quaint and delightful charm of *The Revelations of Divine Love in Sixteen Showings* has begotten in many a reader a taste for mystical writings which they would not otherwise have acquired. In this little volume Julian barely conceals the pulsing of a very human passion even though instinctive emotion is directed to a celestial rather than an earthly lover. A modern psychologist may be at pains to point out that passionate language addressed to Jesus shows an intimate relation between religion and sex and may even rejoice in what he imagines to be the destruction of spiritual experience.

This kind of criticism is much in evidence and a word in reference to it, at this stage, may not be out of place. If passion rightly directed enhances the value of life, as who will deny, why should it not, when rightly directed, exalt the spiritual life? 'No heart is pure that is not passionate and no virtue is safe that is not enthusiastic.' And if medieval saints were no better able to repress inexorable biological cravings than others, imagining that they had 'crucified the lusts of the flesh' when they had only 'harnessed their fiery instincts to the chariot of light' as Jacob Boehme counselled, modern teachers have no reason to accuse them of insincerity. Indeed, it is doubtful whether, in spite of a new jargon, psychology has advanced our knowledge beyond what was taught by the psalmist. There is perhaps something to be said in favour of the franker discussion of sex and the part it inevitably plays in the spiritual life. If common fairness must not grudge a tribute to workers in a difficult and rather muddy field, common sense should at least restrain extravagant praise of the chanters of sex.

In the fourteenth century, we notice a slight change in the religious temper, an unconscious enlargement, perhaps,

of its territory so as to make provision for the inclusion of the insistent 'manifold of sense.' This expansion naturally becomes more marked after the Renaissance with its humanizing effect both upon culture and religion. Even earlier than Julian of Norwich the ferment had begun to work, for the use of verse by Richard Rolle of Hampole (1290-1349) signifies that new wine skins had been provided for the new vintage. Instead of Theological treatises, sermons and manuals of devotion, poetry is enlisted to provide a more flexible instrument to express mystical experience. What could be more inevitable than that a state in which the spirit enjoys a sense of harmony and rises to heights of rapture should seek to communicate its joy through such a natural medium as music and rhythm? The writer expresses the opinion that verse, as a vehicle for revealing mystical emotions, is not merely one of a variety of equally suitable means, but is of them all the most pliable and finely adapted for the purpose. As the transmitter of Ineffable tidings, what better form could be employed than poetry which uses words only to carry the mind beyond them to a music without words, which leaves its secret with eligible souls by the aid of the most delicate inflections and nuances, finer than the shadow of a shade, and finds its evocative power in some subtle gift of incantation held invisible within itself like the fragrance in the flower? The future of mysticism would seem to be linked up with poetry.

In the Elizabethan period it may be possible to detect faint traces of the mystical temper, here and there in Spenser and possibly in Shakespeare. But an age occupied with material expansion and joys could hardly be expected to produce mystics. It was not until the 'Metaphysical poets'—to use Dr. Johnson's term—of the seventeenth century that the stream of mystical thought begins to flow freely in verse-form. With the Reformation, the unity of the National mind, reflected in Spenser and such chronicle plays as Shakespeare's *Henry V*, was broken up. The open

Bible in the people's hands, in most respects a great gain, led to searchings of heart. Introspection developed into a habit and stimulated by a Puritanical interpretation of the Scriptures resulted in a sharp distinction being made between the desires of the flesh and the desires of the spirit. The theological pendulum was swinging back to St. Augustine. In the one case where mysticism became 'a distinct and permanent ecclesiastical organization,' under George Fox, it was closely identified with the stern Puritan ethic of the Commonwealth period.

In regard to the expression of mysticism in poetry it is not surprising to find in the middle of the seventeenth century, a number of poets maintaining, with varying rigidity, the Puritan attitude to the manifold of the senses. Notable exceptions are Richard Crashaw and Thomas Traherne. The name of John Donne is usually included among the mystics of this period. Edmund Gosse makes the amazing statement that 'since the reign of Elizabeth English mysticism has always spoken in the voice of Donne.' This poet's influence upon religious verse has been far-reaching but it may very well be doubted whether Donne was ever, strictly speaking, a mystic. Whilst at Oxford he was attracted by the burning intensity of the austere Spanish mystics; and had it been possible for him with his scholastic education to fuse together the sensuous and metaphysical sides of his nature, his contribution to erotic mysticism would have been considerable.

Professor Garrod has said that as a young man, Donne 'had a solid respect for nothing else but the passions.' 'The Exstasie' indicates how far he might have gone in the sublimation of the Sex instinct to the Ideal love.

This Exstasie doth unperplex
(We said) and tell us what we love,
Wee see by this, it was not sexe,
Wee see, we saw not what did move:
But as all severall soules containe
Mixture of things, they know not what,
Love, these mixt soules, doth mixe again,
And makes both one each this and that.

230 THE LATER DEVELOPMENT OF MYSTICISM

But we seem to be listening to a very different voice when 'Johnnie Donne' becomes Dean of St. Paul's, though even in the *Divine Poems* occasional flames flare up from the slumbering fires of passion:

Divorce mee, 'untie, or breake that know againe,
Take mee to you, imprison mee, for I
Except you 'enthrall mee, never shall be free,
Nor ever chaste, except you ravish mee.

With his marriage and entrance into the Church, comparatively little of a mystical tendency remains, indeed there seems to have been something in his make-up incompatible with the unity of the mystic's mind. The two conflicting sides of him, the sensuous expansive and adventurous, and the critical and restrictive, were never, and perhaps could never, be reconciled so as to make one harmonious nature. 'He can never surrender to rapture; he is in conflict with his sensations in the very process of indulging them.' Nevertheless his significance for Erotic Mysticism is important.

There is little in George Herbert to foreshadow the later development of mystical thought with its franker acceptance of the joys of the senses. A poet who bids us hearken 'how the birds do sing,' only to remind us that

. . . man's joy and pleasure
Rather hereafter than present is,

can have but a small contribution to make to the kind of mysticism we are considering.

Richard Crashaw, on the other hand, has definite affinities with a mysticism wedded to the flesh, and in giving vent to his sensuous nature he is the precursor of Rossetti, Browning, Coventry Patmore and finally Walt Whitman. Within the latitude allowed by High Anglicanism and later, Roman Catholicism, Crashaw could find an outlet for the erotic element in his nature by directing glowing passion to the symbols of faith provided by the Church. In his adoration of the canonized women saints he found release both for the

THE LATER DEVELOPMENT OF MYSTICISM 231

spirit of devotion and his sensuous nature. Sometimes the voluptuous character of his feelings breaks the bounds of good taste:

What e're the youth of fire weares fair,
Rosy fingers, radiant hair,
Glowing cheek, and glistening wings,
All those fair and flagrant things.

The author of these lines cannot be accused of coldness, whatever other charges be brought against him. Love is the key-note in his verse. 'An hymn to the Name and Honour of the Admirable Santa Teresa,' 'An apology for the foregoing Hymn, as having been written while the author was yet among the Protestants,' and 'The Flaming Heart' mark the height of his mystical flight.

Henry Vaughan has been described as the lineal progenitor of Wordsworth. The attitude of both poets towards external nature was similar. Also, there are features in Vaughan's poems which suggest a trend in the direction of a more inclusive mysticism. For though he tended to regard light, the clouds and even childhood as symbols of the spiritual and eternal rather than entities to be loved for their own sakes, he nevertheless led the way to a new appreciation of external nature. Perhaps even more important as an impetus to mystical thought was the significance he attached to a return to childhood:

O how I long to travel back
And tread again the ancient track!
That I might once more reach that plain,
Where first I left my glorious traine.

A more complete treatment of this theme had to wait for Traherne and Wordsworth's 'Ode to Immortality,' but Vaughan could at least claim a share in that mysticism which requires a man to become again as a little child. That after his conversion Vaughan permitted the publication of his profane poems, so called; indicates that unlike Herbert, whose versification he often imitates, he could not bow his neck to the yoke of the Church. There was a struggle

232 THE LATER DEVELOPMENT OF MYSTICISM

in his nature between the Puritan and 'the Caresser of life,' and though he can sing,

There is in God some say
A deep but dazzling darkness; as men here
Say it is late and dusky, because they
See not all clear.
O for that night! Where I in Him
Might live invisible and dim,

he could never reconcile himself to the *Via Negativa*.

The rapid development of mysticism in English letters of a broader type with the coming of Thomas Traherne may be compared with those sudden leaps in nature which have called forth the term 'emergent evolution.' No religious writer before had entered into such an unfettered enjoyment of created things. His significance for modern mysticism is so important that we shall not attempt to deal with him in this article, but one has only to open the first page of *Centuries of Meditations* to realize how entirely Traherne has separated himself in attitude from Augustinian theology and Puritan restrictions. 'To condemn the world and to enjoy the world are things contrary to each other. How then can we condemn the world we are born to enjoy.' In Traherne a new chapter in English mysticism begins.

J. HENRY BODGENER, M.A.

Evolution or Creation. By Sir Ambrose Fleming, F.R.S.
(Marshall, Morgan & Scott. 3s. 6d.)

Sir Ambrose Fleming gathers together in this volume the substance of addresses given in various centres. He traces the upgrowth of the idea of evolution, 'from an unexpressed but nevertheless powerful desire to eliminate from the idea of a Final Cause the conception of Individuality and Will.' He holds that Evolution is 'insufficient as a philosophic or scientific solution of the problems of reality and existence.' He feels no grave objection to the use of the word Evolution if its meaning is strictly limited to describe a series of events or processes, without denying that there is or has been a continual manifestation of Divine Thought and Will. He thinks it perfectly allowable to assume that creation occupied vast spaces of time and was effected in a series of acts of Divine Power.

THE RELATIVE POSITION OF KEATS, SHELLEY AND BYRON, AS POETS

THERE can be little doubt as to Byron's place in this trio of poets. If poetry be the best words in the best order, Byron cannot be regarded as the greatest, for his rhythm is often halting. He sometimes shows signs of carelessness and his blank verse is frequently exceedingly awkward and unmelodious. Now this particular fault was very much more evident to Englishmen than to foreigners. The latter would not so speedily detect faults in rhythm and rhyme. Hence, in so far as the spirit and matter of his poems appealed to foreigners in that revolutionary era, he was easily first in their estimation. No poet ever achieved so rapid and indeed so permanent a continental fame. But it was the matter and not the spirit that appealed, the same characters would possibly have made him equally popular, expressed in prose. Or again to take another test, if poetry, as Plato said, must not only be pleasant, but useful to states (which Mr. McNeale Dixon emphatically repeats) this in some degree Byron fails to achieve, for one reads through his dashing romances and his interminable *Don Juan* without receiving the slightest suggestion as to how the colossal evils against which he protests are to be rectified.

He is pre-eminent among iconoclasts, almost prophetic at times in his ironical fury, though not prophetic of a diviner and humaner day's dawn, but rather of Chaos and Cimmerian darkness of despair. Childe Harold goes forth on his pilgrimage, driven out of his native land by remorse, the result of his own sins, of his revelries, and his drunken orgies. He wanders to seek distraction. There is the remnant of an artistic soul within his debauched and enfeebled body. History, its tragedy and comedy and Nature in the sublimities of the Alpine mountains and lakes appeal to him, and he proceeds to record, as in a species of verbal cinematograph,

the succession of happenings in the external world which have seemed to divert him. Despair is writ large across the world and his soul. He has tasted earth's sweets, but they have turned to gall and bitterness, and he can say, 'There is no strong granite of goodness upon which to lay the foundations of a new world for the ruins of the old.' The unnecessary and reckless rebels against history and the social order, have ever found temporary relief in Byron, but no thoughtful social reformer could trace one practical reformatory principle to his inspiration.

In the Oriental romances, 'Corinth,' 'Bride of Abydos,' 'Corsair,' 'Lara,' (written 1815-16) and the others, he presents himself in various disguises, always a rebel, defiant, restless, now triumphant now defeated, impulsive and unreasoning. In his dramas, especially in 'Manfred,' 'Cain,' and 'In Heaven and Earth' we have escaped from the gloomy personality of George Gordon in revolt against God and society. Manfred passes forth into darkness and death. There is no morning star shining on the far horizon, only the welter of waters and an oppressive darkness.

The Venetian plays and Sardanapalus manifest greater vision and artistry and in the Two Foscari and Marino Faliero one feels that Byron for a brief period loses sight of himself and exerts his undoubted artistic ability. The brilliant and coruscating satire of 'Don Juan' would be reason for placing Byron on a very high plane of satirical excellence but here again one is bound to exclaim *cui bono*. Byron manifests no trace of Greek inspiration in his poetry though he died for the Greek ideal.

The real question of relative position is, then, between Shelley and Keats. There are points of resemblance. They were contemporaries who rarely met and had small interest in each other. But they were both passionate lovers of beauty, Keats in its permanent and detailed characters, Shelley in its more opaline, and translucent and variable, manifestations. Both were influenced by the Greek spirit,

but Keats much more than Shelley. Keats was frankly a Greek by nature; Shelley by cultivation. Keats was temperamentally Greek. He writes it large over the portals of the temple of beauty. 'Beauty is Truth, Truth Beauty, that is all ye know on earth and all ye need know.' Therefore he takes a Grecian urn, gazes at it, drinks in the Beauty of its figures and of the arrangements of them until he is transported through three or four thousand years to that May morning of the religious festival and lives it all over again. Shelley could never have sung his Ode to a Grecian Urn. It would be difficult to conceive happier language. The poem is itself a 'thing of beauty and a joy for ever.' Beauty to Keats was fixed, static. It was an eternal fact that had become fixed in certain temporal foci. To Shelley it was rather evolutionary, evanescent, changing, elusive. Hence he was ever seeking and never finding. This explains the tragedy of his life.

There is a striking similarity between Keats and Browning and between Shelley and Tennyson in this respect, that Keats can only see beauty; he has no eye, no thought for anything else; Browning can only see the soul, one soul at a time, whereas Tennyson and Shelley range the universe and the centuries, past and to come. Judged by the canon of 'utility to states' Keats must be placed very high because though 'art for art's sake' seems to have been his theory, yet in so far as all great art purifies and educates, Keats was a great artist and therefore left the world purer and better educated than he found it. It is impossible for any living poet or even for the average man, to look through 'these magic casements opening on the foam of perilous seas in fairy lands forlorn' without experiencing a thrill of purification as when a fresh wind passes through a germ-laden sick room. In 'Isabella And The Pot Of Basil' he extracts sensation of beauty ineffable from murder and in it there are lines of an almost unspeakable beauty. McNeale Dixon has directed a most bitter and unreasonable attack upon Shelley in his 'English

Poetry.' He, the critic, is too much influenced by the art and morality idea to form a correct judgement, and he does not increase our respect for himself, by practically unsaying in the last paragraph all he had said previously. The student who reads the chapter on Shelley, who has not read Shelley, would probably think life too short to read him. The essence of his indictment is in the charge that Shelley serves no useful purpose. Even could it be shown that he shows us no way out of the sordid actualities of human life, it cannot be denied that it is better for states to be made to look at their own wounds and bruises and putrefying sores, than to be oblivious of them. Shelley sees beauty transient, iridescent. He is not satisfied. He must see beauty triumphant, permanent. He weds beauty to love. Love only can save the universe. He sets this forth in 'Prometheus Unbound' and in 'Adonais.' He has seen as in a vision 'the white radiance of eternity' and the vision saves him from despair as it is saving us from despair. Reflection and shadowy recollection of that beauty of white radiance have been caught sight of. Shelley 'follows the gleam,' and surely the man who 'follows the gleam' and sings us songs of hope, is useful to the State and indeed cannot be done without if the State is to survive amid so many discouragements.

Matthew Arnold attacked Shelley on quite a different ground. He said that Shelley invaded the realm of the musician, that there was more music than sense in his poetry. This is a most unfair criticism. It is true that he becomes incoherent at times. But generally, the music is not incompatible with absolute clearness. This would seem to be Shelley's claim to the highest place. The music of his verse, its haunting melody, its luscious tones, create just that necessary pleasure which makes the reader in spite of himself look steadily at beauty and at the 'loveliness of that realm far from the sphere of our sorrow.'

Shelley differs from Byron in regard to the matter and spirit of his work. Shelley looks up to heaven, Byron looks

down into Hell. Both are in passionate and relentless revolt against the social crime, the oppression of the people, their ignorance and vulgarity, but whereas Byron shows them no pathway of redemption, Shelley constantly proclaims Love as the Star of Hope. '*Amor vincit omnia*' that is his doctrine. Love as Boethius taught, shall yet bind manifestly as indeed it does now, in design and purpose, heaven and earth, men and beasts and herbs and flowers into one glorious and mutually helpful fellowship. Surely this alone will help us to put Shelley first in this trio of poets and very near the triumphal seat of the God of Poetry.

E. J. B. KIRTLAN, B.A., D.D.

The Infinity of God. By B. R. Brasnett, M.A., B.D. (Longmans & Co. 7s. 6d.)

Canon Brasnett, who has already made his mark as the author of *The Suffering of the Impassible God*, continues his speculations in Christian Theism in the present work upon a difficult subject. Taking his stand within the orthodox theology he carries it forward to what are said to be orthodox conclusions by arguments which show much freedom and ingenuity of thought. The notion of infinity is one of the most obscure in philosophy, yet by defining it as 'reaching limits and passing beyond them in a range that is far and free' he contrives to play upon the common antithesis of finite and infinite, as used, say, of Christ, in a way that is fascinating and perhaps helpful. Thus Christ as God was infinite, as man was finite. He loved as man to the utmost of his finite capacity, and learned only hereafter that His love was infinite in eternity. Even God's love, however, alone is infinite; his power and knowledge have certain limitations. So that in the end the Incarnation is the infinite love of God made manifest in perfect and complete human love, whilst knowledge and power needed not to be even humanly complete. This way of thinking brings Christ into historical credibility. It seems to forget, however, that it is good theology to say that God's attributes involve each other, so that if one is infinite presumably they all are so. But 'infinite' will need to be defined more exactly than it is by Mr. Brasnett.

ATKINSON LEE.

A GRANDFATHER'S MEMORIES¹

FIVE years ago Mr. Murray published the memoir of *Lord Chief Baron Pollock* by his grandson, Lord Hanworth (Sir Ernest Pollock), Master of the Rolls. Now another grandson has had the happy thought of describing his friends and his experiences for the benefit of his little grandson. It is no small pleasure to look over the child's shoulder and watch the world through the eyes of one who has played a distinguished part in legal and literary history.

Sir Frederick was born in 1845 and opens his story with a chapter on 'Everyday Life.' Candles were the usual indoor light in his boyhood. Each table at the Athenæum Club had its own candle, and when the reign of electricity set in old members were inconsolable till every table was furnished with a small electric lamp made to look as like a candle as possible. There was in those days, a solid round table in the middle of the room with a couple of candles in the centre. About 1860 joints began to be carved at a side-table and ultimately in the kitchen, though as late as the 1890's Sir Frederick had to carve at a luncheon in South Molton for some thirty members. The dinner hour in the Middle Ages had been noon. A Year Book reports that the judges firmly refused to start a new argument after eleven o'clock saying the Court was already sitting quite late enough. In Dr. Johnson's time dinner was at three. 'Later hours were made possible by increased lighting and necessary by the increase of the world's business.' Motor vehicles abated the irritating and evil-smelling stable dust which filled the air. A well-appointed hansom, however, was 'a mighty pleasant conveyance on a fine day. Ten miles an hour, or maybe twelve, with the air on one's face and a clear outlook,

¹ *For my Grandson: Remembrances of an Ancient Victorian.* By the Right Hon. Sir Frederick Pollock, Bart., K.C. (John Murray, 1933.)

made a singular combination of enjoyments.' A four-wheeled open carriage was not near it. Domestic life had its code. A gentleman must possess real silver and had to keep a man-servant to guard his plate. The mistress of the house herself served out tea from the caddy which was kept locked at other times.

Sir Frederick was sent to Eton and thence to Trinity College, Cambridge. At Eton he was a pupil of William Johnson, afterwards known as Cory. He had the art of setting boys to learn with understanding. He put the *Shaving of Shagpat* into Pollock's hands long before he knew anything of George Meredith. He also taught the boys to feel a living interest in history and to see its importance in forming a wide and rational outlook on public affairs.

Pollock went up to Trinity College, Cambridge, where his father and grandfather had been before him. He ought really, as an Eton boy, to have gone to King's, and its old Provost was highly displeased. Sir Frederick has seen four Masters of Trinity. Whewell was severe and unpopular, Thompson's fastidious taste and keen wit concealed his genial nature from superficial observers. Montagu Butler was an accomplished humanist and a brilliant speaker; Sir J. J. Thomson is a master in mathematical physics.

Whewell was overbearing and at his formal receptions at the Lodge 'stood up radiating repulsion,' Thompson restored the Lodge to its proper function as the social as well as the official centre of College, and dispensed a noble hospitality.

Sir Frederick's chief good fortune at Cambridge was being elected in his second year a member of the famous Cambridge Apostles of which Henry Sidgwick and Henry Jackson were leaders. He owed much also to the friendship of Bradshaw, the University Librarian, and had the joy of healing a breach between him and Jackson by inviting them both to meet in his rooms. The trifling misunderstanding was forgotten and they remained friends to the last day of Bradshaw's life.

Pollock became a Fellow of Trinity in 1868 and in 1883 was chosen Professor of Jurisprudence at Oxford, where, under the terms of the foundation, he was a Fellow of Corpus Christi. He thinks Jowett's real genius lay in fitting his pupils to make the very most of their capacities, and not only to be but to appear all that they were worth. 'Jowett's disciples went forth into the world with a peculiar stamp of complete and active readiness, and without envy from competitors to whom their success had an element of mystery.' One special feature of their training was writing essays under the tutor's critical supervision with special attention to style and effect. Ingram Bywater embodied the best traditions of the Renaissance, and had an extraordinary knowledge of books and bibliography. One of Sir Frederick's earliest recollections is of evenings at home where his father read Waverley Novels and his mother Shakespeare's plays. *Ivanhoe* was specially attractive but he thinks that Peacock's *Maid Marion* beats it 'all round, and not only by its capital merit of being written in natural English.' James Spedding was an intimate friend of the family and was no less devoted to Shakespeare than the father and mother. So also was Edward Fitzgerald, whose *Omar Khayyám* has such a wide reputation, though his exquisite dialogue *Euphranor* remains the delight of a few. His place as a letter-writer is assured and his conversation had its own charm and power.

Sir Frederick has some pleasant notes on clever talkers. Gertrude Bell was one of the most eminent. 'She combined all the qualities: an ample store of matter in travel and adventure which not many men could rival, wide curiosity guided by keen intellect, readiness in speech, great power of expression, and the crowning virtue of never showing off. She was not only a great traveller and explorer but a complete mountaineer; she had one escape from an all but desperate situation, in which the party was saved largely by her courage and self-possession. . . . It was a loss to the British Empire, to the world of letters, above all to Iraq, that she did not live

longer, and a lamentable surprise to her older friends.' George Eliot would have been a good talker if Lewes had not posed her as a pontiff and allowed only one visitor at a time to speak to her. Madame Duclaux stands out as an Englishwoman who lives in Paris and has there perfected herself in the art of conversation.

Sir Frederick saw Tennyson many times and bears witness that his outward brusqueness of manner, especially with strangers and chance acquaintances, was no more than a superficial effect of shyness; a shyness aggravated, if not caused, by short sight. Some pleasant sketches are given of journalists, editors and scientists with whom Sir Frederick was brought into contact. The Huxley of controversy was not 'the Huxley whom we knew at home. There his conversation was delightful; he was pleasant, versatile, full of experience, and with an abundant sense of humour, a blessing denied to many philosophers and notably to Herbert Spencer.'

Tyndall was a lifelong friend whose charm of character endeared him to his own circle. 'A certain exuberance in his written style is just Irishry, and so was his indifference to the danger of Englishmen taking his epithets too literally, or using the sense for their quite different ends.' Sir Frederick still remembers the charm of Faraday's lectures for children at the Royal Institution. He had the gift of making things quite clear without any sign of effort.

Pauline Viardot and Joachim were the two most perfect musical artists whom he has known. He was one of the executive committee that took over the Joachim Quartet Concerts and he prepared the address which was presented to the great violinist on the diamond jubilee in 1904 of his first appearance in England in 1844. There is much about the stage, especially the Comédie Française. Beside Eleonora 'Duse's art Sarah Bernhardt's was—to say it bluntly—a bag of tricks: mighty pretty tricks and executed with astonishing skill, but nevertheless tricks—unlimited virtuosity on an instrument of limited compass, but not imaginative genius.'

The chapter on the Inns of Court throws light on many points which a lay reader will welcome. It also describes the duties which he had to discharge as marshal to Mr. Justice Willes on the Western Circuit in 1870. Pollock acted as aide-de-camp, private secretary, and helper in work not judicial. He took notes of the pleadings, and Willes seeing his interest, made them a text for instructions from which he learnt more of the Common Law in one month than he could have learnt in any other fashion in six. He regards Willes, Macnaghten and Bowen as the greatest English judges he has known. In Bowen's reported judgements the whole reasoning process stands out so that the author is armed at all points; Macnaghten seems to be talking shrewdly round the whole matter, till with one luminous sentence he goes right to the vital point. The judgements of Lord Justice James, hardly inferior to Jessel's in learning and acuteness, were much more elegant in form, and some passages deserve to be classical.

Sir Frederick says he owed much to his learned friend, James Brice, who was his legal colleague at Oxford for ten years. He was appointed editor of the Law Reports in 1895 and has thus been brought into living touch with the practising leaders of the profession. He has much to say about law beyond the seas.

A great charm of the book, as the little grandson will some day discover, is the final chapter on Travel and Recreation with its account of camping in Canada, his Alpine experiences, and the fencing which has stood by him longest of all his recreations.

It is a pleasant thing to turn from his own remembrances to his cousin's life of Lord Chief Baron Pollock, with its extraordinary account of his Senior Wranglership, his love of Wesley's sermons and his letters to Frederick in 1867-1869. They give weight to the old judge's words: 'I have had a very large family, and I own I had rather occupy my position as the *head of such* a family than have any title or wealth without them.'

JOHN TELFORD, B.A.

Notes and Discussions

TRAHERNE AND THE SPIRITUAL VALUE OF NATURE STUDY

THOMAS TRAHERNE, the seventeenth-century English mystic and religious thinker who is not yet as highly valued by us all as he deserves to be, once worked out for a friend a system of spiritual exercises based on observation of Nature which I venture to think would be well worth bringing more prominently into present-day notice. Ours is certainly an age when Nature and the world out-of-doors has a wide appeal—wider perhaps than ever before in our history; currents of this strong feeling are to be felt all round us, from the great national movements to preserve places of natural beauty to the universal popularity of 'hiking.' Many a man who is not easily reached by the Churches is yet responsive to the Divine as expressed in Nature; and to him and to others the deeply spiritual Christian teaching of Traherne based on exquisite perception of Nature's wonder might well come home with healing and with light.

Traherne was remarkable in his own day, unique in that Restoration age of cynical wit and brilliant urbanity, for the kind and quality of his emotional response to natural beauty. He was a far-off pioneer of Blake and of the great Romantics a century later. And he believed that in following the clue of Nature he had found a path that David and other saints and heroes had found before him, and one that infallibly brought those who followed it into the presence of God.

How Traherne came to write of these things was—as far as we can now reconstruct the story—somewhat as follows. He had a friend, a sincere Christian, painstaking in all religious duties, a thoroughly good woman; yet one who nevertheless had failed to find the radiant joy and power which Traherne knew, and which he believed to be an essential part of a living Christian religion. It was for her that he went back over the path of his own experience to describe it, and to point out with tender and encouraging persuasiveness what she too must do if she would emerge from the valleys and dwell with him on the sunlit peaks. What he wrote for her was no set treatise or book of rules; the short numbered paragraphs are more like extracts from letters, with all the charm of intimacy, and yet lit from within by the ardour of Traherne's own devotion to God. Never in the first instance destined for publication, they have come down to us in manuscript, and have been printed only in 1908 as *Centuries of Meditations*, a book praised without stint by world-famous critics and with a still profounder appeal to wayfaring Christians. There the reader will find set forth in fullest detail and with a flaming ardour of conviction those spiritual exercises and the religious discipline which constitute

the strange and lovely Way of Return to God through the gate of Nature as Traherne himself had trodden it.

Only the briefest outline of Traherne's teaching is possible here. The first axiom is that there is no natural thing whatsoever in the universe that is common or ordinary. It is, he insists, only a dull and sleeping spirit which fails to perceive the astonishing marvel of the common. The first essential therefore for the sluggard soul, the first step towards the regaining of spiritual health, is to be awakened to the miraculousness of the physical world around it; and the method is perceptive and emotional observation. Anything will do for a starting-point—an acorn, a mote of dust, the sun; and for all its seeming simplicity it will tax every resource of intellect and imagination and spirit before a man has done with it.

'Place yourself therefore in the midst of the world as if you were alone, and meditate upon all the services which it doth unto you. Suppose the sun were absent, and conceive the world to be a dungeon of darkness and death about you; you will then find his beams more delightful than the approach of Angels, and loathe the abomination of that sinful blindness whereby you see not the glory of so great and bright a creature because the air is filled with its beams. Then you will think that all its light shineth for you, and confess that God hath manifested Himself indeed in the preparation of so divine a creature. You will abhor the madness of those who esteem a purse of gold more than it. Alas, what could a man do with a purse of gold in an everlasting dungeon? And shall we prize the sun less than it, which is the light and fountain of all our pleasures? . . . It raiseth corn to supply you with food, it melteth waters to quench your thirst, it infuseth sense into all your members, it illuminates the world to entertain you with prospects, it surroundeth you with the beauty of hills and valleys. It moveth and laboureth night and day for your comfort and service; it sprinkleth flowers upon the ground for your pleasure, and in all these things sheweth you the goodness and wisdom of a God that can make one thing so beautiful, delightful, and serviceable, having ordained the same to innumerable ends. It concocteth minerals, raiseth exhalations, begetteth clouds, sendeth down the dew and rain and snow that refresheth and repaireth all the earth . . .'

Meditate constantly in this fashion, says Traherne; think about all the common things within your range of experience—air and light, heaven and earth, water, trees, men and women, cities and temples. Think about them until you see them not only as the scientist sees them but also as the poet and the philosopher—till you see their relationships in eternity as well as in time. Then and only then may you claim to enjoy Nature, or really 'see' the things of Nature.

'Your enjoyment of the world is never right, till every morning you wake in Heaven; see yourself in your Father's Palace, and look upon the skies, the earth, and the air, as Celestial Joys; having such a reverend esteem of all as if you were among the Angels. The bride of a monarch in her husband's chamber hath no such causes of delight as you.

'You never enjoy the world aright, till the Sea itself floweth in your veins, till you are clothed with the heavens, and crowned with the stars; and perceive yourself to be the sole heir of the whole world, and more than so because men are in it who are every one sole heirs as well as you. Till you can sing and rejoice and delight in God as misers do in gold and kings in sceptres, you never enjoy the world aright.

'Till your spirit filleth the whole world, and the stars are your jewels; till you are as familiar with the ways of God in all Ages as with your walk and table . . . till you more feel it than your private estate, and are more present in the hemisphere considering the glories and beauties there, than in your own house . . . you never enjoy the world.'

It is no small part of the devotional value of the *Centuries*, from which the foregoing are extracts, that Traherne compels us to see with

him the wonder of so many things, from a blade of grass to a thinking mind, that we in our blindness have passed by.

This quality of enjoyment is the great reward of a long discipline of the mind—'As nothing is more easy than to think, so nothing is more difficult than to think well.' (Traherne himself was ten years before this orientation became habitual and effortless.) Nevertheless this deep power of joy which sees into the heart of things is not an end in itself. Power of willed attention, insight, joy, are but the first three steps of a ladder. But the man who has mounted so far may go on if he will to new heights of spiritual understanding. Traherne was convinced that from this beginning one who pressed onward would come to a rational conviction that the whole physical universe was perfectly—and only—explicable as a love-token from a Divine Lover to Man the infinitely beloved; that the essential nature of God was a Love-Energy; that Man is literally made in the image of God and potentially divine; that the Incarnation of God in the person of Jesus Christ was not only the supreme fact of history but supremely rational. All this Traherne demonstrates in the book written for the inspiration and convincing of his friend; a book strangely preserved from accident, strangely restored to our own age.¹

And the first step, within the compass of us all, is a patient observation of Nature's miracles. Yet on a faith so founded, Traherne built for his personal life one of the loftiest forms of Christian mysticism that the world has seen. I cannot refrain from one last quotation.

'Suppose a river, or a drop of water, an apple or a sand, an ear of corn, or an herb; God knoweth infinite excellences in it more than we. He seeth how it relateth to angels and men; how it proceedeth from the most perfect Lover to the most perfectly Beloved; how it representeth all His attributes; how it conduceth in its place by the best of means to the best of ends; and for this cause it cannot be beloved too much. God the Author, and God the End, is to be beloved in it; Angels and Men are to be beloved in it; and it is highly to be esteemed for all their sakes. O what a treasure is every sand when truly understood! Who can love any thing God made too much? His infinite goodness and wisdom and power and glory are in it. What a world would this be, were every thing beloved as it ought to be!'

G. I. WADE, M.A., Ph.D. (Lond.)

IF THIS IS GOD'S WORLD!

THE question of progress will always exercise the mind of man. He will always want to know if life has improved and how. Moreover, he will always be intrigued by a pictorial demonstration of it. If he is a detached spectator, with a splash of the laconic in him, he will, like Aldous Huxley, see in progress just the innumerable kickings of many boots at the posterior of Leviathan. If he is a high-brow, like Dean Inge, he will view it merely as something to hope for. And if, by any chance, he is an ordinary man, he may see signs of progress but feel a sense of inability to relate it to a unifying principle.

¹ The full story of the discovery and identification of these MSS. of Traherne will be found in the Preface written by the late Bertram Dobell, who published the *Centuries of Meditations* in 1908.

To believe in progress is certainly more than merely to make an assertion concerning it. Questions, fundamental and far-reaching, are involved. Why do we believe in progress and on what grounds? And fully to reply necessitates a discussion of such matters as a belief in God, the permanence or otherwise of civilization, the power of science and invention both as contrasted with and opposed to the idealism of man. The position is resolved for most people, however, into the alternative between a breakdown of civilization—the universe lying about us in ruins—and the inevitability of progress. Are we living in a world where men can permanently go wrong or in a world where, however long the road and roundabout the journey, they must go right, reaching out to some Promised Land? It would seem that the pendulum of judgement has again been swinging to extremes. A few decades ago, almost all men argued that the world was getting better every day. Then came the war and many began to doubt. Since the war that doubting has turned into definite assertion, assertion, it must be admitted, not too carefully stated though forceful and impressive. Thus Rev. Dr. James Reid, in his Warwick Lectures, spoke about the illusions which have been 'shattered for many people by the experience of the last few years, or will need to be shattered. . . . One is the mechanical idea of progress. The notion that there is such a thing as a river or stream of progress that somehow carries us along if only we will just drift and so, somehow, "get better and better every day" or every century, is gone for ever.' Now on the face of it this statement appears convincing. Yet, without being didactical, is it not pertinent to ask, first, if it is really possible for man to drift and, secondly, whether or not this so-called illusion of the mechanical idea of progress (though how a man who believes in God can accept the phrase 'mechanical idea of progress' is puzzling) is due to an inability to relate the diversities of misfortunes, disasters and setbacks, to the main stream of progress? It would appear that Dr. Reid, and those who think like him, have become frightened at the laziness, indifference and neglect of many people to the needs of morality and worth. They do not condemn mankind, they are rather more than anxious that men should arouse themselves to the seriousness of their plight, their imminent danger and disaster.

But is the plight men are in the same as Dr. Reid indicates? Can men really stop progress? Can they put an end to improvement? Will they ever be able to bring the universe to ruins? Is it possible to live in a world where men can do this? If so, the faith of many people will be more rudely shaken than it is possible to imagine, and the damage more real than could ever be possible in telling them that the world will go on progressing. Dr. Reid himself agrees that the shattering of these illusions has, with many, only produced despair—despair of any progress, or of any power in the Christian faith, or of any help in God. Inevitably so. Yet it would seem their only remedy is to begin to face their tasks and look unto God. But as to whether or not such action is the condition of discovering

there is no progress that is inevitable is both uncertain and questionable. This matter needs to be seen clearly and seen whole.

The question brings us back to God and His relation with the world. Do we live in a fortuitous world, a world of chance, where there is no direction, no purpose, and where men might and can go irretrievably wrong? If this is so, then it is natural to see folly and stupidity in the idea of 'a stream of progress.' But if we live in a world which is God's world, governed and directed by Mind, it would seem a reflection to say that man can bring all this to nought. It is true, of course, that to assert that 'this is God's world' needs faith and a faith not unrelated to science, biology, psychology and metaphysics. Yet, for the Christian, it is not demanded he shall be *au fait* with such subjects before he can give reasonable assent to a belief that this world is God's world. It may be reassuring to have Sir James Jeans' inference of a mathematical mind at the back of the universe and Professor Eddington's assurance of the reasonableness of an ideal—a goal for life, or of some psychologists that there is something deeper in man than either Freud or Jung have found. But for the Christian, reason is satisfied when something other than what appears is acknowledged, an 'otherness' in and about and through the universe—a power not ourselves. And most of us are led to acknowledge this position. Behind all beauty there is more beauty, beyond all discovery there is more to be discovered, beneath all truth there is more to be revealed. There is always something beyond man, something more than he understands, something 'other than' himself. Reason, then, is satisfied. It is for the Christian to believe that this 'otherness' is God.

This is God's world. What does that mean for man? Does it not mean a loving, interested, recreating God whom Jesus said was our Father; a Father who seeks our good, pardoning our offences, bringing men to justice, improving things; a God continuously working in and through us? And if God be God can we despair concerning the world and progress? If this is God's world can we doubt the inevitability of progress? With a slight emendation of Pippa's song can we not justifiably sing, 'God is in man, all will be right with the world'? Truth, Beauty, Goodness, are in the hands of God. It is for man to struggle until he appraises them. And God is in man reconciling him to these great ends. Men all down the ages have been urged to hasten to their enjoyment. If they have been idle and dilatory, it is neither wise nor safe to deduce that these great ends will come to nought. There is surely some other explanation.

In seeking a further explanation the question arises, Do we regard men as naturally good or naturally evil? Is there a possibility of man, owing to his inherent nature, going wrong? Is it possible for the world to be eternally lost? Does man left to himself go astray? Is man ever left to himself? These are vital questions.

They are not new. St. Paul, it would appear, held that man—universal man—left to himself, goes wrong. Boswell once observed to Johnson: 'But, sir, do you not think that man is naturally good?'

'No more than a wolf,' replied the great man. Whitefield once appealed to a congregation asking whether he had wronged human nature in saying with good Bishop Hall that 'a man left to himself is half a devil, half a beast.' Professor A. E. Taylor hazards the opinion that a man cannot lift himself by the hairs of his own head. On the other hand, Rousseau believed—though it is now fashionable to discredit him (so change fashions of thought), Dr. Jacks saying a little while ago that there was a lot of pernicious stuff about Rousseau—that man was naturally good. He said: 'Vice and error are introduced into man from without and are due to his institutions.' It may not be and, indeed, hardly is possible to accept Rousseau's position in its entirety (man being responsible for his institutions and, therefore, responsible for their effect on him), yet it does make a difference as to whether or not we accept the view of the natural goodness or natural sinfulness of man. Paul believed that man needed God to come in and redeem him—which He did in Christ. Rousseau believed that man was ever expressing God, sometimes wrongly, sometimes darkly, but still expressing God. If Paul's view is followed then there is always the possibility of man closing his heart to God, and such a condition would mean that man and the universe could go wrong; God not being able to realize His purpose without man. Thus God, in spite of a kind of an accompanying belief that this is God's world, could be defeated. But if God is in man, inevitably in man, of necessity in man, man, it would seem, could not and cannot go permanently wrong. He could only delay the enjoyment of the great ends and qualities of life.

Once more, then, we return to the problem of the mechanical idea of progress. If by 'mechanical' it is meant that God has wound up men like a clock so that they cannot err or make mistakes (clocks, of course, do go wrong) the sooner the better, as James Reid says, we shattered the illusion. If the users of the expression mean, however, that they are opposed to the idea of a stream of progress or against the idea of the world getting better every day, they ought to hesitate. If this is God's world and God is working through man and being expressed by him, is there not a stream of progress in the world? And if God is interested in men, interested in improving things, is mankind not getting better and better every day? If the answer is in the negative, the problem will be to find out the kind of God that is being worshipped. The difficulty of course, concerns the stream of progress along which, so it is imagined, men are carried and just allow themselves to drift. But, again, can we drift in God's world? Was not Mr. Bernard Shaw right when, some years ago, he suggested that men were coming back to Christ in spite of themselves? And even James Reid, in another place, admits 'We can be sure of this—there is a conspiracy in life to bring men to the need of God,' though how he can maintain this position in the light of his other assertions it is difficult to see. God's conspiracy is an open conspiracy. He is 'clearing things up' continuously. And He is doing it in men—clearing their vision, their hearing, their mind and heart.

Does mankind, then, inevitably progress? Yes, on the whole, inevitably. There may be individuals, groups, communities, nations, peoples who fail, who miss the mark, who sin. There may be a year, a decade, a century when we seem to recede—get worse. But on the whole civilization is, as W. H. Hudson puts it in quoting Posnett's *Comparative Literature*—'A movement by no means regular, but often spasmodic, back and forward, forward and back, though on the whole forward.' Without such a belief men will, as likely as not, become pessimists, content to say with Evelyn Waugh, that there is no such thing as progress, only change. For if God can be defeated and if man can fail, with all our anxiety to save both man and God we shall always have a doubt, an uncertainty, at the back of our minds. But if we believe that the Hound of Heaven will flee us down the ages or, with Maud Royden, that we are matched against infinite love, we shall find a sure ground for the ultimate victory of God and a meliorist view of life.

Do we, then, inevitably improve? And because of it shall we drift? We cannot drift. The inevitability is within us. 'Trailing clouds of glory do we come' and our life, if there is a God, will never be stripped of those varying spiritual gossamers. The mistakes and errors and sins of groups and communities, the years of wrong decision and the decades of indecision, delay the gaining of life's treasures, but, as the saying goes, 'we shall come again.' We shall seek, inevitably seek, for the treasures in spite of our sins. It may be true that humanity has chained itself and is still chained, chained to Forsytism, to the love of money, power and status. But God in man is breaking the chain. It is inevitable that the chain shall be broken. And other chains, too, of laziness, of neglect, cowardice, weariness, inferiorities. In spite of everything they shall be broken. They are being broken now, though, like a thing that appears all right when it is not all right, many are deceived by appearances. It is simply tragic to discover how men are losing faith and, in consequence, becoming indifferent: disarmament advocates, League of Nations exponents, Internationalists. They have witnessed the breakdown of the Disarmament Conference, they have seen the League of Nations compromised by its action concerning Japan and the Manchurian question, they have become conscious of a resurgence of the spirit and temper of Nationalism. And they are quaking before it. But not all. To others, all this is recognized as a 'backward' move. But it will not be for ever back. Rather, it is, to them, but a sign of the inevitability not of non-success but of a subsequent birth of a new and better life. In spite of everything, a world consciousness is on the way. It may, at the moment, be dammed back by the barriers of Tariff walls, national boundaries and limited views, but the breakdown of the barriers is assured. It is assured just because men love life. The way they are going is death though, as yet, they see it not. But see it they will—some day. Some have, so to say, seen it from afar, and because of it have passed beyond hope: they have gained conviction. In every regression there are those, the righteous

remnant, the seer, the prophet, who see what it all means and in their seeing there is an inevitability against drift and destruction. And if this is God's world we should expect it to be so. The life men love may be low in the scale of values but it is not inconceivable that the condition of living may create its own necessity of truth. Thus men will come to recognize, of necessity, that in order to live, a world order of life must be conceived and adopted. The consciousness of such an inevitability is even now trickling through: Industrialists, Financiers, Bankers, have made chinks in the barricades of the nations. Progress, then, is indubitably certain. From Nationalism to Internationalism men must go, from Individualism to Universalism, from exclusiveness to inclusiveness, from falsehood to truth, from fear to faith and from hate to love. In the process man might travel backwards and forwards, but in the long run the forward step shall be taken. Man was meant for good and the good ends of life. He must be persuaded not to delay his enjoyment of them. All he needs is to be shown clearly what he is missing and its desirability. The longer he delays his desire for them the longer he will go on suffering the sorrows of those who make inferiorities their satisfaction. To let men see how much more they suffer than they need to suffer is the task of all awakened people. If this is God's world He is always seeking to awaken those that sleep. Men will never be allowed to sleep the sleep of death.

T. W. BEVAN.

CHRISTIAN INVULNERABILITY

THE most striking feature of our modern world is its increasing suppression of individual freedom. We see this in Church affairs in the movements towards Catholicism, both Roman and non-Roman. In matters of State the uprising of dictatorships reveals the same tendency. There is a wide-spread effort to reverse the whole direction of European history, which, as Dr. Whitehead has shown, has been primarily an evolution from 'the notion of society based upon servitude to that of society based upon individual freedom.' To this transformation Greece contributed her fine philosophical thinking, Rome, her becoming sense of the need for law and order; and Palestine the moral energy of her faith.

The present world-tendency is not merely a rejection of the precious heritage of the past and a betrayal of the achievements of our fathers; it is a serious menace to Christianity, which has ever insisted upon the worth of the individual human soul; more even than this, it is a denial of the very nature of man, for the essence of manhood is that a man shall be able to stand alone.

Dr. Oman has shown that common to the four classic definitions of man, as a rational, a tool-using, a laughing, and a religious animal, is their emphasis upon man's ability to stand. 'All alike show that man does not accept his environment in the way it is accepted by

other animals. To be rational is to think of things no longer merely as they happen, but to inquire into their permanent relations; to use tools is to accept no more the arrangements of life made for him; to learn to laugh is not to submit to the immediate impression of what threatens, but to determine his own impression by twitching off its mask; to be religious is to face the immediate and convenient, even when he could not think, or work, or laugh himself out of them, and to look for something more reliable in them and more permanent beyond them. Thus all are phases in the one peculiarity in man that somehow he was able to gain a footing amid the mere flux of his experience.' Since it is unlikely that man won four separate and unconnected victories over his environment, Oman seeks a common root-stock. He concludes that that which gave man faith to stand on his own feet in the flood of circumstance was the sacred. 'The moment man said "this is sacred" . . . he began to be master of himself, and master in his world. Then in some true sense of the word, he began to be free.' Thus Oman's reading of pre-history and Whitehead's review of history agree in emphasizing the importance of individual freedom, and in asserting that this freedom is based on faith. If, however, man's distinctive independence sprang from faith, this independence can never be self-contained, final, absolute; it must, in the last resort, be a DE-pendence.

The modern disregard of the individual is due partly to our habit of over-socializing everything, and partly to the disappointment which has come to those who have sought personal freedom not derived from faith. Many capable thinkers have applied the 'Learned Knife' to our European culture. Admitting that we owe much to Rome, and even more to Greece, they have cut the faith of Palestine out of their reckoning. Their mental atmosphere may have been in line with high Platonic tradition, and their aim with the Stoic end of attaining invulnerable simplicity of soul. But simplicity is one thing, simplification another. 'To be simple is all very well, but turn it into an active verb, and you spoil the whole idea. To simplify seems forced.' The wisdom of Greece and the strength of Rome need vitalizing by the religion of Palestine if they are to be made adequate to the needs of life.

Even Christian thinkers are sometimes strangely blind in this matter. Some of our Christian Platonists are more Platonist than Christian. They need reminding that, as one of our own ministers wrote, 'The Greek has given us mighty and imperishable things, but there are some elements of the New Testament tradition which he may still regard as foolishness.'

In the realm of practical ethics, in matters of daily conduct, the teaching of the New Testament is the only teaching which really meets our needs. The thought of Greece easily becomes 'high-brow,' out of touch with common life; at best its intellectuality puts it out of reach of the many. To turn from Greece to Palestine is to breathe a different air. Baron von Hügel estimates our debt to Hellenism as consisting chiefly in its insistence upon four main values:—(i) Universality;

the sense of the universal nature of philosophy: (ii) Conversion; the conviction of moral accountableness . . . and of the need of conversion . . . philosophy is a redemption, a liberation of the soul from the body: (iii) Unification; the dominant consciousness of Multiplicity in Unity, and Unity in Multiplicity: (iv) Transcendence; an unfailing faith in an unexhausted and inexhaustible world of Beauty, Truth, and Goodness. But Greek philosophy ends in abstraction. Turning to Christianity von Hügel finds a new concreteness, and suggests that the originality of the Faith consists not in any specific doctrines, nor even in its teaching as a whole, but 'in its revelation through the person and example of its Founder, of the altogether unsuspected depth and inexhaustibleness of human personality.'

Our joy as preachers is that we bring to our people a Gospel rather than a philosophy; a Gospel which implies a philosophy greater than even Greece attained; a Gospel which includes the treasures of the Greek heritage by transcending them. Men can lay hold of the idea of Universality when it is presented to them in the form of the thought that God is the Father of all. Unification, the relating of the One to the Many and the Many to the One, has never been dealt with more simply and richly than in the Christian doctrine of the Fatherhood of God. Over against Greek abstraction Christianity reveals the Son who is so completely one with the Father, that He can say, 'He that hath seen Me hath seen the Father.' Our message is that the Son of God became the Son of Man so that the sons of men might know that they could become the sons of God. Transcendence loses its misty vagueness and becomes real to those who believe in a God who is Creator and Sustainer of all that has been, is, or shall be. Thus Universality, Unification and Transcendence come to a common focal-point in the Faith that 'There is one God who is the Creator, Preserver, and Ruler of all things; who is over all, and through all, and in all.' In the matter of Conversion also, Christianity is clearer and deeper than Hellenism. Greek intellectualism restricted the need and possibility of Conversion to the thinker. Again, Christian Conversion is no mere liberation of the soul from the body, but leads to a salvation of the soul even within the body; nay, more; it views the body itself as a temple of the Holy Ghost.

Christianity is adequate to meet the practical personal problems of men because it began in the fact that God became Man. God crowned His teachings with a showing so that we might the more clearly perceive His will. 'God, who at sundry times and in divers manners, spake in times past unto the fathers by the prophets, Hath in these last days spoken unto us in one who is a Son.' The teaching, the thought, the 'Word was made flesh, and dwelt among us.'

There are some disheartened souls who would once have agreed with Whitehead that the significant thing in history has been a growing insistence upon the individual, and with Oman, that the distinguishing mark of man was his attainment of individuality. But they are disappointed with the results of their strivings, and

it is their failure which is driving the world back into the 'dark ages.' Men have echoed Augustine's cry, 'Our hearts have no rest,' but they have omitted his major premise, 'Thou hast made us for Thyself,' and hence have fallen short of his conclusion, 'our hearts have no rest UNTIL WE REST IN THEE.' If we seek an independence which is utter and self-sufficient, which is not rooted and grounded in faith, we may attain to Stoic endurance, but we shall miss peace, and wisdom.

Wisdom has been defined 'as being at home in the universe.' Herein lies the final failure of Stoic self-sufficiency—'The *anima mundi* of the Stoic is there to be respected and submitted to, the Christian God is there to be loved; and the difference of emotional atmosphere is like that between an arctic climate and the tropics.' If wisdom does involve being at home in the universe where can we find a higher wisdom than in the Faith which views God as 'our dwelling-place from one generation to another,' and which asserts that 'in Him we live, and move, and have our being'?

But most of our people are troubled not with the metaphysical problem of relating themselves to the universe, but with what they conceive to be the more vital issue of learning how to withstand bitter adversity, how to harmonize self with circumstance. Put two men into the same environment and note what happens. Take a world-conqueror, a Napoleon, shut him away on an island where he can no longer 'wade through slaughter to a throne,' and his last days are filled with petty, almost childish irritations, with little-minded complainings against the British government. Take a Christian saint, a John, put him also on an island surrounded by an impassable wall of steely waters; the perfect liberty of the sons of God remains with him. His spirit soars and he finds the Holy City coming down to meet him. He has the freedom of the City and it is no mean city but a city whose builder and maker is God.

Again, the Faith which views God as the pre-supposition and consummation of everything provides the only finally satisfying view of our own natures. The house divided against itself falls. Christianity unifies our inner selves. It leads to no self-destroying asceticism, but involves a realization of 'the value and significance of the flesh.'

Against the arrogance of Henley's

I am the master of my fate
I am the captain of my soul,

we may set Paul's magnificent 'I can do all things through Christ, which strengtheneth me.'

Henley claims a self-sufficiency which is utter and absolute; Paul, a self-sufficingness which is relative. He is independent of mere circumstance, but only because at bottom his in-dependence is a de-pendence. He does all things in, and through, and because of, the power of the Christ who 'liveth in me.' His steadfastness grows out of a peace which is more than harmony, which is a positive protecting power; for the 'peace of God which passeth understanding' KEEPS, i.e., guards, protects, acts sentry over, his heart and mind. Paul's

dependence upon Christ is so complete that he can face anything that life or death can bring.

Here we have the invulnerability, the walled integrity, of fully matured manhood. We are tempted to adapt a prophet's word and define man by saying 'A man shall be . . . a rock.' But Paul's case reminds us that the prophet's insight is deeper, truer, more discerning than ours; and so instead of adapting, we will adopt, his word, as our definition of invulnerable manhood—'A man shall be . . . the shadow of a great rock,' which rock we call our God.

JOHN SLACK.

THE APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY

WHAT is philosophy? The word was first used by Pythagoras *φιλία τῆς σοφίας* and means love of wisdom. As applied to men the term 'philosopher' does not mean one who is possessed of all wisdom, for only God possesses wisdom in the strictest sense of the term. Men, however, can be, and some men are, lovers of wisdom. Philosophy is wisdom attainable within the limited compass of the human mind.

But the further question must be asked, Wisdom concerning what? In this question we are forced back to ultimate realities. We mean by philosophy wisdom about the nature of Reality. This involves that we attempt to ascertain whether it is constituted solely of material things or whether what to us seems material is only an appearance of some invisible but solely true reality of a spiritual kind. It is no doubt true, as Plato used to say, 'philosophy is born of wonder.' But again we have to press for an answer: Wonder about what? About everything? If you like, yes, but is everything simply a jumble of incoherent events consisting of a perennial stream of changing phenomena or does not everything we perceive, and which others perceive, hint that the passing shows of the senses are but the moving images of eternity?

Are we to conclude that change is the ultimate reality, or rather infer that only that which changes has real and permanent significance? Philosophy, we suggest then, is wisdom about ultimate reality. Many questions arise out of this conception of philosophy. If we conclude with all Idealists that the ultimate reality is mental, that thought rules and alone is real, and that the deliverances of the senses are but appearances, we shall approach philosophy from that angle. If we are Realists who say that the world exists apart from being perceived by human beings, or even perceived by God, we shall approach our philosophical quest from that standpoint. If we are theists, that is if we believe that there is as the Fount and Cause of all reality as well as its appearances a Divine Being, Infinite, Personal, and Immutable, whose Purpose is ever being brought to fruition in the world of time and space, then we shall approach reality from the theistic point of view. I do not propose in this note to argue which way of approach

to the contemplation of all time and existence is the best. I am only concerned at the moment with indicating the lines of approach which until recently have been accepted and to some degree still are in vogue to-day.

There are, however, in these days special emphases which are apt for the moment to drown the controversy between Idealist and Realist, Theist and Empiricist, and it is with these I want to deal in this Note. The attempt to grasp the whole of Reality before an adequate appreciation of its parts was the failure of Hegel and the Idealistic school. While admitting that the part cannot be understood in a complete sense separated from the whole, how can a human mind, a small struggling element of reality itself, comprehend the whole which it but partially expresses? In view of this problem, and while Idealism was thought to favour religion in T. H. Green's day, its innate pantheism soon compelled theologians of the Lux Mundi school to repudiate the lurking denial of a Personal Deity, Transcendent to but Immanent in the Universe.

The approach to philosophy to-day follows three main lines because of the felt inadequacy of the traditional modes of approach.

(1) There are those who affirm that the function of philosophy is to act as a critique of the fundamental axioms of the sciences, and also to bring the results of the special sciences into some kind of synthesis. If this were the *sole* function of philosophy it would indeed demand of the philosopher an erudition which only a super-human being could possibly possess. How is a person essaying to be a philosopher in this sense to know what are the fundamental axioms of *all* the special sciences? Supposing such phenomenal knowledge were possible to him, how can he when not possessing expert knowledge of each indulge in really valid criticism of them? And further the attempt to synthesize the results of the sciences is not only impossible in itself, in view of the enormous amount of knowledge theoretical and practical involved, but also because the mass of experienced and known facts to-day is utterly beyond the comprehension of any one mind. Someone said recently in my hearing, what we need is another synthesis to-day like that of St. Thomas Aquinas in the Middle Ages. Such a synthesis can only remain an ideal possibility until the super-human philosopher appears to do it.

(2) Another way of approach to-day to philosophy is through one of the special sciences. Mathematics and physics are specially favoured in this respect and have been frequently from Plato's day, including Leibniz, Descartes, Jeans, Eddington, Einstein and Whitehead. It would seem that the fort of wisdom can be more effectively stormed by concentrating the troops on one point and after battering down opposition capturing the whole. How far such a method can succeed it is not within one's power to say, but one can legitimately affirm that there would appear to be a more immediate prospect of success by such a method than by the pretentious efforts of the method indicated above. At the same time the method of the approach to philosophy through any particular science, whether physics, biology,

or what not, is condemned to failure unless the special scientist has also the philosopher's mind which seeks for ultimate unity, and refuses to rest in a partial and fragmentary attitude. The question also must be asked, and an answer to the question determined, namely, by what criterion are we to judge which special science is the best approach to philosophy. Have they all an equal claim in this respect, and if not, why is one more preferable than the others? It will thus be seen that to suggest that philosophy should be approached through some special science has its own peculiar difficulties.

(3) The third and probably the best mode of approach to philosophy or the study of reality is to face the subject from the historical point of view. Croce's emphasis upon history as the sole reality is only an exaggeration of one small aspect of Hegel's doctrine of development turned to other usages, but the emphasis upon the historical method of approach in all intellectual disciplines seems to us to be vital. Philosophy is indeed the history of philosophy as Croce affirms. No one can say that the whole truth and the sum of wisdom is to be found in any special school of philosophic thought, whether the pre-Socratic with its emphasis on matter and its constituent elements, or the Socratic, with its healthy moral and religious emphasis, which Plato inherited and enhanced, or the Aristotelian distinction between matter and form, or any of the modern systems from Descartes to F. H. Bradley. The wise man, the true philosopher, will study all these points of view, accepting what is congenial to his own mind and rejecting that which does not appear to stand before the bar of a consistent logical analysis and criticism. We must not ask, Do these systems work? It does not matter whether they do or do not, and it depends on what you mean by work. What matters is, are they *true*? I am not making a philosophical confession in this Note but only suggesting lines of approach. In conclusion, let me say human experience is not the final arbiter of truth for there are no doubt many truths we can never experience and ultimate truth can be but partially apprehended by us. *The philosopher's quest then is truth.* What is the truth about the Universe, about Reality, about God? In so far as we press on in this quest we attain unto Wisdom.

National Sunday School Union.

ERNEST G. BRAHAM, M.A.

The *Round Table* for March opens with an important study of 'The Empire, the League and Security'; 'An Australian Economist looks on the United States' in its financial perplexities; there are articles on 'Northern Ireland and Partition' and 'The Church in the Third Reich,' on India and Social and Industrial reform in Great Britain. The number is a cosmopolitan survey of vital interest for thinkers.

Recent Literature

THEOLOGY AND APOLOGETICS

The Hebrew Literary Genius : An Interpretation. By Duncan Black Macdonald, M.A., D.D. (Oxford University Press. 11s. 6d.)

This is an introduction to the reading of the Old Testament and an altogether delightful and refreshing one. It regards the literature of the Hebrew people as a thing alive and having its own laws of life. We have to ask what the artist meant who created our Book of Genesis and have to read it and the other parts of the Old Testament not for criticism but 'with a finger on the pulse of sympathy with beauty which throbs to the emotion which beauty excites.' Dr. Macdonald's study of the Bible deals with it as literature in the truest, broadest sense. The Book of Job speaks with the poet's mind, and is an example of the Hebrew use of the lyric to render all manner of emotional situations and attitudes. *Genesis* impresses us as a single, great work of genius, complete and rounded. It culminates in the story of Joseph who is a type of the Hebrew race over against the world. There are chapters on The Hebrews and the Weird; the Hebrews and Nature; on The Philosophy of the Hebrews, and an illuminating study of *Ecclesiastes*. There are aspects of the Old Testament which are not included in this survey but it is a real pleasure to look on its literary beauties and to watch the Hebrew genius unfolding itself.

Elemental Religion. By L. P. Jacks. (Williams & Norgate. 4s. 6d.)

The six lectures which Dr. Jacks delivered on the Lyman Beecher foundation for 1933 are here followed by the three sermons preached in Liverpool Cathedral last June. He describes the essential difficulties which confront the preacher of our day and suggests man's conception of religion has gained a height and breadth which require the exertion of ourselves to the uttermost if we are to keep it alive and to make it good. When we claim that religion permeates the whole of human life, 'we are challenging opposition far more formidable than arises from intellectual doubt. We are challenging the massed forces of human selfishness and must be prepared to quit ourselves like men in opposing them.' The traditions of the service were fixed in the Garden of Gethsemane and the preacher must bear them as a good soldier of Christ. Dr. Jacks holds that all human experience reveals the inescapable pressure of the Spirit of the Living God, and lays emphasis on Carlyle's words about 'a preacher who knows God *otherwise than by hearsay*.' He regards the Church as the spiritual university of the human race. Religion and education are both concerned with the

whole man in an inseparable unity of soul, mind and body. The dangers besetting the young are clearly pointed out but Dr. Jacks does not believe that there is a moral chaos in the modern world, though there is 'an appalling lack of the self-control, of the disciplined will-power, of the social orchestration founded on discipline, that are needed to give effect to the sound instruction and the good ideas.' The Liverpool sermons deal with the main topic of the lectures. Faith in the Holy Ghost, and in the Holy Catholic Church are powerfully set forth, and the third sermon answers the question, 'What shall we do with our lives?' Christ answers, '*Give them away*. Make a generous gift of them to mankind. Find the thing that is worth dying for as well as worth living for. Die for it daily, not in a spectacular way, but in a silent way.' There is a fine moral tone ringing through both lectures and sermons and some fragments of autobiography add emphasis to the appeal.

I Believe in God. By Peter Green, M.A. (Longmans & Co. 6s.)

Canon Green's three books—*Our Heavenly Father, Our Lord and Saviour, The Holy Ghost: the Comforter* are here brought together in one volume with a title that suggests the essential unity of the subject, and with the object of encouraging more general study and meditation. The first section grew out of a conviction that the chief feature of our age is its deep godlessness. The Canon means that increasing numbers of people are allowing God to pass altogether out of their lives. He regards religion as a disinterested delight in God for His own sake. The second part attempts to give a mental picture of Jesus Christ which shall do justice to all aspects of His person and work, and to interpret His teaching and seek to apply it to the life of discipleship here and now. He believes John the Son of Zebedee wrote the Fourth Gospel and utterly repels his so-called 'red martyrdom.' The section on *The Holy Ghost* expresses his 'daily deepening conviction that nothing but a great revival of spiritual religion can save the whole of Western civilization from a catastrophe more complete, and more dreadful in its results, than the collapse of the Roman Empire.' It is a powerful exposition, vindication and application of what St. Paul called 'the word of life,' and we hope it will get into the hands and minds of thoughtful readers and especially of young people.

The Meaning and Message of the Fourth Gospel. By C. J. Wright, B.D., Ph.D. (Hodder & Stoughton. 6s.)

Dr. Wright's purpose in this volume has been to show that the penetrating insight into the religious consciousness of the Historic Jesus is a clue to the *meaning* of the writer of this Gospel, and that its *message* has abiding value in any adequate apologetic for Christianity. The Evangelist is both seer and dramatist. He combines with his dramatic quality a most penetrating spiritual insight and intuition. Dr. Wright thinks that he had probably been brought into intimate personal contact with Jesus in Jerusalem and had been a close friend of John

the Apostle at Ephesus. The Gospel bears the marks of a transcendent genius. In St. Paul we see a man thinking; in the Fourth Gospel we have the united and completed thought. Dr. Wright regards the Prologue as experimental not metaphysical. It is the key to the comprehension of the whole Gospel. That view is ably defended as against Harnack. We now turn to the message of the Gospel. The Historic Incarnation has found 'its vitalizing centre in the Johannine insight into the unique manifestation of the Eternal and Divine in the person of Jesus.' The mysticism of the Fourth Gospel enables us to hold together the two essential elements in Christianity—the historical and the eternal. The Gospel also involves a profound and the only really satisfying and satisfactory doctrine of man. It is a revelation of God's will for man which reaches its consummation in Eternal life. 'It is the message of the Johannine Gospel, which is the essential Gospel of Jesus, that the Divine capacities of our souls have a sphere beyond that of time for the possibility of their fulfilment.' A wide circle of Christian thinkers will be grateful for this rich and reassuring study of the Fourth Gospel.

The Will to Fuller Life. By J. H. Badley. (Allen & Unwin. 10s. 6d.)

In this book, Mr. Badley, the Headmaster of Bedale's School, continues and develops the line of thought of his previous book, *The Will to Live*. Here, however, his concern is not 'psychological,' but, as we may say, 'spiritual.' That is, his aim is to trace the growth of that sense of values by which man passes beyond his immediate needs to the pursuit of ends which transcend the bounds of self. The author's point of view is expressed in his title. Life is a striving; its central impulse is the will to live. 'In man it is no longer a blind striving,' for he has learnt to distinguish the better from the worse, and can will, not only to live, but to live the abundant life of the spirit. This is the main theme of the book, which may thus be regarded as an appeal to man to follow the ultimate values, truth, beauty and goodness, and to take a conscious part in directing the further stages of the evolutionary process. It is a fascinating theme, and the author has treated it with ethical insight and spiritual conviction. In the emergent, evolutionary process a being has appeared who is in a very real sense 'the pilot of his own destiny.' The question of questions for the present and for the future is: *Whither* is man going to pilot his ship? Science has put into his hands powers that will enable him wondrously to control his destiny. Eugenics, for example, may show him how to eliminate the defective and physically unfit; and education, another means of conscious selection, may assist him to mould the mind of future generations. But unless our 'will' be illumined and directed by 'faith' our scientific method, using scientific knowledge, may easily wreck us. We have already seen what mass propaganda can do in some European countries. Our 'faith,' then, the author sees, is the final question. And whatever the doctrinal content of faith, it must give man the assurance that in the universe and in

his own life there is meaning and value, and that these are not alien from his conception and experience of goodness and beauty and truth. The reader may be surprised that in a book dealing with spiritual values there should be so little direct reference to religion. Mr. Badley explains this lack by assuring us that he is devoting a succeeding volume to this central theme. This is a good book, written by a forward-looking man, and in an untechnical manner which will commend it to any thoughtful reader.

C. J. WRIGHT.

Science and the Spirit of Man : A New Ordering of Experience.

By Julius W. Friend and James Feibleman. (Allen & Unwin. 12s. 6d.)

The writers of this volume, who appear to be Americans—the Preface is dated from New Orleans, and much of the diction has the indeterminate flavour which pervades some of the philosophical writings from the other side of the Atlantic—seem to be actuated by convictions similar to those which inspire Mr. Badley's book. They begin with the conviction that there is everywhere to-day the tendency to belittle man and all human values; and they set themselves to combat this tendency. Since the writers feel that contemporary problems take their root in a set of philosophical beliefs, the essence of which is 'a belief in and an obsession with the factual and proximate aspects of life,' they are largely concerned with metaphysical discussion. This centres upon 'modern cosmology,' and leads to a critical consideration of the testimony of modern Physics. The book concludes with a chapter on some final questions: here the authors tell us what they think about 'religion' and 'theology,' and kindred issues. I do not know whether the reader is expected to laugh when he is told that 'it would be better to think of God as a low undertone of laughter' than to think of Him mathematically. God conceived as 'a low undertone of laughter' is certainly an interesting, if unsatisfying, conception. The book is, I fear—as the authors themselves remind us—'alas, most abstract.' Many of their readers, should they be many, will be disposed to underline the 'alas.' Other readers—the minority, I imagine—will enjoy the remarkable dexterity with words that is manifest here and there; they may even set themselves to the coining of words that will give similar scope for metaphysical jugglery. Yet other readers may in all seriousness ask whether the time has not come when this latter occupation should cease. Is it really necessary, for example, to talk about 'fluxing' appearances? The authors, in fine, have many good things to say, but they have made their book unnecessarily difficult for the reader unacquainted or unsympathetic, with their language.

C. J. WRIGHT.

The Mishnah. Translated from the Hebrew with Introduction and brief Explanatory Notes. By Herbert Danby, D.D. (Oxford Clarendon Press. 18s.)

Dr. Danby is Residentiary Canon of St. George's Cathedral, Jerusalem. That adds to the interest with which one studies his portly volume and

its importance is evident from the fact that although portions of the Mishnah have been published from time to time in various languages, most of it has only been available in the Latin version of Surenhusius (1698-1703) and the German version of Rahe (1760-3). It has considerable value for the study of comparative religion and the civilization of the Near East during the first and second centuries of our era, and also throws light on the development of Judaism and the conditions of Jewish life during the final stages of its association with the soil of Palestine. The Preface gives a clear account of the text used for this translation and of the method pursued. It aims at being as literal as English idiom will tolerate. Words and passages not represented in Hebrew are enclosed in square brackets. The notes are confined to explaining illustrations and removing surface difficulties. The Mishnah is a deposit of four centuries of Jewish religious and cultural activity closing with the second century A.D. It has ranked second only to the Hebrew scriptures as a national religious creation and possession, and has provided a bond to the Jewish race despite their geographical disintegration. Its six divisions cover the whole range of Pentateuchal legislation. Attention is concentrated on rules of Jewish usage and these 'traditions of the elders' are its essential and characteristic element. The veneration for the letter of tradition is remarkable for pedantic insistence on verbal exactitude. Canon Danby gives a full account of its origin and development; its arrangement, method, and language, and of its commentators, Rashi, a French Jew (1040-1105), and Maimonides (1135-1204) who brought out the general principles governing the subject and thus removed the chief difficulties in the way of understanding the Mishnah.

Science, Religion and Man. By W. J. J. Cornelius. (Williams & Norgate. 15s.)

Science, Religion and Man is a very comprehensive survey, on the one hand of the facts relating to religion and magic, both in the ancient and modern world, and on the other, of the theory of Evolution by Descent. The ruling idea is that the great verities of religion and the facts of science may be equally received as true; and that there is no reason why the Christian system may not be accepted, as well as man's emergence through a continuous process from a lower order of life. A good deal of attention is given to animistic beliefs, and to the history and practice of magic, both in ancient and modern times. There is a survey of all the more important systems of Pagan religion of old time, Babylonian, Egyptian, Persian, and others, and of modern systems, as of India and China, with Buddhism, Mohammedanism, and the rest, ending in a brief account of comparatively recent movements, such as Christian Science, Spiritualism and Theosophy. One comment may be made on the last section, and it is that the account given of Spiritualism is quite amazingly prejudiced and one-sided. The book is of great interest, and covers a very wide field. The best work, we consider, is found in the chapters on the Existence of God, and the Life Hereafter. On the scientific side, the theory of Evolution

by Descent is accepted, somewhat uncritically, we think. For instance, man is not a 'special creation, but the result of a continuous evolutionary process.' Yet a little further on we read of the 'direct interposition of the finger of God.' The general idea of evolution is of great value, and goes back at least to Aristotle: it does not necessarily imply evolution by descent. It seems a mistake for theology to tie itself too closely to scientific theories which are rapidly changing before our eyes.

T. STEPHENSON.

The New Psychology and Religious Experience. By Thomas Hywell Hughes, D.D. (Allen & Unwin. 10s. 6d.)

Dr. Hughes is lecturer on the Psychology of Religion in Edinburgh University and his research students, mainly from the United States and Canada, have pressed for the publication of these lectures. They deal with the bearing of the New Psychology on the facts of religious experience. That psychology regards religion as an outgrowth of the sex instinct, and the idea of God as a projection of some of the repressed wishes, or of the ideal aspiration of the mind of man, but having no corresponding objective reality. The racial Behaviourist assumes that our knowledge of psychological laws and processes is so complete that it furnishes a full explanation of all our desires, thoughts and feelings; and also that the supernatural powers are finally disposed of because they cannot be discovered by his peculiar type of microscope. Such assumptions are really baseless and the examination of Freud's system shows that it cannot rank with the great scientific theories which co-ordinate existing knowledge and serve as guides to further discovery. The tendency of the whole movement of thought within the schools is opposed to the basal truths and principles of the Christian faith. There is no room for anything in the nature of a gospel. 'No power from without is needed, nor is there any call for grace or for the reinforcement of a Divine Spirit.' The lectures show what a menace this is to the Christian position. They will be of great value not only to preachers but to all Christian thinkers.

In this Light. By Alan T. Dale, B.D. (Epworth Press. 3s. 6d.)

A missionary in China here rethinks his theology in the light of a revolutionary experience. Mr. Dale shows the great and clear conviction of the Lordship of Christ, that has come to him with overwhelming freshness during his missionary years in China. The outline of his studies is twofold. Part one is mainly historical; part two is concerned with the nature and problems of discipleship. The recovery of moral and spiritual health is to be achieved through shaping individual life and social enterprise by the spiritual adventure of discipleship at the feet of Jesus. Mr. Dale asks whether 'the experience of Jesus Christ is stout enough to ride the rough waters of the modern world?' The New Testament shows how men of very different types found it possible to live together within the circle of the new spiritual fellowship and enjoy a liberty, self-control and sense of God which they had

sought elsewhere in vain. That experience is repeated to-day for in Christ the Universe is ours and in Him our life is 'sweetened and cleansed, steadied and invigorated, made quiet and unafraid.'

Here and Hereafter. By A. Maude Royden. (Putnam. 7s. 6d.)

The charm of these sermons lies in their approach to life. They face its daily problems, they enter into its heart and mind, they travel with men and women along the pilgrim way and are not afraid to speak plainly about even such a subject as hell. The language is clear, and simple, there are many glimpses of outstanding events, of men and women and not a few pleasant bits of personal history. Miss Royden gets hold of one's attention in her first sentences and she never loses it. 'Blessed are the meek' leads to the conclusion, 'You cannot break, or dispossess, or destroy the meek. They inherit the earth.' It is a real refreshment to turn these pages. Miss Royden is not afraid to bring in our pets, and you never lose touch with life, whilst the highest things play round it with some hallowing beams. She handles such themes as Personal Survival, All Souls' Day, The Imitation of Christ and the Grace of God, and they all take new beauty and attractiveness. 'All Souls' has its own message: 'For everything we have truly had, we have to all eternity. And what is real if love is not real? To have loved is always our possession. No change in the person whom we love can alter that fact.'

The Heart of the Bible. By Jeannie B. Thomson Davies, M.A. (Allen & Unwin. Three vols. 5s. each.)

The author has aimed to present the most significant biblical writings in something like chronological order so as to combine reading the Bible with learning to understand it. And it will be readily admitted that the publication of Volume III of *The Heart of the Bible* sets the seal to a very creditable and successful study. Mrs. Thomson Davies is the author of several books on teaching and an experienced lecturer and trainer of teachers. She inaugurated Bible Study Circles at Bingley Training College during her term as Warden, and at the Mather Training College, Manchester, she also lectured on Mathematics and Psychology. The entire work is a tribute to the author's equipment. The courage of her aim in this venture is equalled by the simplicity of its execution. Mrs. Thomson Davies has no critical axe to sharpen. She is a biblical student mainly in the sense that she is a Bible lover. Under her direction technical difficulties disappear and we are grateful for a more intimate and a more significant Bible. Moreover, one is struck by the complete absence of any sort of literary affectation. The author recognizes that where so much selection is involved, depending entirely upon her personal preference, there are potential difficulties. But she has disarmed criticism by a taste well-nigh impeccable. Each volume indeed bears evidence of patient research, accurate scholarship and masterly selection. The arrange-

ment and setting of selections which constitute the heart of the Bible are very illuminating. The author, moreover, must be hailed as a clear interpreter and her hope is not unjustified that 'this selection will enable us to follow the thread of the whole so that we may return to our complete long Bible with a clue to its difficulties and perplexities.' Volumes I and II deal with the Literature of the Jewish People and Volume III with the Literature of the New Testament. This work has special value to students and to all who are called to teach and interpret the Bible.—*Every Man's Bible*. An anthology arranged with an Introduction. By W. R. Inge. (Longmans & Co. 3s. 6d.) It is a real gain to have this anthology added to the *Swan Library*. The arrangement in four sections—God, Christ, The Christian Graces, The Christian Experience—is very clear and very suggestive. The Dean's notes and brief prefaces to the sections are really helpful and the Introduction which covers forty-seven pages will richly reward the reader and will add much to the interest of the anthology. It is impossible to exaggerate its value as a book for daily devotional use. *The Bible and the Quest of Life*. By Bruce Curry. (Oxford University Press. 7s. 6d.) Dr. Curry is Associate Professor of Practical Theology in Union Theological Seminary, New York, and has gained a high reputation as an interpreter of the Bible to Student Conferences. Here he gives fifty-two studies on arresting themes such as: 'When the world goes wrong'; 'How to live wisely and well'; 'The Hope of Life immortal.' Each subject is briefly unfolded; notes are given on the relevant Bible passages; the lessons are clearly summarized and the values for modern thought and life are brought out. The lucidity and variety of the studies will appeal to all teachers and preachers and a year's devotional reading of the most helpful sort is here available. It is a novel approach to the Bible and an attractive one.

The Gospel According to John. By G. Campbell Morgan, D.D. (Marshall, Morgan & Scott. 7s. 6d.)

These Meditations took their final form when delivered in Westminster and have been condensed to omit any incidental matter. The main line of exposition stands out clearly. The last page of the Gospel becomes a frontispiece and the first supplies the thesis. Then follow meditations on our Lord's first year of ministry, or the central period and the final stage of the ministry. The Meditations bring out the wonders of what Dr. Robertson calls 'The Profoundest Book in the World.' Lovers of the Fourth Gospel will study this exposition with burning hearts. It will bring them into intimate fellowship with their Master and will increase both their faith and their love. In *Hosea: the Heart and the Holiness of God* (Marshall & Co. 3s. 6d.), Dr. Morgan unfolds the prophet's tragedy with insight and sympathy and then fastens on his great themes such as: The door of Hope; Joined to Idols; God's Departure and His Compassion. The lucidity with which every subject is set forth, the effective illustration, and the practical application make this a suggestive book for preachers and teachers.

A Restated Faith : Positive Values. By H. Bulcock, M.A., B.D. (Independent Press. 2s. 6d.) This volume is based on a paper read at a Conference arranged by the 'Blackheath Group' of Congregational ministers. Its aim is to show how the eternal verities emerge from the temporary cloud with greater meaning and significance as a new way of earnest ethical discipleship of Christ. We come to read the Scriptures for their rich testimony to the few eternal instincts of faith. We look for a Christ genuinely human, an interpreter of the familiar world in which we live, the searcher of truths which we can apply and test every day of our lives. Four pictures of the Historical, the Apocalyptic, the Aryan and the Logos Christ merge in the portrait of Jesus which reveals the Love that sits upon the Eternal Throne, and stands out as the Way, the Truth, and the Life.

An Anthology of Prayers. Compiled by A. S. T. Fisher, M.A. (Longmans & Co. 3s. 6d.) The Chaplain of Bryanston School, Blandford, has compiled this Anthology for use in school and home. It includes prayers of 'every age and accent' arranged in eleven divisions. The opening section on Praise includes treasures in prose and poetry from many sources, and is followed by 'Arrow Prayers,' sentences shot out from the soul. St. Clement makes his contribution: 'O God, make us children of quietness and heirs of peace.' 'Special Occasions' have their appropriate petitions and twelve pages of Biographical notes and a full index add to the interest and usefulness of a very catholic and impressive little anthology.—*Facing our Day.* By William Chalmers Covert. (Abingdon Press. \$1.50.) Our educationally-minded world expects great things from its Christian leaders. The propagation of the Gospel must include every form of presentation, with all the miscellaneous labours of the pastoral office. Dr. Covert describes the generation of schools, the age of machines, the era of leisure, of books, newspapers, the vogue of religious cults, the new psychology, faith healing and musical appreciation. Such a world furnishes a great opportunity for the simple interpretation of God and His love as revealed in the character and teaching of our Lord, and realizable in daily experience.—*Christ our Life.* By the late R. B. Jones. (Marshall, Morgan & Scott. 2s. 6d.) The writer was the first Principal of the South Wales Bible Training Institute, a forcible preacher and an attractive teacher. His eight sermons form a real unity, circling round Christ, the Life-giver. The great texts are unfolded in a way that is impressive and practical. It is deeply spiritual throughout.—*Jesus.* By Herman Malan. (Central News Agency. 1s.) This comes from Johannesburg. It is an ode with a message of hope for weary hearts:

Be not dismayed because Christ plucked strange blooms for thee
And dropped them in the Garden of Gethsemane.

It is very suggestive and the little poems that follow have both grace and meaning.—*His Glorious Shame.* By James Black, D.D. (Marshall, Morgan & Scott. 1s.) Simon the Cyrenian goes to Jerusalem for the Passover and bears the cross of a felon. He does not know that it is

Jesus, but seven years later his sons become Christians and Mark recognizes Simon as the cross-bearer whom he had seen years before, and is able to add a new verse to his Gospel. It is a beautiful little sidelight on a famous story.—*The Holy Spirit*. By Glory in Him. (Boston [Mass.] Meadow Co. \$1.25.) These daily readings have grown out of personal experience which was 'like a new and joyous conversion.' They are short but pointed and really stimulating. They have helped the writer in his pastoral work and they will help many others.—*Christianity in Home Life*. By L. E. Manley (Stockwell. 2s. 6d.) is certainly comprehensive and concise. It is also practical and marked by good sense in its handling of the sex questions of a child, child training, home making and the irresistible power of Divine Love. It is thoroughly Christian in tone and likely to promote family affection and piety.—*A Free Church Liturgy*. Compiled and arranged by J. P. Oakden, M.A., Ph.D. (Dent & Sons. 2s.) The Free Churches are increasingly awake to the value of a form of Communion Service in which the communicants may take their part. Dr. Oakden's form is simple, clear and not too long for ordinary use. He gives a simplified Latin and an Orthodox Eastern side which have special interest because they form the pattern on which his own Form is framed. A strong recommendation of his Form is that it is based on appropriate Scripture passages aptly arranged. Its appeal is to 'Evangelical Christians throughout the English-speaking world,' and they will find it a valuable aid to devotion.—*Anima: The Pilgrim of the Cross*. By L. V. Holdsworth. (Longmans & Co. 2s. 6d.) This little book has grown out of an old picture of The Divine Master underneath which are the words 'He that taketh not his Cross and followeth after ME is not worthy of ME.' Beneath are ten small pictures which form the story of a pilgrim soul. These have led to many intimate discussions in private gatherings and are now made the subject of ten meditations on bearing the cross. The soul learns by humility and patience to follow Christ in loving confidence, sure hope and ardent love till the *Via Crucis* becomes the *Via Lucis*. 'When we accept a Cross we find that it is Heaven.' The ten little steel engravings of the old pictures have been enlarged to go with the ten meditations.—*The Royal Banners*. By Dom. Bernard Clements. (Longmans & Co. 3s. 6d.) This book with its deeply devotional atmosphere takes us through the Passion week. Dom. Clements is indeed a communicative contemplative whose writings speak of constant meditation. *The Watchers by the Cross*. By Canon Peter Green. (Longmans & Co. 3s. 6d.) The seven words of our Lord. Its style is attractive and the quotations used are happy and illuminating. To both these books we give an equally sincere welcome. They are widely diverse in their style and approach yet in a sense they seem to be complementary.—*One Thousand Wonderful Things about the Bible*. By Henry Pickering. (Pickering & Inglis. 2s. 6d.) It will help many a preacher and teacher to turn over these pages which are full of facts and of suggestions, brief but clear and of practical service.

HISTORY, BIOGRAPHY, TRAVEL

Cardinal Newman and William Froude, F.R.S. : A Correspondence. By Gordon Huntingdon Harper. (Oxford University Press. 9s.)

This volume comes from the Johns Hopkins Press in Baltimore and nothing has appeared in the Centenary Commemorations which is more significant. The chief part of the correspondence is now first published. Mr. Harper was largely indebted to Froude's daughter, the late Baroness Anatole von Hügel for the letters from her father which have not before been printed. She also gave him much information about her family and Froude's granddaughter granted him permission to print a few charming letters from Hurrell Froude to his younger brother William. A pencil sketch of Newman by Miss Emmeline Deane, shows the Cardinal in old age. The letters cover thirty years from 1843, when Newman was brooding over his line of action at Littlemore, to 1879 when he was in Rome waiting to receive formal notice of his Cardinalship, and writing a long letter to Froude who had died at Cape Town before it was finished. The interest of the correspondence lies in Newman's long continued endeavour to bring his old Oriel pupil over to his own religious position. He hoped to see Froude become a Romanist as his wife and children did, but Froude remained unshaken. We see Newman's own course in even more intimate light than in the *Apologia*. 'Not until that multitude of small reasons, in themselves insignificant, had finally a cumulative force equal to certainty could Newman make confession of faith in the Catholic Church.' There are many personal details in the letters. Newman seems to have sprained some muscles and never writes without pain. He says in 1848 that he is always tired and finds it an effort to brighten up. He found himself in an awkward position labouring to draw Mrs. Froude and her children over to Rome to the constant grief of William, who was steadfastly opposed to such a course. Newman tells Mrs. Froude in 1848 when he himself had gone over: 'Oh that you were safe in the True Fold. I think you will be one day. You will then have the blessedness of seeing God face to face. You will have the blessedness of finding, when you enter a Church, a Treasure unutterable, the Presence of the Eternal Word Incarnate, the Wisdom of the Father who, even when He had done His work, would not leave us, but rejoices still to humble Himself by abiding in places on earth, for our sakes, while He reigns not the less on the right hand of God.' When Froude's son, Hurrell, went to Oxford and lived with Professor Donkin, the question arose of his attending family prayers. As a way out of the difficulty Newman suggested that the youth should carry a crucifix and attend with full mental reservation. When this 'Roman guile' was discovered Hurrell's attendance at prayers ceased abruptly. Newman carefully explains his position as to Papal Infallibility to Mrs. Froude: 'If anything

could throw religion into confusion, make sceptics, encourage scoffers, and throw back inquirers, it will be the definition of this doctrine. This I shall think even if it passes.' Other things in the correspondence which throw light on Newman's mind and on the whole course of his history, make the book one of extraordinary interest.

John Henry Newman. By J. Elliott Ross. (Allen & Unwin. 7s. 6d.)

Mr. Ross traces three significant events to Newman's wrecked hopes of a Catholic University in Dublin, a new translation of the Bible, and an Oratory at Oxford. First there is the Anglo-Catholic movement in the English Church; then the flow of Conversions to Rome; and a revived and, to a large extent, a transformed Catholic Church in England. 'Newman's reputation as a religious thinker of perennial interest seems as secure as Pascal's.' His course is traced as Oxford don, Roman Catholic convert, till his *Apologia* ushers in a later summer and is crowned by a 'crimson sunset.' Mr. Ross finds the secret of his hold on the hearts of succeeding generations in his integrity of character. As a stylist he has never been surpassed, but it is his sincerity, his courage under coldness and suspicion in high circles which would have crushed many a stronger man, that have won him his crown of honour. That is the spirit of Mr. Ross's study with which we have much sympathy and not a few nor slight criticisms.

Henry William Carless Davis, 1874-1928. A Memoir by J. R. H. Weaver and a Selection of his Historical Papers. Edited by J. R. H. Weaver and Austin Lane Poole. (Constable & Co. 10s. 6d.)

This is a memorial of a distinguished Regius Professor of History at Oxford. His father was a solicitor and his mother a Miss Carless, a doctor's daughter, of Stroud. Her husband died early, leaving her with five small children and a narrow income. She opened a school for little children at Weymouth and was afterwards head of the Preparatory School for boys connected with Weymouth College. Henry was described as a very remarkable boy within a week of his entrance at the Lower School of Weymouth College. He won the Brackenbury History scholarship at Balliol in 1890 and in 1894 when he was twenty gained a first class in Greats. Next year he was elected Fellow of All Souls. He lectured in History at New College and Balliol and was commissioned by Dean Rashdall to write the official history of Balliol where he was elected a tutorial Fellow in 1902. He had a high standard of what was required of a tutor though his natural reserve somewhat concealed a heart of singular tenderness. His *England under the Normans and Angevins* won him immediate recognition as a medievalist scholar of the front rank. He married in 1912 and had three sons. The Great War brought him many calls for literary propaganda and early in 1915 he joined the Trade Intelligence Department as Vice-chairman where he did most valuable work.

He also was a representative of his department at the Peace Conference in Paris in 1918. He returned to Oxford in April, 1919, with broadened interests and a large circle of friends. He took charge of the *Dictionary of National Biography*. He had to revise the main issue and prepare a new volume for the current decade. In 1921 he went to Manchester University as Professor of Modern History but was brought back to Oxford in 1925 as Regius Professor of History. University affairs engaged much attention and he took a leading part in the question of the Bodleian Library Scheme. He died in June, 1928, in the full tide of his influence. Everywhere he left the impression of unusual power and fineness of judgement and the six Historical Papers carefully selected, show how richly this reputation was deserved. 'The great Game in Asia, 1800-1844' is a masterly epitome of British activities in India and those on 'The Study of History,' 'The Anarchy of Stephen's reign,' 'Canon Law,' and 'England and Rome in the Middle Ages' show the breadth and interest of his historical work.

Private Letter Books of Joseph Collet, sometime Governor of Fort St. George, Madras. (Longmans & Co. 10s. 6d.)

Professor Dodwell has edited these four private letter books with many valuable notes and Miss Clara Collett has given him much assistance in his task and has supplied a history of the family in an extended Appendix. The Collets, who were merchants at Rouen in the time of Edward the Confessor, settled in England eight centuries ago. Dean Collet, the founder of St. Paul's School, was the most eminent member of the family. The writer of these letters was born in 1673, and went out to India in 1711 to repair his fortunes. He spent four years at Sumatra and then passed on to Madras. He served the East India Company with great ability and traded with extraordinary activity. His profits were said to be £10,000 a year. He was a man of high character, a Baptist who took a keen interest in Missions and in education. On the voyage to India his ship was taken by the French and he had to ransom her, leaving his son John and another as hostages for the due payment of the bills of exchange. The great sorrow of his life was the death of this only son who joined him in India but succumbed to the climate within a year. Collet himself had a violent fever, but after his recovery enjoyed perfect health. At York Fort he preached every Sunday and all the natives took him for a divine. At Madras he attended the Church services but got the clergymen to omit the Athanasian Creed. He wrote to thank Richard Steele for 'the noblest entertainment I had ever met with' in the *Tatler* and tells him 'the *Spectator* has visited me in this side the globe; his conversation relieves me from the fatigue of business; by him I am entertained and often improved. The Bible has the first place in our study as teaching me the whole compass of my duty to God and man.' He enjoins his daughter 'to study the *Spectators*, especially those which relate to religion and the daily life. Next to the Bible you cannot read any writings so much to your purpose for the improvement of your mind and the conduct of your

actions.' His letters to his eldest daughter show the deep affection and religious feeling of the Governor, and there are many pictures of his public life, his friends and his surroundings, and the problems he had to face. He returned to England in 1720 and settled at Hertford Castle, where he died in 1725, and was buried in Bunhill Fields.

The Social Implications of the Oxford Movement. By William George Peck. (Charles Scribner's Sons. 7s. 6d.)

The Hale Lectures for 1933 of which this book is composed, were delivered by a one-time Methodist minister—W. G. Peck; now an Anglican priest in Manchester. The Centenary celebrations of last year produced a flood of biographical, historical and theological literature which repeatedly covered the same ground. This latest book, however, is a stream of its own and is both impressive and unique in its conception and execution. Mr. Peck has a mind which is both receptive and adventurous and he has given us a capable study of the social genius of the Oxford Movement. He would admit that the original Tractarians were but slightly conscious of social problems, for they looked upon fair College greens from their study windows and lived in the stratosphere of the mind and spirit. However, the Faith they declared held implicit the solution of all things and a later generation applied their teaching to sociology. It is the Faith that is to become 'the co-ordinating centre of human effort.' The Church is the Body of Christ, and while other advocates of reform may have motives of their own the motive of the Church is Love and the value of every human personality. This we would all agree is far removed from any expedient humanism. The Church owes allegiance to nothing human, but it has responsibilities for everything human. Every unemployed worker is a charge upon the Family and every prostitute a sorrow to be endured by the Mother of us all. There is no inactive charity here, no love by proxy, but a vivid declaration of Faith that makes no apology for its attempt to transform and to sacramentalize the whole of life. No student of affairs can afford to ignore this book, and while many people will find difficulty in accepting the premises upon which the thesis is developed all will admire the theme-song of redemption.

B.

The Story of the Student Christian Movement. By Tissington Tatlow, M.A., D.D. (S.C.M. 12s. 6d.)

The Student Christian Movement is known to many who care for good books as a publishing concern with a reputation for attractiveness both in the appearance and the contents of the volumes bearing its imprint; those of the student world will know it as an organization that provides good fellowship that has for its aim the guidance of life towards complete dedication to Jesus Christ; it encourages 'laughter and devotion'; few will be prepared to confess definite knowledge of its many ramifications as these are set forth in this formidable volume of nearly a thousand pages. Canon Tatlow has

been connected with the movement from its inception, and was, earlier than this, working for the Student Volunteer Missionary Union, which, with its slogan—the evangelization of the world in this generation—excited such astonished attention forty years ago. He has personal knowledge of every aspect of the work of which this is the record. And he is an expert reporter. The story is of such immense proportions that of necessity all that he can give is a catalogue of events, and persons who made the events possible. His intimate knowledge is sometimes a disadvantage; the passage from one aspect of the work to another, the transition from committees, conferences, and the drudgery of preparation for these, to events that influence world policy, racial problems, and inter-Church activities becomes bewildering at times. It is not surprising that as his task is brought to a finish the wish is expressed that the ‘interest, friendship, and wonder’ of more intimate matters could have been distilled for use in this history. Not but that Canon Tatlow has managed this business of a crowded canvas with great skill. This is a history that can be read, and that must be read if its significance is to be appreciated. He writes: ‘The theme of this book is how the Student Movement has thought about its work and tried to do it during the last forty years.’ It enshrines the record of vision, adventure, and attainment. It is also a declaration of faith. The secret of success has been personal contact with a definite object. The missionary interest has been maintained, but other contacts with the ceaselessly passing generations of students have been sought. The Movement has its problems; its task is by no means accomplished; but this record is an inspiring document that challenges the whole constituency of organized Christianity.

J. C. MANTRIPP.

William Blake. By J. Middleton Murry. (Jonathan Cape. 10s. 6d.)

Mr. Murry's attempt to elucidate the doctrine of William Blake has furnished a distinctive and notable book. The author frankly avows his design: to concentrate on Blake the Mystic; and he insists that Blake's sole purpose was to teach men what he believed to be the truth. Few writers are better equipped for his task and if it be too much to claim that all the baffling problems of Blake's mysticism have been solved it will at least be recognized that in his serious and illuminating treatment our author has rendered problems much less difficult of interpretation. Mr. Murry accepts Blake's method quite philosophically on the ground that he is generally compelled to admit that there is no other way of saying what he had to say. And throughout he is concerned only with what Blake is ‘trying to express.’ He illustrates, as a simple fact of experience, what Blake describes as ‘a seeing through, not with the eye, a hearing through, not with the ear.’ Blake, he thinks, evidently found that ‘the truths of the Imagination did not lend themselves to the same neat ordering as the truths of “natural” philosophy.’ He declared that ‘He who

sees the Infinite in all things, sees God. He who sees the Ratio only, sees himself only.' In 'seeing the Infinite in all things' Blake doubtless meant the same thing as to see

A world in a grain of sand
And a heaven in a wild flower;

Thus by Imagination or Spiritual Sensation he perceives 'the Infinite in all things' and becomes aware of their 'incommensurable individuality.' When Blake affirms that 'The desire of Man is Infinite' he means 'not that the desires of Man are illimitable, but that the true and abiding desire of Man belongs to, and indeed is, his eternal individuality, and that it strains towards Eternity.' No one, Mr. Murry thinks, has looked more swiftly and surely into the mystery of sex than Blake. He claims that Blake was proof against the error into which D. H. Lawrence not seldom fell 'of asserting the body and denying the soul' and he further avows that with all their startling resemblances the doctrine of Blake belongs to the higher order. In discussing 'Selfhood and Self-Annihilation,' he holds that Jesus is for Blake the condition of Self-Annihilation, which is Forgiveness. Blake believed this to be the very essence of the doctrine of Jesus, and he is convinced that Blake was right. 'He understood the teaching of Jesus in the only way it could be understood, directly, through his own experience.' He felt himself to be 'at one with Jesus, in not merely knowing Eternity but knowing that Eternity is Forgiveness.' Mr. Murry holds that Blake's teaching of this final unity between Eternity and Forgiveness makes him 'great among the greatest.' This book is the best key yet offered to unlock the secret of Blake.

B.

East and West in Religion. By S. Radhakrishnan. (Allen & Unwin. 4s. 6d.)

Professor Radhakrishnan is India's best known philosopher, and this small volume of essays and addresses will add to his reputation. Written in English as irreproachable as its spirit, the book represents the cultured thought of the East facing the West. The author touches lightly, but never superficially, upon many problems. Christian missions, War and Peace, psychology, Indian yoga, Marxism, are among the many things he passes in review. His admiration for Jesus is unconcealed, though it is set in contrast to the Church, which is not quite so impartially assessed. It is not correct, for example, to say that during the War the pacifists, except the Quakers, were outside the official Churches. But he may be right in asserting that the success of Bolshevism is because its leaders have faith in their cause, 'the faith which in sufficient measure the reformers and the pacifists lack.' Professor Radhakrishnan is fond of epigrams, and some are striking, for example, 'saints start their careers by first losing their characters'; 'pacifism is not a thing to be purchased from the League of Nations'; 'altruism is not a substitute for the adoration from which it arises.' Sometimes one thinks his statements too summary. To say that insistence on the personality of God is a Christian inheritance

from Greek intellectualism, seems to miss the mark. Greek intellectualism saw in God a principle, not a person. It was the Hebrew who conceived God as essentially personal. There is a kindliness of spirit and gentleness in criticism that is characteristic of the courtesy of the East at its best, and this is marked throughout the book. Whatever defects may be attributed to Hinduism, intolerance is not amongst them, and Professor Radhakrishnan shares fully in that characteristic. 'If we are true to the teaching of Jesus,' he declares, 'we shall know that absolute truth goes beyond all forms and creeds, all historic revelations and institutions.' Yet one wonders how much of this book a Hindu who had no knowledge of Christianity, who owed no debt to it, could have written. One is not trying to make capital, if one says it is a striking example of what is owed to Christ by one who is not outwardly amongst His followers.

E. S. WATERHOUSE.

Ancient Italy and Modern Religion. By Robert Seymour Conway. (Cambridge University Press. 10s. 6d.)

The Hibbert Lectures for 1932 show how some features of the religion of the Italian peoples outside Rome contributed to the common stock of ideas which Europe took over in or with the Christianity which it drew from Rome. Many years of study of Ancient Italy have led Professor Conway to this conclusion. He takes us to Gubbio where we watch the annual festival on May 15, and to Este where the Goddess Rehtia, whom the Romans identified with Juno, had her temple and describes the objects of worship, the thoughts which have helped to shape our own world. Then we come to the teachers of Orpheus, in Italy, who believed in a kind of conditional immortality attained either by purity of life on earth or purification in the after-life. The Etruscan religion was one of fear, and left its stamp on the forensic theory of the Atonement. Virgil's pantheism was deeply earnest and devout and his insistence on human affection opened a way for the faith that God is love. His famous Eclogue is a dream of Christmas. 'A little child shall lead them.' Wild beasts, men and women all come under his spell. The charm of the lectures lies in the broadening outlook on the religious development of the world.

James Silk Buckingham, 1786-1855. A Social Biography. By Ralph E. Turner, Ph.D. (Williams & Norgate. 12s.)

James Silk Buckingham played many parts as sailor, newspaper proprietor, Parliamentarian and social reformer. He gained a world outlook by his experiences in England, India, Europe and America, and ranks as a representative figure in the host of men who laid themselves out for the uplifting of the people. He was born in Cornwall, went to sea when he was ten on a mail packet, and on his third voyage was captured by a French privateer. After his release he worked for a dealer in nautical instruments at Devonport from 1798 to 1801. He had been converted as a boy in a Methodist revival in 1794 and said that he never felt anything 'more exquisitely delicious than this

ecstatic elevation above earthly things.' Soon after his marriage his father's property was lost by a trustee who used it for a smuggling adventure, and the young father had to go to sea, where he became a captain. In 1813 he was wandering in Egypt and formed a plan for opening the Red Sea route to India by a canal, but this the Pasha resolutely opposed. Then he found his way to India and started the *Calcutta Journal* which was finally suppressed by the Government and its editor expelled from India. When he got back to England he founded the *Athenæum*, and became member for Sheffield in 1832. His work in the Commons and as a Temperance advocate in the United States and Canada is fully described. Dr. Turner says his faults were vanity and excessive confidence in the capacity of man to do the right, but no contemporary reformer had broader sympathies or keener insight into the social problems of the day. He is here framed in the midst of the life of his times, a man of restless zeal and endless adventures.

Indian Religion and Survival: A Study. By Mrs. Rhys Davids. (Allen & Unwin. 3s. 6d.)

Mrs. Davids' studies in the Pali records have shown her that early Buddhism gave to India, and thereby to the world, a more definite doctrine, cult, or theory of survival, rebirth, reincarnation, transmigration than any other religion before or since. She finds in an unnoticed discourse Gotama, as 'Man of the Way of Becoming, Man of the Worlds, Man of a life as a joyous opportunity.' Underneath the modern crust Mrs. Davids finds 'the remnants of a great world-gospel, bringing a new message for the man, a mandate of the more that is in him and that is ultimately awaiting him.' Present day Buddhism with its absence of interest in survival has departed from the original Buddhism which set forth man's birthright and right of way not in one world only but in the worlds. Monastic ideals brought in a view of 'lives' as prolongers of misery, which has tended to show to man a less in life and destiny rather than a more.

Some Aspects of the Life and Work of Nietzsche, and particularly of his Connexion with Greek Literature and Thought. By H. J. Knight. (Cambridge University Press. 10s. 6d.)

Mr. Knight is Lecturer in German in Cambridge University and has been impressed by the paucity of English studies on Nietzsche who was neither a hypocrite nor a knave but a distinguished scholar, a valuable critic, a bold speculator, and as a rule, though not always, a reasonably sensible man. His father and grandfather were Lutheran ministers and his mother's family was also clerical. At Bonn University he took up philological studies and was specially influenced by Ritschl. When twenty-four he became a teacher of Basel University. The outside world showed no sign of interest in his work till 1888 when Brandes lectured on his philosophy in Copenhagen. The following January Nietzsche had a stroke which left him insane. He died on August 24, 1900. Mr. Knight wonders whether his final

breakdown was due to his inability to shake off a religion which he hated and feared, but could not in his heart deny. His real excellence is as a critic and a stylist, and there only.

Erastianism. By Erastus Evans, M.A. (Epworth Press. 2s. 6d.)

This essay gained the Hulsean prize at Cambridge in 1931 and there can be no question as to the importance of the subject or the research that Mr. Evans has devoted to it. He shows that Erastus held no theory that religion was the creature of the State though some of his leading ideas and arguments were such as to form links in a logical chain leading to such a position. His motives in supporting the secular power—intellectual, religious, political—are clearly stated. The problem of Erastianism has no final solution 'but meets the Church in ever-varying forms, and calls her to struggle for a complete self-expression against conditions that change continually.' It is an essay of vital interest for our day.—*Luthers Kampf gegen die Juden*. Von Erich Vogelsang. (Tubingen: Mohr. Mark 1.50.) For Luther the Jewish question was first and last the question of Christ, included with that it was a question of social ethics, of nationality and of state policy. He was already swayed by the conviction which he sets out in his great Galatian commentary: 'In my heart this single article of faith in Christ rules, from whom, through whom, and to whom all my thoughts turn day and night.' Luther's fight against the Jews was not a case of lack of personal charity. He desired to win them for Christ, and the lesson for to-day is that the Jewish question is not one for agitation, nor one that belongs only to Germany, but is a question of world history to be dealt with in the light of the Cross of Christ.

Mildred Duff: A Surrendered Life. By Noel Hope. (Marshall, Morgan & Scott. 2s. 6d.) Mildred was the eldest daughter of Colonel James Duff and gave forty-six years of service to the Salvation Army. She was in charge of the Women's Social Work in the slums and carried sunshine with her everywhere. General Booth took her from that post to edit *All the World*. Afterwards she had charge of the *Young Soldier* and was for some years A.D.C. to Mrs. Bramwell Booth. General Booth found her 'a tower of strength and a source of wisdom.' Her whole life was consecrated and it was richly fruitful.—*Scotland's True Glory*, by John D. Rose (Marshall, Morgan & Scott. 2s.) traces the story of the Church of Scotland from the earliest times down to the present day. It shows how Christianity came to Scotland, and gives interesting sketches of the great missionaries; it has chapters on Luther, Calvin, Knox, Melville. The struggle with Episcopacy and the martyr times are vividly described: Chalmers as social and religious leader became a National but the disruption was a terrible blow. Norman Macleod inspired new courage and life and the Reunion Movement reached a glorious issue in 1929. Six chapters are given to the Life and Work of Today and the volume closes with a brief account of Church government. It is packed with information and is a marvel of cheapness.

GENERAL

The Use of Poetry and the Use of Criticism. By T. S. Eliot.
(Faber & Faber. 7s. 6d.)

These eight lectures were given in 1932-3 at Harvard University. Their subject is the relation of Criticism to Poetry in England. Mr. Eliot begins with a quotation from a letter of Charles Eliot Norton, the scholar and humanist whom the lectureship commemorated, and quickly reaches his theme. The pattern we form out of poetry we have enjoyed is a kind of answer which each makes for himself to the question 'What is poetry?' Criticism becomes inevitable. A great change came in the attitude to poetry towards the end of the eighteenth century. Wordsworth and Coleridge made claims which reached their highest point of exaggeration in Shelley's phrase, 'poets are the unacknowledged legislators of mankind.' The first lecture deals with the critical efforts of the friends and relatives of the Countess of Pembroke. We next pass to the age of Dryden where Mr. Eliot does not conceal his antipathy to what he calls 'the smugness and priggishness' of Addison. He regards Dr. Johnson as superior to Collins and Gray in 'a moral elevation just short of sublimity.' The lecture on Wordsworth and Coleridge recognizes that no woman has ever played so important a part in the lives of two poets at once—I mean their poetic lives—as Dorothy Wordsworth. The criticism of her brother's *Preface to Lyrical Ballads* and of Coleridge's *Biographia Literaria* is considered together in a lecture of special interest. Mr. Eliot's distaste for Shelley's poetry, which intoxicated him at the age of fifteen, but which he now finds almost unreadable; his tribute to the general brilliance and profundity of the observations on poetry in Keats' letters, and his searching estimate of Matthew Arnold's poetry give special interest to other lectures. His 'conclusion' brings out the variety of poetry and the many uses to which it may be put. It makes us aware of those deeper feelings 'which form the substratum of our being, to which we rarely penetrate, for our lives are mostly a constant evasion of ourselves, and an evasion of the visible and feasible world.' The lectures afford not a few glimpses into Mr. Eliot's own mind and are provocative as well as profoundly suggestive.

The Universe Around Us. By Sir James Jeans. (Cambridge University Press. 12s. 6d.)

This is a third edition, revised and enlarged, of a book which had an extraordinary and well-earned success on both sides of the Atlantic. Since the second edition appeared in October, 1930, in which Sir James inserted discussions on the new planet Pluto, the rotation of the galaxy and the apparent expansion of the universe, three eventful years have elapsed. 'At the sub-atomic end of the scale of Nature, the uncharged neutron and the positively charged electron have been discovered—in a world which had hitherto been believed to consist

solely of positively-charged protons and negatively-charged electrons.' Much new knowledge has also been gained on the expansion of the universe and cosmic radiation, as well as a large mass of observational material and new spectroscopic methods for investigating the constitution and relation of the stars. That material has been used to enlarge the scope of the book and gives this third edition new importance. It is much enlarged and puts all the latest research into this fascinating subject at the service of students.

A Guide to the Sky. By E. Agar Beet. (Cambridge University Press. 4s. 6d.)

This book is not only intended to be read but also to serve as a guide for those who wish to make personal experiments in studying the movements of the heavenly bodies. It begins with the constellations, giving plates to show their formation and direction as to the way to find them in the sky. The legends about them are told in a way that adds greatly to the interest of the study. We then follow the wandering stars, learn how to use a telescope and camera and have directions as to the best books for further study. Seven appendices give tables of the Solar System, explanations of 'right ascension and declination' and other points. The plates are wonderfully clear and helpful and there are maps of the Zodiac, of the moon, of the southern sky, and a most ingenious one of our own sky. Directions are given for making sketch maps and personal experiments. All who are interested in Astronomy, young and old, will find this book remarkably complete and instructive.

Public and Private Morality. By R. B. Mowat. (London: Arrowsmith. 3s. 6d.)

This little book is one of a commendable series published by Arrowsmith to present the story of the development of the States of the world. Here an attempt is made, and a successful one, to show the difference between the high standard of morality held up as the ideal of private conduct, and the ignoring of morality frequently permitted to nations. Professor Mowat does not mince matters. Convinced that modern State life is immoral, he has little hope of the world achieving a decent destiny. The subject is treated historically, with emphasis on recent history. Greece and Rome and the Middle Ages are examined and excused culpability. The root of the evil is found in the Machiavellian doctrine of State-sovereignty, and its persistence is noted in the eighteenth century and on, with the not too justifiable exception of the years 1815-1853, to the most immoral period of 1856-1871. The following years contain little or no evidence of change until the coming of the League of Nations in 1919. The League is whole-heartedly welcomed as 'a supreme moral force.' On the other hand, Tariffs, regarded as immoral, and Nationalism, described as just ordinary human selfishness on a national scale, are strongly condemned, and encourage the judgement that modern States, in their public life, adopt standards different from and lower than the standards of private morality. That high standards of private morality

are not always acted upon is admitted, but, it is argued, even when not acted upon they are acknowledged, whereas modern States neither acknowledge these standards nor act upon them. For this state of things politicians, clergy, journalists and teachers are regarded as being largely responsible, 'having constantly obscured the moral issue'—especially the teachers. The book raises the important question as to whether or not standards of private morality can be applied to public affairs. If they cannot, that is the end of the matter and of other things, too. If they can, it is very difficult to escape Professor Mowat's conclusions. Any hesitation to do so is due only to a lack of fuller consideration of the consequences, in however small a measure, of sacrificing national interests. People must be persuaded that something done by a State for the world's good really means, in the long run, something for the good of such a State. Professor Mowat believes this, but it must be adequately stated and, if at all possible, proved to the unconverted. Present State immorality means ultimately world disaster. State life conducted on the high standards of private morality will often mean the sacrificing of some national interest. Modern States and their peoples must decide which is the better way, and they must see, a little more fully and clearly than Professor Mowat presents them, the likely consequences of their choice. This is a stimulating and important little book. Rarely have we read such a pungent, penetrating, unequivocal, discerning, yet withal, constructive criticism of modern State life.

T. W. BEVAN.

An Essay on Philosophical Method. By R. G. Collingwood. (Oxford. The Clarendon Press. 10s.)

Mr. Collingwood's presentation is technical, but it is direct, and an excellent summary helps the reader to grasp his point, and then, by turning to the book itself, to trace out the arguments by which the point is established. Philosophy differs from poetry, as Mr. Collingwood points out, in the fact that the theory of poetry is not part of poetry, whereas the theory of philosophy is essentially part of philosophy. The philosopher must study the nature of philosophy as part of his task as a philosopher, and the best way, according to Mr. Collingwood, is by a study of philosophical method. One may add that, later in the book, Mr. Collingwood has some very illuminating words about the kinship of philosophy and poetry, since philosophy is prose which comes nearest to being poetry in that it is the expression of experience. In the Platonic dialogues, for example, 'philosophies come to life as dramatic characters' in a style that would be wholly unfitting in history or in science. The good listener is quiet to be attentive, and Mr. Collingwood demands the same qualification from the reader of philosophy, in order that he may not obtrude his own view to the misunderstanding of his author's. The section on philosophy as a branch of literature is an outstanding part of Mr. Collingwood's book. Another very interesting point is Mr. Collingwood's appreciation of the ontological argument, which after being left in the shadows

ever since Kant made it a jest, is coming back to its own. For philosophy, essence and existence, however clearly distinguished, are inseparable and one agrees with Mr. Collingwood that, whilst Anselm's argument does not yield a conclusion that gives what Theism needs, it does express the conviction of philosophy that its subject matter is existent. The more technical parts of the essay will be a severe discipline to those to whom philosophical theory is unfamiliar, but to others, they will appear to be more lucid than most similar attempts, and despite a few points on which one could pick a quarrel with Mr. Collingwood, the book as a whole is a stimulating and excellent example of what it professes to be.

E. S. W.

Outlines of Indian Philosophy. By M. Hiriyanna, M.A. (Allen & Unwin. 15s.)

Students of Indian philosophy will have reason to be grateful to Professor Hiriyanna for a convenient summary of the main lines of Hindu thought. He divides them into three periods, the Vedic, the early Post-Vedic and the Age of the Systems, and explains them with great succinctness and (so far as a layman can judge) with accuracy. The book is one which needs a teacher behind it, for it is neither so full as to explain itself nor so pithy as to be untechnical. In spite of the author's attempts to be plain, the great number of unfamiliar terms must be bewildering to a Western reader, who will also find it necessary to fill in these bald outlines with material from such great histories as those of Radhakrishnan and Deussen. A book which ends with the theism of Ramanuja, moreover, can hardly be said to give a complete outline of Indian philosophy; it needs to be supplemented by references to modern thought. However, within its limits and for its purposes as a textbook, it is likely to prove very serviceable. It is a welcome sign that Indian philosophy is reviving, and that it is being written by Indians.

ATKINSON LEE.

Experience and its Modes. By Michael Oakeshott. (Cambridge University Press. 15s.)

Mr. Oakeshott, who is one of the younger philosophers at Cambridge, has written a most interesting book. And, what is not always the case with philosophers, he has written it in such a fashion that it may be read by the man who is not conversant with the technical terms of his field. He has a light touch, and a pretty wit, which enlivens many of his pages. That is not to say the book is easy reading. Much of it requires hard thinking if it is to be appreciated. But more than most philosophical books that come before the lay reader it will disclose the author's position if the reader will give patience to its study. In his introduction the author defines his conception of philosophy—'philosophical knowledge is knowledge which carries with it the evidence of its own completeness.' The idea that philosophy is a kind of encyclopædic knowledge is treated with merited scorn, and

the notion that we may find a gospel in philosophy repudiated. 'Instead of a gospel, the most philosophy can offer us . . . is an escape.' The author then devotes four full sections of his argument to the consideration of *Experience and its Modes*, *Historical Experience*, *Scientific Experience*, and *Practical Experience*. Finally he gathers together the result of his argument in a concluding section that sets forth in outline the position he is advocating. We are bound to say, as is nearly always the case when we read a discussion of this kind, or a play of Shaw's, the criticism of other positions makes more appeal than the positive contribution. For Mr. Oakeshott 'experience is always a world,' and this world, moreover, is 'always and everywhere a world of ideas.' 'Truth is the world of experience as a coherent whole; nothing else is true, and there is no criterion of truth other than this coherence.' No separation is possible between experience and reality because nothing but the world of experience is real. On one side of the argument by which the author supports his conclusions the Methodist might suppose himself to have found a helpful ally. According to Mr. Oakeshott our religion is our way of living; though we may profess another religion altogether. He has a good word to say for quietism, which is 'no less a way of living than the most febrile activity.' Where many of us will find the author's doctrine hard is his utter rejection of the idea that what is true in religion must be true ultimately. If we have rightly understood his message it amounts to a restatement of the ancient proposition that all is vanity. Nor will the philosopher in most cases take much pleasure in Mr. Oakeshott. For he will not like the suggestion that philosophy is the surrender of all abstract points of view, and the conclusion that all attempts to find some practical justification for philosophical thought are misguided will hardly be rolled under the tongue as a sweet morsel. But one dictum commends itself to the present reviewer—'we should listen to philosophers only when they talk philosophy.'

An Idealist View of Life. By S. Radhakrishnan. (Allen & Unwin. 12s. 6d.)

A few years ago a distinguished-looking Indian, covered with a turban, delivered to English audiences lectures upon philosophy and religion. Those who heard him remarked upon the excellence of his English, the rapidity of his thought, and the fullness of his knowledge. These qualities are maintained in the printed form of the lectures, which give a survey of various forms of thought held in the present day. First of all the modern challenge to religion is faithfully described, then various substitutes for religion are considered and found to lack the spiritual note. The claims of religion to regenerate man's nature are put forward and found to be justified in experience, the mode of reaching the end—salvation—being, however, ascribed to intuition rather than to reason. Consequently the defects of science are not hard to see, and the need of a vision of ultimate reality by mystical insight maintained. This conclusion is reached by a swift and searching

examination of modern life, whether Eastern or Western, and supported by an almost incredible amount of learning at easy command. The result is idealistic and even theistic, though it coincides with no dogmatic religion. The work may be heartily commended for its freshness of presentation and its depth of insight into what is a perennial form of religion.

ATKINSON LEE.

Lucretius on the Problem of Existence. By Arthur S. Way. (Macmillan & Co. 5s.)

The reading of this new version of *Lucretius* rekindled an old interest and disclosed new beauties in the great Latin poet. In his introduction Dr. Arthur S. Way reminds us that it is to this Roman disciple of Epicurus we are indebted for preserving the 'salient features' of the philosophy of both Epicurus and Democritus—two of the greatest Greek masters. Some time ago W. H. Mallock rendered *Lucretius on Life and Death* in the attractive metre of Omar Khayyám. Dr. Way's however, is more comprehensive. He begins with Books I and II, in which Lucretius unfolds the Atomic Theory of Democritus, and translates also Books III-VI, based on the physical and moral doctrines of Epicurus, which treat of man and his destiny, and of the universe. Lucretius conceived it his mission to 'tell of noble themes' and to snap the chains of superstition 'that bind man's heart at will.' As a scientific thinker he was clearly in advance of his time and 'anticipated in the germ' many conclusions of modern science. Indeed, considering the limited knowledge of his age, W. H. Mallock deems Lucretius to be as completely and as consciously a scientific man and a physicist as Darwin, or Huxley, or any of their contemporary evolutionists. Dr. Way supplements this view: 'The atomic theory, the doctrines of evolution and the survival of the fittest, of the development of primitive man and his social relations, are all among his unverifiable speculations.' Lucretius, like many other pathfinders and pioneers, suffered from the neglect of his contemporaries. It is said that Lucretius 'denied divinely the divine.' Lytton, in a vivid phrase, sums up his teaching on human destiny in a reference to him as the man who gave the black creed of Nothing in the tomb. Cicero, writing probably ten or a dozen years after Lucretius wrote his great poem, scorned the idea that death marked the dissolution of the soul. Unlike Lucretius, he believed that whatever feels, wills, has knowledge and the power of growth, to be 'celestial and divine,' and for this reason 'must of necessity be eternal.' And his critical attitude to the poem is summed up in the declaration: 'I find there are few gleams of philosophical insight, though there are many of poetic talent.' Lucretius takes high rank as a poet. Among competent critics there is a consensus of opinion regarding his merit: Munro holds that he is perhaps the greatest of extant Latin poets and thinks his genius akin to Milton's. Another claims that Lucretius stands alone as the great contemplative poet of antiquity. He has dignity, moral elevation and a sense of the beautiful and the sublime. He also reveals a graphic

art in depicting nature-scenes and in interpreting nature's moods. He sees 'the storm-cloud's sable pall'

Blackening afar with its burden of darkness and drag in its train
A murky tempest with thunderbolts charged with cataract rain.

Indeed he had a special interest in clouds and storms, in lightnings and thunderbolts. He sees the gathering clouds like 'battalions of darkness' driven as they crowd all the vaults of heaven:

So fast, so far, outstarting from hideous night of cloud,
Glare those swart faces of horror from that overpalling shroud,
When the tempest forging his thunderbolts smites on his anvil loud.

He describes the genesis of lightning—how the 'fire atoms roll together from the dense cloud-rack':

And round those cavernous furnaces whirl their flame about
Till the flanks of the cloud are rifted, and flash forked splendours out.
Hence comes it withal that down to the earth from the troubled skies
Yon golden glory of liquid fire with winged speed flies.

He fires the imagination—so vivid are his descriptions. You see the lightning flash, are awed by the crash of thunder and thrill to see 'the shattered realms of the rifted sky.' But he does not believe lightning to be the weapon of gods. He reveals also a tender humanity as in his description of the cow seeking her lost calf. A commendable feature is a synopsis of passages sublime and beautiful. In his translation of *Lucretius*, the late Dr. Arthur S. Way proved himself both scholar and poet.

B. AQUILA BARBER.

Problems of Peace. Eighth Series. (Published for the Committee of International Relations by Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 8s. 6d.)

This is a careful study of current problems of international interest. It consists of fourteen lectures delivered at the Geneva Institute of International Relations in August, 1933. As in previous series the international team of lecturers was well chosen, many of them being recognized authorities in their subjects. Professor Gilbert Murray, in a survey of recent world affairs, comments on the failures of the World Economic Conference and on the League's handling of the Manchurian problem. In the latter instance he speaks of a bad defeat for civilization, but a defeat in a territory which until 1919 civilization would never have dared to occupy. He holds out some hope of partial success in the Disarmament Conference. Professor William E. Rappard's judgement is: 'Three major attempts, three major failures.' But it is not internationalism that has failed, rather contemporary statesmen. Mr. W. Arnold-Forster deals with disarmament and security, and M. Henri Rolin says some disquieting things about the manufacture of arms and the arms traffic. Recent events in the Far East and in America—North and South—are surveyed. The Gold

Standard and Economic Policies are appraised. Possible International co-ordination of public works is discussed. The concluding lecture is by Dr. C. De Lisle Burns on 'Authority and Force in the State System.' Its thesis is that before there is world peace *moral* authority must be reinforced in our State system by the creation of a new belief in the common good. The student of world affairs cannot afford to miss this book, but the layman need not be repelled by the fear of academism. It is eminently readable.

W. R. CHAPMAN.

Shakesperian Scraps and other Elizabethan Fragments. By Samuel A. Tannenbaum. (H. Milford. 20s.)

This publication of the Columbia University Press makes a strong appeal to Shakesperian students. It is an investigation of forged entries and documents which poisoned the original sources and have left a 'shadow of doubt which clouds the way of those who would explore the intricate paths of Tudor-Stuart dramatic history.' John Payne Collier is here described as the chief offender. He had gained an unsurpassed reputation as a student of the period and then 'began to fabricate entries and even whole documents, which he craftily planted in the larger libraries and occasionally in the archives of the government, to be later "discovered" and published by him to the confusion of more conscientious labourers in the field.' Dr. Tannenbaum examines the subject as a trained handwriting expert and seeks by identifying the hands in genuine manuscripts to throw light upon the problems of authorship. He thus brings out the value of a knowledge of paleography and bibliotics for students of Elizabethan literature. The first of the eleven papers deals with 'The Norman Notes on Shakespeare' which Collier said one of his friends had discovered among the Ashmolean MSS. in the Bodleian Library. Dr. Tannenbaum examines Collier's statements and concludes that he was really insane. The conditions then existing at the Bodleian were also inconceivable, and favoured Collier's fraud. Unprincipled persons were able to tamper with, mutilate, and even remove books and manuscripts. Dr. Tannenbaum shows how the forgery, of which he has no doubt, could be carried out. The second subject investigated is Collier's note as to the authorship of *The Lamentable Tragedy of Iocrine*. He adduced a note by Sir George Buck as evidence, but investigation under the microscope shows that 'many of the letters, the mode of linking them to one another, the shading, &c., do not reproduce Sir George's writing habits.' The note is a forgery and it is more than highly probable that Collier was the forger. The full extent of his forgeries will probably never be known. 'In some instances, he was content to adulterate a document merely by the insertion of a few words, in some cases he may have torn away portions of a document which did not suit his purpose; in other cases he concocted matter which no one would think sufficiently important to investigate; in still others he boldly invented documents whose authenticity could not be impugned because of the absence of an unquestionable

standard for comparison, and so forth. In some instances the alleged "find" disappeared after the announced discovery, so that it became impossible for other scholars to make a study of it.' Sixteen plates make it possible to follow the discussions of the text, and the ample notes add to the critical value of the work.

The Dancing Floor. By John Buchan. (4s. 6d.) This is No. 18 in Messrs. Nelson's Uniform edition of Mr. Buchan's Works. It was first printed in July, 1926, and had to be reprinted eleven times that year. The plot hinges on a young fellow's nightmare which has a strange sequel in a Greek island where a girl is nearly made a martyr. It is a story that grips one's imagination and the way in which Arabin wins her life and her lover is a series of marvels. Vernon is an heroic champion, but Miss Arabin is not less brave and resourceful.—*Out went the Taper.* By R. C. Ashby. (Hodder and Stoughton. 7s. 6d.) This is a story of ghosts and criminals in the Welsh mountains with a ruined monastery as the hiding-place for diamonds and tangled mysteries of crime. Nothing could be more sensational, more full of adventures in which ghosts and thieves make life a horror to the rector and his family and the plucky Rhodes Scholar who brings his American wits to bear on a series of plots and evil deeds that keep a reader's imagination on full stretch to the last. The end is a triumph for justice, and though the Rhodes Scholar is impatient with its leisurely methods he finds that its officers know how to strike and how to master a set of horrible rascals.—*Spindrift.* Lyrics by Anne Macdonald. With eight illustrations by John G. Mathieson. (Methuen & Co. 3s. 6d.) It is certainly dainty work which weds rich thought to melodious verse. Every lyric has its own grace and some have a welcome touch of pathos like 'Pibroch,' with the light gleaming out from the Isle of Rest as a signal, 'Boatman, bring home your dead.' The Song, 'Love went past! Love—with a rose in her hair' has its own charm, and Mr. Mathieson's etchings give additional pleasure to the poems by their own witchery.—*Determinism, Indeterminism, and Libertarianism.* By C. D. Broad. (Cambridge University Press. 2s. 6d.) This is an Inaugural Lecture by the Knightsbridge Professor of Moral Philosophy on the implications of obligability with all that it involves. It is an admirable illustration of philosophic method with its exact definition of terms and its regard to conditions which modify our judgements. Dr. Broad holds it 'highly probable that the notion of categorical obligability is a delusive notion, which neither has nor can have any application.'—*How to Debate and the Science of Argument.* By H. M. Barron, B.A. (Stockwell. 1s.) This little book follows Mr. Barron's *How to Argue*. It points out that the first thing needed is to remove confusions and misunderstandings and shows that the method of argument is largely determined by the subject discussed. The argument from silence is explained, and there are many hints which young speakers will find really helpful.

Periodical Literature

BRITISH

Hibbert Journal (January).—Mr. Channing-Pearce discusses the 'Theology of Crisis.' Barth in each successive edition of his *Romans* has to some extent 'modified earlier extremities of thought and expression or abandoned positions, mostly inessential, which, on more mature consideration, he has found untenable. But the gist of his argument and the force of his challenge remain unabated.' Miss Emmet's 'Philosophy of Civilization' is based on Professor Whitehead's *Adventure of Ideas* which is 'perhaps the most delightful and readable of his books.' 'Psycho-analysis and Psycho-synthesis' by Dr. Assagioli of Rome is a full and careful study of the whole subject. Mr. Rynd, lately reader in the Temple, gives the impressions of an impartial observer at various Group meetings at an International Congress in Oxford. They are not very decisive but hold that if the roots of the Movement go deeper into the spiritual consciousness of those who make use of it, 'it may well bring a much-needed message to this distracted age.' 'The Young Man's World' by the Vicar of Wisborough Green, Sussex, deserves to be read with attention, so also do Mr. Montefiore's 'Jewish Emancipation and the English Jew.' and Mrs. Elton's 'Louisa Alcott and her father.'

Expository Times (December).—Dr. Lynn Hough writes on the Message of *Colossians*. St. Paul is here free from limitations. His mind is in full flight. He was profoundly stirred by Rome where the life of all mankind seemed to spread before him. That was the life which must be completely transformed by the mighty religion of which he was an ambassador in chains. The Epistle to the Colossians insists that 'only a tremendous Christ can meet the need of this strange creature man.' Dr. C. J. Wright's *Meaning and Message of the Fourth Gospel* is heartily welcomed. It places in our hands 'a Gospel that can be fearlessly used, and fruitfully applied to meet religious and intellectual needs.' Dr. Moffatt writes on Jerome's letters to Marcella. (January).—The Editorial Notes on Barth's *Theological Existence To-day*; Dr. Macdonald's *Hebrew Literary Genius*; and Professor Grensted's *Person of Christ* are of special interest. 'Local colour in Proto-Luke' comes from the Jerusalem School of Missions, and shows how many scenes are fragrant with the atmosphere of the Holy Land. Dr. James Reid's exposition of *Philemon* is very suggestive, and the article on the Servant passages in *Isaiah* should not be overlooked. (February).—The notes of Recent Exposition deal with Dr. Kennett's *The Church of Israel*, Professor Rock's *Conversion* and 'The Young Man's World' in the *Hibbert Journal*. Professor H. C. MacGregor's article on 'Recent Criticism and our Approach to the Life of Jesus' refers to the collapse of many

'assured results' of nineteenth-century source-criticism. 'To-day we are more humble.' Mark and Q remain as the two fundamental sources for the life and teaching of Jesus. We now go back to the pre-history of the Gospel literature. Dr. Vincent Taylor's *The Formation of the Gospel Tradition* is referred to as 'a brilliant exposition from the positive angle of the new criticism' which he describes as 'the child of disappointment' who tries to make up for 'its parents' despair, that purely literary source-criticism can even reach back nearer the "beginnings" behind the two fundamental documentary sources, Mark and Q.'

Journal of Theological Studies (January).—Dr. G. A. Cooke says 'Walter Lock' was compelled to concentrate on teaching, and no teacher of the New Testament exercised more influence upon the generations that came under his instruction. His lectures as Dean Ireland Professor of Exegesis (1895-1919) were as effective as any delivered in the Theological Faculty. He feared the consequences of Biblical Criticism for the faith of the average man, and was unwilling to take risks, but as editor of the *Westminster Commentaries* he found it possible to be both true to the faith and open-minded in criticism. 'Up to the end he continued to grow in courage and breadth of outlook; and it is only the finest type of mind which does that.' The Notes and Studies and Reviews are varied and valuable.

Congregational Quarterly (January).—The Editor's extracts from Mr. Birrell's letters to him are of special interest. Professor Raven in 'Immortality and Eternal Life' says it is the plain teaching of both the Sermon on the Mount and the Message of the Kingdom that 'life, apart from God, has no abiding quality; it is mere wastage—lost and destructible.' 'Man's real life depends wholly on his relationship to God.' Mr. B. L. Manning in 'Does this Generation need the Gospel?' says, 'We have precisely what this age requires; a motive of gratitude for an age of disillusioned benevolence and a resurrection from the dead for a generation that fears death so much as to pretend it is not there.' Dr. Cadoux writes on 'Jesus and the Problem of Prayer,' Mr. Llewellyn Pourys on 'Cardinal Newman.' It is a varied and stimulating number.

Church Quarterly Review (January).—'Spiritual Healing,' by Douglas McLaren, is largely concerned with the teaching of Mr. Hickson who died after this wise criticism had been written. 'The Rejected Christ' by Wilfrid Richmond, shows how in *St. John* 'the gospel of rejection becomes the gospel of glory.' 'John Bramhall,' by Charles Nye, pays tribute to one of the great Episcopal figures of the seventeenth century. The short article on 'Church Crises in Germany' throws welcome light on the subject.

British Journal of Inebriety (January).—Dr. Carter writes on 'Paradehyde Addiction,' which is rare, but which he has had special opportunity for observing. He is convinced that the special drug

is not of so much importance as the addict, who counts for almost everything. Most addicts 'desire freedom from the slavery and misery of addiction,' and Dr. Carter sounds a grave warning to the medical profession and to chemists as to exercising 'adequate care when liberating addiction drugs to the public.'

John Ryland's Library Bulletin (January).—Warm tribute is paid to Professor Conway who made Manchester a centre of Vergilian study. The list of publications added to the Library since the last *Bulletin* appeared is nothing less than astonishing. The lectures on 'Shakespeare's Jew' by Professor Charlton and on 'The Mind of Paul' by Professor Dodd, 'Some Early Letters of Mark Pattison' and 'Unpublished Letters of Arthur Hallam' from Eton are some of the treasures of this fine number.

AMERICAN

Harvard Theological Review.—The final issue for 1933 is a double number almost entirely devoted to an encyclopædic article (pp. 173-321) by Professor Gustav Krüger, of Giessen. It is entitled 'A Decade of Research in Early Christian Literature, 1921-1930,' the survey being limited, however, to the field of patriotic literature in which for almost half a century Dr. Krüger has specialized. Much more than an exceedingly valuable Bibliography is given; the material is sifted, brief digests of the contents of the various works being added, and frequently longer discussions furnish the student with the trustworthy guidance of an expert in Church History. Koch is described as 'one of the best equipped scholars in Early Christian Literature'; of Tertullian and Cyprian he has made special study. His discussion of passages in Cyprian often adduced in support of the Roman primacy is 'especially telling.' The usual interpretation of *matrix et radix catholicae ecclesiae* regards the words as referring to the Roman Church as the mother of the Churches; but this 'finds no support in the whole body of Early Christian Literature'; that it 'can be read into Cyprian only by misunderstanding seems now to be established beyond doubt.'

Religion in Life (Winter Number).—John Oman heads a distinguished list of contributors. His subject is 'Honest Religion.' 'In religion we must be as bold, as free, as honest, as prepared to face all realities as in science or philosophy.' Rufus M. Jones builds an article on Clement of Alexandria's phrase 'mutual and reciprocal correspondence.' 'Religion in its deepest significance may turn out to be mutual and reciprocal correspondence between the soul and its invisible environment.' 'Adventures in Altruism' gives some striking incidents of attempts at evangelism. 'The Functions of Counseling'; 'The Devotional Life of the Minister'; and John S. Zelig's 'To the tune of Hursley,' a bright account of a visit to Keble's parish, will be read with pleasure. 'Immortality of the Unfit' gives a series of replies to the question, 'What becomes of the clearly unfit in the future life'?

The Rev. Umphrey Lee describes Maldwyn Edwards' *John Wesley and the Eighteenth Century* as the best work on the subject.

Journal of Education (January).—This number is given up to a series of addresses delivered last summer at the University of Chicago on 'Modern Trends in World Religions.' The discussion was limited to six great religions—Hinduism, Confucianism, Buddhism, Judaism, Islam and Christianity. The object was to gain a real idea of the position of each religion. They indicated that the leaders of the great religions are approaching a consensus as to the vital questions of living in the world to-day. 'This awakening of old religions to play a directing rôle in the drama of the new age is one of the most interesting phases of our time.'

Colegate-Rochester Bulletin (October and November) has important articles on the Old Testament in Modern Education; What did Primitive Christianity owe to the religions of India? and The Coming Christianity, which Mr. Barry believes will, more than ever, be a 'religion of the spirit, a religion of freedom, reflecting the Spirit of Christ, transforming individuals and the world.'

FOREIGN

Analecta Bollandiana (J. Tomus LI—Fasc. III et IV).—A Greek Life of Pope Martin I, by Paul Peeters, has the first place in this impressive number. The Life has been almost forgotten, but the Greek text is here given with a French epitome of each chapter and valuable exposition. M. Delehaye's subject is the Letters of Constantine Acropolita with notes on the Ambrosian Codex where they appear. Other papers deal with the relics of S. Ouen at Canterbury, with the birthplace of S. Emilien of Cogolla, the prophecy of S. Malachie on Ireland and the Eucharistic Miracle of Brussels.

The Moslem World (January).—Dr. Zwener writes on 'The Fourth Religion of China.' The religion of the masses includes elements of ancient animism, Confucian philosophy and ethics, as well as Taoist superstition and Buddhist idolatry. More than seven millions of the people are Mohammedans. Islam has been in China for more than a thousand years and has penetrated each of the nineteen provinces. The article describes Dr. Zwener's personal experiences in China. Other articles deal with Mohammed's call; The Modern Press in Persia; Magic Cures in Popular Islam and kindred subjects.

Arquivos da Assistencia a Psicopatas de Pernambuco (April).—This is a report issued every six months under the direction of the Psicopatas Assistencia. It covers psychology, mental hygiene and other matters. There is a portrait of Professor Juliana Moreira whose death is a severe loss to the Brazilian School of which he was the founder. He was a scholar of national reputation. Other photographs and accounts of the work accomplished add much to the interest of the report.